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FOREWORD
Evan Wright1
On behalf of Lincoln Memorial University’s Duncan
School of Law, the Law Review Editorial Board would like to
extend the warmest welcome to our Volume 4 readers. For the
2016-2017 academic year, the Law Review underwent some
significant changes. We welcomed new faculty advisors,
Professor Akraim Faizer2 and Professor William Gill, 3 to our
team, and said farewell to Academic Dean Matt Lyon, who had
provided leadership and insight to the Law Review staff. We
cannot thank him enough for his hard work and dedication.
Professors Faizer and Gill will further develop the Law
Review’s scholarship, focusing on academic excellence and
advancing positive change throughout our community.
No discussion of change at the Duncan School of Law
would be complete without acknowledging the contributions of
former Tennessee Supreme Court Chief Justice Gary Wade.
Evan Wright, Juris Doctor Candidate (2017) and Editor in Chief of
the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review.
2 See Akraim Faizer, Exacerbating the Divide: Why the Roberts Court’s
Recent Same-Sex Jurisprudence is an Improvident Use of the Court’s
Judicial Review Power, 24 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395 (2014).
3 See William Gill, A Tale of Two Ironies: In Defense of Tort, 25 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 343 (2012) (with David Partlett).
1
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Having grown up in rural Appalachia, 4 Dean Wade knows
exactly what the mission of this law school means to this region.
During his tenure, Dean Wade has fostered positive change that
will reverberate for years to come. The Law Review Board
recognizes these accomplishments, and we are excited about
future developments, including Lincoln Memorial University’s
partnership with East Tennessee Legal Aid. Together we can be
an instrument of positive change in the world around us.
Volume 4 will mark a new era for LMU. We now publish
online articles in a new rolling format, issuing an article or
articles monthly to disperse quality scholarship at times more
relevant to the subject matter. No longer will submissions set
dormant waiting to proceed through the various stages of the
publication and printing process. Each academic semester will
feature several articles comprising an issue, each academic year
corresponding to a Volume. As the Law Review develops this
process, articles will gravitate toward fresh, relevant material
elevating the scholarship of this journal.
The Editorial Board would also like to show our
gratitude to those who came before us. Volume 4, Issue 1 will
contain four articles that the 2015-2016 Editorial Board worked
diligently to develop. In addition, two of these articles are
authored by our former Editor in Chief, Jacob Baggett. 5 Both
submissions elevated the level of scholarship and dedication
expected of future students submitting Notes to this
publication.
In conclusion, we hope Volume 4’s new rolling
publication meets and exceeds our reader’s expectations. For
potential authors, we look forward to publishing submissions
earlier, presenting your scholarship to others fresh and
untainted by the passage of time. We endeavor to effectuate
4See

DUNCAN SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://law.lmunet.edu/2015/07/28/tenn-supreme-court-justicegary-r-wade-to-be-dean-of-lmu-law/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2009).
5Jacob Baggett, Juris Doctor (2015) and former Editor-in-Chief of the
Lincoln Memorial University Law Review.
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positive change in our region, the legal community, and the
entire world around us. If you would like to become part of our
mission, please submit your article to our board for review, and
together we can elevate the world around us.

IN RE BABY: BLESSING OR PROBLEM
CHILD?
Jacob Baggett1
“I got into this because the O’Briens needed my help. I never
wanted a baby, but now . . . I just wish I could hold him in my
arms, and never let him go.”

Major Kira to Odo, discussing her surrogacy, Star Trek: Deep
Space Nine: Season 5, ep. 12, “The Begotten”

INTRODUCTION

From legal and sociological perspectives, surrogacy
arrangements, along with the accompanying contracts, remain
hot topics of debate. In addition to a colorful body of
jurisprudence, a New York Times article from September 2014
reported a story in which intended parents attempted to bribe
a Connecticut surrogate to undergo an abortion procedure after
having learned the developing fetus had heart and brain defects
as well as a cleft palate. 2 Refusing to either accept the bribe or

1 Jacob Baggett, Juris Doctor (2015) and former Editor-in-Chief of the
Lincoln Memorial University Law Review.
2 Tamar Lewin, Surrogates and Couples Face a Maze of Laws, State by
State, N.Y. TIMES, September 17, 2014, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/us/surrogates-and-couplesface-a-maze-of-laws-state-by-state.html?smprod=nytcoreiphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0. The article was

IN RE BABY: BLESSING OR PROBLEM CHILD?

5

undergo the abortion procedure, the surrogate fled to
Michigan, where surrogacy contracts are illegal. 3
The birth certificate listed the surrogate as the child’s
mother, despite the fact the surrogate had no genetic connection
with the child. 4 Eventually, a family with other special-needs
children adopted the child. 5 The New York Times article also
provided several state-by-state diagrams which illustrated the
complex legal landscape concerning surrogacy, aptly calling it
a “maze.” 6 Tennessee’s lack of statutory guidance regarding
surrogacy issues creates one of the dead ends within this
nationwide maze.
Since the mid-1990’s, the Tennessee General Assembly
has remained entrenched in neutrality with regard to issues
terms the parties’ surrogacy agreement may legally contain. Of
these issues, the most heavily emphasized was public policy.
Part One of this note discusses the relevant surrogacy
arrangement terminology and outlines key statutes and cases
detailing the nationwide legal maze of surrogacy. Part Two
discusses the facts giving rise to Baby, the sources of Tennessee
law examined, and the Court’s analysis and holdings in Baby.
Finally, Part Three examines Louisiana’s legislative efforts as a
case study exhibiting the various difficulties legislatures may
experience when addressing surrogacy issues. These
difficulties may lead a state’s highest court to determine it has
an obligation to act. The Tennessee Supreme Court did.

PART ONE: BACKGROUND
I. TERMINOLOGY OF SURROGACY AGREEMENTS

published one day before the Tennessee Supreme Court released its
opinion in In re Baby).
3 Id.; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 7.22.851- .863 (West 2013).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
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This note concerns two types of surrogacy arrangements:
and
gestational. 8
Traditional
surrogacy
traditional 7
arrangements involve a woman, the surrogate mother, whose
egg is fertilized by means of artificial insemination and the
surrogate mother carries the fetus until birth for the benefit of
another. 9 On the other hand, a gestational surrogacy
arrangement involves the intended mother supplying her egg
to be transferred, housed, artificially inseminated, and the fetus
carried to term by another woman, the surrogate mother. 10
Gestational surrogate mothers have no genetic connection with
the fetus. 11 However, in traditional surrogacy arrangements,
the surrogate mother and the fetus are genetically connected. 12
It is this genetic connection which often ignites legal flames
because the corresponding rights, if extinguished, must occur
by proper legal procedure. 13
A number of legal commentators have professed that
gestational surrogacy “has rendered traditional surrogacy
obsolete and unnecessary.” 14 So, why do people continue to
enter into traditional surrogacy arrangements when the
gestational counterpart completely avoids the legal issues
regarding the unborn’s genetic connection with the surrogate
mother? The reasons are numerous.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1582 (9th ed. 2009); see also In re C.K.G.,
173 S.W.3d 714, 720 (Tenn. 2005).
8 See In re F.T.R. 833 N.W.2d 634, 643 (Wis. 2013); 7 Samuel Williston,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 16:22 (Richard A. Lord ed.,
4th ed. 1992 & Supp. 2013); Christen Blackburn, Note, Family Law—
Who Is A Mother? Determining Legal Maternity in Surrogacy
Arrangements in Tennessee, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 349, 352 (2009) (also
identifies and defines donative surrogacy which involves creating an
embryo from the genetic contribution of one intended parent with
that of an unknown donor’s egg or sperm).
9 See In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d at 720.
10 See id.
11 Id.
12 See id.
13 See Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *5.
14 Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the
Millennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating “Non-Traditional”
Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 690 (2000).
7
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First, artificial insemination, the medical procedure
utilized in traditional surrogacy, 15 is a relatively simple
procedure which may be performed in the home. 16 The
procedure involves using sperm, typically of the intended
father, to impregnate the surrogate mother. 17 As a result, it is
significantly less expensive than in vitro fertilization, the
procedure used to initiate a gestational surrogacy. 18 The low
cost and relative convenience of artificial insemination make it
an attractive method for many surrogates and intended
parents. 19
Second, there are high success rates among surrogates
with proven fertility, and the time between a failed artificial
insemination attempt and the time another attempt may be
made is a matter of weeks. 20 Conversely, in vitro fertilization,
the time between implantation attempts often takes months. 21
Third, perhaps the most pertinent benefit of the traditional
arrangement is the safety of both the mother and the unborn. 22
“The main risk to the [gestational] surrogate comes from the
pregnancy itself, especially if she is required to carry multiple
babies[.]” 23
Additionally, gestational surrogates are administered a
cocktail of prescription medications not involved in traditional
Intrauterine (Artificial) Insemination (IUI),
http://www.nyufertilitycenter.org/infertility_treatment/artificial_i
nsemination (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).
16 Gestational vs. Traditional Surrogacy: A Comparative Study,
http://www.surrogatemothers.org/ gestational-vs-traditionalsurrogacy-a-comparative-study (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
17 Id.
18 Gestational vs. Traditional Surrogacy, supra note 16.
19 Ashok Agarwal & Shyam S. R. Allamaneni, Chapter 36: Artificial
Insemination, Section 6: Infertility and Recurrent Pregnancy Loss
(Jan. 23, 2007),
http://www.clevelandclinic.org/ReproductiveResearchCenter/.../
agrach019.pdf.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 The Center for Bioethics and Culture Network, Drugs Commonly
Used for Women in Gestational Surrogacy Pregnancies,
http://breeders.cbc-network.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/Drugs-Commonly-Used-for-Women-inGestational-Surrogacy-Pregnancies.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
23 Id.
15
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arrangements. 24 Some of these medications come with
potentially significant side effects. 25 In preparation for embryo
transfer, the surrogate is administered hormones which inhibit
the brain from secreting the natural hormones that control the
menstrual cycle. 26 “The woman is put into a ‘medical
menopause,’ so that the ovaries stop functioning and her
menstrual cycle can be completely controlled[.]” 27 One of these
hormones, Lupron, carries a Category X classification, which
causes harm to the fetus if the surrogate mother becomes
pregnant while taking the medication. 28 Despite the potential
side effects of the medications, the desire for genetic linkage
between the child and the intended parents is a compelling
reason why gestational surrogacy is chosen over a traditional
arrangement. 29

II. FOREIGN STATUTES AND CASES
Foreign Statutes

Id.
Id.
26 Id. (Gonadotropin releasing hormone (GnRH) agonists like Synarel
or Lupron. Lupron is administered by injection while Synarel comes
in a nasal spray).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Ethics
Committee Opinion Number 397, Surrogate Motherhood, p. 2,
http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions/Committ
ee% 20on%20Ethics/co397.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20140324T1309556802
(last visited Oct. 21, 2014). [Eds. note: The American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists issued Committee Opinion Number
660 replacing Committee Opinion Number 397,
http://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/CommitteeOpinions/Committee-on-Ethics/Family-Building-ThroughGestational-Surrogacy].
24
25
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Some contracts cannot be enforced due to their illegal
The word “illegal” in contract law has a broader
meaning than simply contracts made for a criminal purpose. 31
“Illegal in the contract setting means . . . [that] the contract or
clause involved is void as a matter of public policy, whether or
not technically criminal.” 32 As a matter of public policy, a
contract or contractual term will be nullified if the arrangement
violates the precepts of the society in which the court sits. 33
nature. 30

Approximately one-third of state legislatures have
provided statutory guidance regarding surrogacy contract
formation and enforceability. 34 Of the legislatures that have
spoken, three “camps” have formed. 35 In the first camp of
states, all types of surrogacy contracts are prohibited. 36 One
state even provides criminal penalties for forming such an
arrangement. 37 The second prohibits traditional surrogacy
contracts. 38 Finally, the third camp allows both traditional and

gestational surrogacy contracts, subject to various

regulations and specified limitations. 39 Tennessee’s current
surrogacy laws do not fit within any of these three established

Thomas D. Crandall & Douglas J. Whaley, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 620 (6th ed. 2012).
31 Id.
32 Id. (noting this potentially powerful theory is often forgotten by
attorneys).
33 See id.
34 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *8.
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 16-401(A)-(B), -402(a) (West 2013); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 7.22.851- .863 (West 2013); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 122 (surrogate parenting contracts declared contrary to the public
policy of the state).
37 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 7.22.851- .863 (West 2013).
38 See, e.g., N.D. CODE §§ 14-18-05, -08 (West 2013); IND. CODE ANN. §
31-20-1-1(West 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.580 (2013) (limits
applicable to gestational, rather than traditional surrogacy
arrangements).
39 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1 to – B:32 (West 2013); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 20-165 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 22.26.210- .260 (West 2013).
30
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camps. 40 Instead, the current Tennessee statute essentially
consists of a definition ending with an interpretational caveat
found in the statutory section entitled “Adoption.” 41 The statute
provides that:
(48)(B) “Surrogate birth” means:
(i) The union of the wife’s egg and the
husband’s sperm, which are then
placed in another woman, who carries
the fetus to term and who, pursuant to
a contract, then relinquishes all
parental rights to the child to the
biological parents pursuant to the
terms of the contract; or
(ii) The insemination of a woman by
the sperm of a man under a contract by
which the parties state their intent that
the woman who carries the fetus shall
relinquish the child to the biological
father and the biological father’s wife
to parent;
(B) No surrender pursuant to this part is
necessary to terminate any parental rights of
the woman who carried the child to term
under the circumstances described in this
subdivision (48) and no adoption of the child
by the biological parent(s) is necessary;
(C) Nothing in this subdivision (48) shall be
construed to expressly authorize the surrogate
birth process in Tennessee unless otherwise
approved by the courts or the [G]eneral
[A]ssembly. 42

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48)(A-C) (West 2014).
Id.
42 Id.
40
41
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The Tennessee Supreme Court was not the only court which
found itself without statutory guidance regarding surrogacy
issues.

Cases in Other Jurisdictions
In the absence of guiding statutes, several well-known
cases dealing with surrogacy contracts have arisen in
jurisdictions other than Tennessee. Some state courts have
focused on whether a surrogacy contract embodies a traditional
or gestational surrogacy arrangement. 43
In Johnson v. Calvert, the California Supreme Court held
gestational surrogacy contracts “differ[] in crucial respects from
adoption[.]” 44 As a result, the monetary exchange, meant to
compensate the surrogate for her services in gestating the fetus
and undergoing labor, detailed within the gestational
surrogacy contract was distinguishable from the California
adoption statutes prohibiting payment for consent to adopt a
child. 45
In reaching that conclusion, the California Supreme
Court pointed to the fact that the surrogacy arrangement was
entered into prior to the child’s conception, and as discussed
above, the definition of gestational surrogacy rendered the
surrogate without genetic connection to the child. 46 Therefore,
the surrogate was not vulnerable to financial inducements to
part with “her own expected offspring[,]” an element of the
prohibitive California adoption statute 47 at issue. 48
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court was not
persuaded by the argument that such contracts violate the
public policy of California because the surrogate based her

See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
Calvert, 851 P.2d at 784.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West).
48 Calvert, 851 P.2d at 784.
43
44
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argument on the same prohibitive statute the court had just
distinguished and thereby, rendered inapplicable. 49
The Supreme Court of Ohio went a step further in J.F. v.
D.B. 50 by holding that the public policy of the state remained
uncrossed by gestational surrogacy contracts, even when a
provision of the contract requires the gestational surrogate to
refrain from asserting parental rights so long as the child was
generated from another woman’s egg. 51 After quickly
dispensing with the issue at hand, the Ohio Supreme Court
curiously used the final breath of its opinion to predict what it
saw as an imminent traditional surrogacy question by stating:
[W]e would be remiss to leave unstated the
obvious fact that a gestational surrogate, whose
pregnancy does not involve her own egg, may
have a different legal position from a traditional
surrogate, whose pregnancy does involve her
own egg. This case does not involve, and we
draw no conclusions about, traditional
surrogates and Ohio's public policy concerning
them. 52
In contrast, other state courts have articulated a blanket
prohibition on surrogacy contracts. 53 In Doe v. New York City Bd.
of Health, Mrs. Roe agreed to serve as a gestational surrogate for
her sister, Mrs. Doe, who had been unable to bear children as a
result of cancer. 54 “No consideration, except love and affection,
[was] involved.” 55 Prior to birth, Mrs. Roe and her husband
sought judgment that the named biological parents should
appear on each of the resulting triplet’s birth certificates, and
the New York City Board of Health and the New York City
Id.
J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 2007).
51 Id. at 741- 42.
52 Id. at 742.
53 See, e.g., Doe v. New York City Bd. of Health, 782 N.Y.S.2d. 180
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
54 Id. at 182.
55 Id.
49
50
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Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (“DOHMH”) objected
when it answered that doing such would violate New York’s
Domestic Relations Law. 56
The DOHMH conceded that it would not oppose the
post-birth amendment of the birth certificates, provided Mr.
and Mrs. Doe established they were genetic parents of the
triplets or the formal adoption proceedings were completed. 57
Mr. and Mrs. Doe were unwilling and proceeded with their
pursuit of favorable rulings on their pre-birth motions. 58 As a
final answer to those motions, New York’s Superior Court held
that any “surrogacy parenting contract is prohibited and
unenforceable in [New York], even where no payment of funds
is involved . . . . Domestic Relations Law makes no distinction
between gestational surrogacy contracts and traditional
surrogacy arrangements[.]” 59
Moving from cases involving gestational arrangements
to those dealing with traditional ones, in Surrogate Parenting
Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 60 the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that traditional surrogacy contracts do not
violate the state’s statute prohibiting the buying and selling of
children, 61 commonly known as “baby-selling statutes.” 62 The
court’s articulated distinction rested on the fact that the
agreement to bear the child was entered into before conception,
and as result, the expectant, biological mother is free from
external “financial inducements to part with the child.” 63 The
court elaborated:
The essential considerations for the surrogate
mother when she agrees to the surrogate
Id.
Id. at 183.
58 See id.
59 Id. at 183 (citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2014).
60 Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel.
Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
61 Id. at 211.
62 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (West 2014).
63 Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d at 211.
56
57
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parenting procedure are not avoiding the
consequences of an unwanted pregnancy or fear
of the financial burden of child rearing. On the
contrary, the essential consideration is to assist a
person or couple who desperately want a child
but are unable to conceive one in the customary
manner to achieve a biologically related
offspring. The problem is caused by the wife's
infertility. The problem is solved by artificial
insemination. 64

In In re F.T.R., the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that,
aside from the termination of parental rights, traditional
surrogacy contracts are enforceable under Wisconsin law as
long as the agreement is in the “best interest” of the child. 65 The
termination of parental rights by the parties’ private contract
was unenforceable because the surrogate had not consented to
that contractual provision, and no basis for the involuntary
termination of rights existed. 66
The legal issues presented in Tennessee’s Baby are most
aligned with the textbook case of In re Baby M. 67 In that case, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that traditional surrogacy
arrangements were contrary to the State’s public policy based
on its adoption, custody, and termination of parental rights
statutes. 68 Initially, the New Jersey trial court, at the conclusion
of a thirty-two-day trial, held that the adoption, custody, and
termination of parental rights statutes were inapplicable to
surrogacy contracts because the “Legislature did not have
[those type of contracts] in mind when it passed those laws,
those laws were therefore irrelevant.” 69 The New Jersey
Supreme Court disagreed and held the provisions at issue “not

Id. at 211-12.
In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Wis. 2013).
66 Id. at 640.
67 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
68 Id. at 1240.
69 Id. at 1237-8.
64
65
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only directly conflict[ed] with New Jersey statutes, but also
offend[ed] long-established State policies.” 70
Other than, perhaps, identifying the pulses of the
nation’s state courts and legislatures willing to speak to the
relevant issues, the preceding cases have little authoritative
weight because the issue of public policy requires the Tennessee
Supreme Court to examine and weigh various sources of public
policy of the state in which it sits. Thus, for the purposes of the
issue of public policy, Tennessee law exists in a vacuum.

PART TWO: IN RE BABY
I. FACTS
A man (the “Intended Father”) and woman (the
“Intended Mother”) (collectively “Intended Parents”), both
Italian citizens who were unable to have children, turned to a
surrogate (the “Surrogate”), a Tennessee resident, for aid. 71 The
parties, both represented by legal counsel, contracted into a
traditional surrogacy arrangement where the Surrogate, who
supplied her own egg, was artificially inseminated by the
Intended Father’s sperm. 72 The Surrogate became pregnant in
April of 2011. 73 During the pregnancy, the Intended Parents
paid the Surrogate approximately $42,000 in medical expenses
and legal fees. 74 The Surrogate also received an additional
$31,000 for pain, suffering, and miscellaneous pregnancy and
birth-related expenses. 75
Prior to the birth of the child, all parties filed a joint
petition asking a Tennessee juvenile court to declare the
Intended Father as the genetic father of the child, grant custody
to the Intended Parents, and terminate the parental rights of the

Id. at 1240.
Baby, 2014 WL 4815211, at *1.
72 Id. at *2.
73 Id. at *4.
74 Id.
75 Id.
70
71
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Surrogate. 76 The petition was granted. 77 Less than a month later,
the Surrogate gave birth to a girl (the “Child”). 78
The Intended Parents were present at the Child’s birth. 79
Following professional medical advice, all agreed the Surrogate
would breastfeed the Child for a short period of time.80 Soon
after the birth, the Intended Mother returned to Italy to care for
her ailing parents. 81 The Intended Father, however, remained
with the Surrogate to assist in the daily care of the Child. 82
A week after birth, the winds shifted. 83 The Surrogate
had bonded with the Child. 84 Consequentially, the Surrogate
sought an emergency ex parte restraining order and injunction
which claimed that “the birth of [the] Child did not meet the
requirements of ‘surrogate birth’ under Tennessee law”
because the Intended Parents had not yet married, a
requirement which implicitly appears necessary under the
relevant statute because it uses terms such as “husband” and
“wife.” 85
The Surrogate asked the sitting magistrate to vacate the
order in which she had waived her parental rights, grant her
temporary custody, and enter an injunction prohibiting the
Intended Parents from removing the Child from the
jurisdiction. 86 The same day motions were filed, the magistrate
conducted a hearing. 87 At the conclusion of the hearing, the
magistrate denied the Surrogate’s motion for injunctive relief

Id.
Id.
78 Id. at *5.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See id.
85 Id. (citing language used in Surrogate’s “Emergency. . . Ex Parte
Restraining Order and Injunction).
86 Id.
87 Id.
76
77
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and ordered the Surrogate to relinquish physical custody of the
Child to the Intended Father. 88
Three weeks later, the Surrogate returned to the
magistrate’s court. 89 That day, the Intended Parents were
married in Williamson County. 90 The Surrogate filed motions
seeking to set aside the order waiving her rights. 91 After the
second hearing, the Surrogate’s motions were, again, denied. 92
She turned to the juvenile court, which affirmed the
magistrate’s decision. 93 The Surrogate then appealed the
juvenile court’s ruling to the Tennessee Court of Appeals. 94
The Surrogate’s argument was fourfold. 95 She argued
that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; the
surrogacy contract was invalid based on the unmarried status
of the Intended Parents at the time of contracting; 96 the
proceeding which terminated her parental rights was improper
due to lack of counsel at the proceedings; and the juvenile court
should have set aside the magistrate’s custody order because
the magistrate failed to conduct a “best interest” analysis. 97 The
Court of Appeals rejected each of the Surrogate’s arguments.98
These issues were accepted by the Tennessee Supreme Court as
matters of first impression. 99

II. SOURCES OF LAW EXAMINED IN BABY

Id.
Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at *6.
95 Id.
96 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48)(A)–(C) (2014) (labels such as
“husband” and “wife” are used; however, this statutory definition
refers to a gestational surrogacy, not a traditional one as is at issue in
Baby).
97 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *9.
98 Id.
99 Id.
88
89
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The public policy concern of traditional surrogacy
contracts is the main issue in Baby. Curiously, neither the
Surrogate nor the Intended Parents raised or preemptively
answered this contractual defense. Instead, the Court raised the
defense sua sponte. 100 The Tennessee General Assembly,
through a commission, last addressed major surrogacy issues in
1993; however, no substantive action was taken on this
relatively new topic. 101 Surrogacy issues remained stagnant
until 2014 when the Tennessee Supreme Court granted Baby
discretionary review under Tennessee Rule of Appellate
Procedure 11. 102 When the Tennessee Supreme Court
confronted the public policy issue, the Court drew from many
sources of state law. 103
First, Tennessee’s traditional principles of contract law
were considered. 104 “Contract law in Tennessee plainly reflects
the public policy allowing competent parties to strike their own
bargains.” 105 Tennessee also recognizes several common law
contract defenses, including fraud, 106 duress, 107 undue
influence, 108 mistake, 109 and incapacity. 110 Surrogacy contracts
are not free from these common law defenses, and each defense
may be raised in an independent declaratory judgment
action. 111 These defenses were inapplicable to the case at hand,

See Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *10.
See id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at *11.
104 Id. at *20.
105 Id. (citing Ellis v. Pauline S. Sprouse Residuary Trust, 280 S.W.3d
806, 814 (Tenn. 2009)).
106 Id. (citing Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d
291, 297, 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
107 Id. (citing Rawlings, 78 S.W.3d at 301).
108 Id. (citing 78 S.W.3d at 297, 301).
109 Williams v. Botts, 3 S.W.3d 508, 509-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
110 McMahan v. McMahan, 2005 WL 3287475, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2005).
111 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-14-102 (West 2012).
100
101
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and the Court held that “none prohibit the enforcement of
traditional surrogacy agreements on public policy grounds.” 112
Second, the Court noted the neutrality of Tennessee’s
statute regarding surrogacy. 113 The statute, previously cited,
amounts to a definition coupled with an interpretational
caveat. 114 Save subsection (C), which expressed the Tennessee
General Assembly’s neutral stance, this statutory definition
provided little help to the Court. 115 Further lessening its
relevance was the fact that this definition describes a gestational
surrogacy, not a traditional one, as in Baby. 116 The
interpretational caveat to the statute states that none of the
provisions “shall be construed to expressly authorize the
surrogate birth process in Tennessee unless otherwise
approved by the courts or the [G]eneral [A]ssembly.” 117 The
Court analyzed the statute in In re C.K.G., determining that the
statute’s caveat expressed a neutral “legislative stance” with
regard to the enforceability of surrogacy arrangements not
memorialized by written contract. 118 The Court could not
interpret these neutral statutes to express unfavorable policy
with regard to surrogacy arrangements. 119
The Court next considered Tennessee’s so-called “babyselling” statutes. 120 Such statutes provide criminal penalties for
illegal payments in connection with the surrender of a child or
the placement of a child for adoption. 121 The Court agreed with
other cases and commentary 122 distinguishing surrogacy
Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *11.
Id.
114 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48)(C) (West 2014).
115 See Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *8-9.
116 Id. at *9.
117 Id. § 36-1-102(48)(C) (West 2014).
118 In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d at 723 n.6. (Tenn. 2005).
119 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *11.
120 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-109 (West 2014).
121 Id.
122 Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d at 211 & n.2.; See 704 S.W.2d at 211; see also
In re Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817 (Sur. Ct. 1986); Jennifer L.
Watson, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb: Should
Surrogate Mothers Be Compensated for Their Services?, 6 WHITTIER J.
112
113
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arrangements as payment “for the services of a surrogate in the
conception of a child[,]” rather than payment for the surrender
of the child. 123 However, the Court held that “[c]ompensation
may not be contingent upon the surrender of the child or the
termination of parental rights, and compensation is restricted
to the reasonable costs of services, expenses, or injuries related
to the pregnancy, the birth of the child, or other matters
inherent to the surrogacy process.” 124
The Court continued by discussing Tennessee’s custody
statute and relevant cases which include the proverbial “best
interest” determination. If all are applicable, there are fifteen
statutorily-enumerated factors that a judge must consider when
making a “best interest” determination. 125 No such
determination was made in the case of Baby, because the
juvenile court ruled the surrogacy contract’s waiver of such
rights was proper under Tennessee law. 126 The Court
disagreed. 127
The Court held that the state’s obligation to make such
a determination could not be relieved by a provision of private
contract. 128 In fact, the Court had previously decided the matter
in Tuetken v. Tuetken. 129 As a result, the Court held the term to
be improper and unenforceable. 130
Consequentially, the Court scrutinized statutes
involving legal parents and the methods that parental rights
may be terminated. 131 In Tennessee, a woman may be properly
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 529, 547(2007); Stacy Christman Blomeke,
Note, A Surrogacy Agreement That Could Have and Should Have Been
Enforced: R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998), 24 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 513, 529 (1999).
123 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *14.
124 Id. at *15.
125 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106 (West 2014).
126 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *5.
127 Id. at *15.
128 Id.
129 Tuetken v. Tuetken, 320 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tenn. 2010).
130 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *16.
131 Id. at *17.

IN RE BABY: BLESSING OR PROBLEM CHILD?

21

termed a “legal parent” in two ways: being “[t]he biological
mother of a child,” 132 or being “[a]n adoptive parent of a
child[.]” 133 In Baby, the Surrogate was the biological mother of
the child, and thus, is the “legal parent” of the Child under
Tennessee law. 134
Under Tennessee law, legal parent’s rights may only be
terminated in one of three ways. 135 First, if a statutorily valid
ground for termination exists and termination of the biological
mother’s parental rights is in the “best interest” of the child, an
involuntary termination may be initiated. 136 Second, a
biological mother may voluntarily extinguish her rights by
signing a “surrender,” a document which provides “that [a]
parent or guardian relinquishes all parental or guardianship
rights of that parent or guardian to a child, to another person or
public child care agency or licensed child-placing agency for the
purposes of making that child available for adoption[.]” 137
Finally, when a mother consents to adoption, her parental
rights may be terminated as part of the adoption proceeding. 138
While the Court held these statutes did not evidence any public
policy against the enforcement of surrogacy arrangements, the
Court did hold that the termination of the Surrogate’s parental
rights through private contract was unlike any acceptable
method of termination and thus, the term was unenforceable. 139

III. BABY’S HOLDING & EPILOGUE
The Court held that traditional surrogacy arrangements,
including the one at issue, did not violate the public policy of
the State of Tennessee. 140 However, the private “best interest”
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(28)(A) (West 2014).
Id. § 36-1-102(28)(E) (West 2014).
134 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *17.
135 Id.
136 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(c) (West 2014).
137 Id. § 36-1-102(47); see also In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 247- 48
(Tenn. 2010) (describing the required procedure for executing a
surrender).
138 See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-102(15)(C), -117(g) (West 2014).
139 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *18.
140 Id. at *19.
132
133
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determination and the private termination of parental rights of
the traditional surrogacy contract were improper. 141 Thus, the
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals with regard to the public
policy issue, vacated the juvenile court’s termination of the
Surrogate’s parental rights, and remanded the case to the
juvenile court to determine visitation and child support. 142
Although the record is unclear as to the exact date the Intended
Father exercised and took physical custody of the Child, 143 an
interview with the Surrogate’s attorney, Shelley Breeding,
revealed that the Intended Father reclaimed physical custody of
the child the evening following the magistrate’s denial of the
Surrogate’s emergency ex parte restraining order and
injunction. 144
On September 18, 2014, the day the opinion was issued, the
Child was nearly three years old and resided with the Intended
Parents in Italy, 145 and the Child continued to reside in Italy as
of December 15, 2014. 146 The attorney for the Intended Parents,
Benjamin Papa, and the attorney for the Surrogate, Shelley
Breeding, stated that they were communicating with their
respective clients to determine how each wanted to proceed in
light of the Court’s unexpected analysis and holding. 147 As a
result of the Court’s unexpected public policy analysis and
holding, no motions by either side had been filed with the
juvenile court to which the case was remanded. 148

PART III: LEGISLATIVE DIFFICULTY
I. JUSTICE KOCH’S CONCURRENCE
Id.
Id. at *24.
143 Id. at *8, n.4.
144 Telephone Interview with Shelley Suzanne Breeding, Partner,
Breeding & Lodato, LLC (Dec. 15, 2014).
145 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *8, n.4.
146 Breeding, supra note 144.
147 Id.; Telephone Interview with Benjamin Papa, Attorney-Mediator,
Founding Member, Papa and Roberts, PLLC (Dec. 20, 2014).
148 Papa, Attorney-Mediator, Founding Member, Papa and Roberts,
PLLC (Dec. 20, 2014).
141
142
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Justice Koch, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the
other members of the Court to the extent that the contract at
issue, save the two invalidated provisions, did not violate the
public policy of the State of Tennessee. However, he disagreed
with the holding that traditional surrogacy contracts do not
violate the Tennessee’s public policy, generally. 149 In his view,
the Court should have tailored its holding to the facts of the
case, refrained from pronouncing a general rule, and thereby,
deferred the general rule to legislative determination. 150 Justice
Koch stated:
[t]he legal rules governing [surrogacy in
Tennessee] are ambiguous, if not non-existent,
and they need to be clarified . . . . While the
desire to bring some order to the ambiguity is
commendable, the case-by-case approach the
courts must use is less effective in circumstances
like this than the far more dynamic ability of the
General Assembly to address . . . Tennessee’s
acceptance or rejection of surrogacy contracts as
a matter of public policy[.] 151
Surrogacy in Tennessee is “big business[,]” 152 and the
need for clear guidance is undoubtedly great and growing, 153
and the Court emphatically called for legislative action. 154
However, one could argue the narrow holding Justice Koch
advocates would provide a great deal of the needed clarity
while simultaneously relieving the Court of the responsibility
of determining the public policy of Tennessee regarding
surrogacy as well as and any resulting political backlash. 155
Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *29 (Koch, J., concurring).
Id.
151 Id.
152 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *27 (Koch, J., concurring) (citing Debora
L. Spar, The Baby Business: How Money, Science and Politics Drive the
Commerce of Conception 3 (2006)).
153 See id.
154 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *26.
155 Mohamed Akram Faizer, Exacerbating the Divide: Why the Roberts
Court's Recent Same-Sex Jurisprudence Is an Improvident Use of the
149
150
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Justice Koch’s concurrence would provide sufficient
boundaries for practitioners to guide their clients through the
traditional surrogacy contract formation process, (i.e., this
contract term is proper and enforceable, and this one is not). 156
In addition, the narrow holding would show the Court passed
on opportunity to declare a general rule, effectively
demonstrating the Court’s powerful reluctance to be the
governmental branch which invalidates such agreements. 157 As
a result, practitioners and citizens of Tennessee would need
only watch (or advocate in) one governmental branch, the
Tennessee General Assembly, for a general rule, and in the
meantime, they may carry on aiding their clients, intended
parent(s) or surrogate, through the surrogacy process. 158
Of course, there is no guarantee the General Assembly
will expressly and clearly address the topic soon or ever. Since
the General Assembly last spoke to the issue in the mid-1990’s,
it has had approximately twenty annual opportunities to
address the topic. 159 However, a history of legislative inactivity,
even coupled with a likelihood of future inactivity, perhaps,
does not obligate a state’s highest court to announce a general
rule. 160 In footnote twelve of his concurring opinion in Baby,
Justice Koch states:
[T]he courts’ response to legislative inaction,
whether inadvertent or intentional, should
always be tempered by the admonition in Article
II, Section 2 of the Constitution of Tennessee that
persons belonging to one branch of government
should avoid exercising the powers properly
belonging to the other branches. The better
course at this juncture would be accredit the
presumption, albeit rebuttable, that the
Court's Judicial Review Powers, 24 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 395, 396
(2013) (emphasizing the power of more narrow court holdings).
156 See Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *28-9 (Koch, J., concurring).
157 See id. at *27.
158 See id.
159 Id. at *10.
160 Id. at *27, n.12 (Koch, J., concurring).
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members of the General Assembly, like other
public officials, will discharge their duties in
good faith. 161
To save the Court from public and political backlash,
one could further argued that a court so high in the judicial
system should be wary of expressing an opinion beyond what
may be required, even if such an opinion would please a
significant segment of the population. 162 The immediate judicial
outcomes should not “solely be evaluated according to their
apparent desirability.” 163 “Instead, decisions should also be
evaluated according to their institutional legitimacy, their
jurisprud[ential] soundness, and finally, the manner in which
these decisions will affect and interact with both [the] U.S.
government and society.” 164
Regarding the Baby decision, the immediate judicial
outcome is that traditional surrogacy contracts expressly
withstand public policy scrutiny. Lawyers who practice in a
directly or indirectly related field find it desirable. Lawyers
dealing with surrogacy contracts also gain a great deal of
guidance with which they will use to guide their clients.
Additionally, future surrogates in traditional
arrangements are protected by the invalidity of contractual
terms that deprive them of parental rights by private
agreement, and proponents of surrogacy gained a muchdesired legal victory which will set heavy precedent for an
entire state.
Next, institutional legitimacy and jurisprudential
soundness appear to be intertwined. Unlike the legislative
branch, the judiciary’s power is predicated on its ability to find
support for a decision, i.e., its ability to base its decision on preexisting law, whether it be statutory, case law, or a mixture of
several sources.
Without a base of precedent or fair
161 Id. (citing See State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Medicine Bird
Black Bear White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d 734, 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)).
162 Faizer, supra note 155, at 411.
163 Id. at 396.
164 Id.
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interpretation of an existing statute, the judicial decision and,
by extension, the issuing court’s legitimacy may be questioned.
In Baby, the Court found, cited, and fairly evaluated
many relevant sources of state law, including the Tennessee
Constitution, relevant Tennessee statutes, Tennessee cases, and
sources of contract principles adopted in Tennessee cases.
Thus, having tethered its decision to a collection of existing law,
the Court’s answer and its legitimacy as body are unlikely to be
questioned by the reasonable critic. Furthermore, it is unlikely
that the Baby decision will cause inter-governmental acrimony
because the opinion takes no power from the Tennessee
General Assembly. It can do what it has always had the power
to do—pass laws detailing the requirements for valid surrogacy
contracts within the state. Indeed, the Court encouraged the
legislature to make a definitive statement on the issue.
As far as the decision’s effect on society, the impact is
much more speculative. The polar options are either that it has
no effect, or that overnight, surrogacy becomes a politicallycharged banner issue causing many state election swings
during the next cycle. In reality, it is likely to be somewhere inbetween. In any event, the citizens of Tennessee, through their
representatives, will have an opportunity to speak.
The argument against the Court’s broader holding
would conclude by stating that legislative inaction is sometimes
a consequence of living in a democracy. What is the cause of
legislative inaction regarding surrogacy? Perhaps surrogacyrelated problems are not high on the agenda of the citizens of
Tennessee. If surrogacy-related issues were as pressing as
commentators claim, legislative efforts, such as those in
Louisiana, may be more likely to occur.

II. LOUISIANA’S LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
The Louisiana State Legislature recently attempted to
comprehensively address its surrogacy issues; however, its
struggles exemplify the difficult position in which courts are
placed when waiting on adequate legislative guidance.
Louisiana State Representative Joseph Lopinto, R-Metairie,
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filed House Bill 187 on February 17, 2014. 165 Louisiana State
Senator Gary Smith, D-Norco, sponsor of the corresponding
Senate Bill, is the father of two children born through
gestational surrogacy arrangements that were formed and
signed outside Louisiana. 166 Senator Smith said the Bill helps
families become complete. 167 He continued, "[i]nfertility is so
private and personal, and . . . this Bill would . . . help[] (parents
with fertility problems) to be able to have a biological child of
their own" within Louisiana. 168
After sailing through the Louisiana House Committee
on Civil Law and Procedure with a 10-0 vote, the Louisiana
House passed the Bill with a vote of 80-14. 169 The Louisiana
Senate Judiciary Committee then picked up the Bill. 170
Following the adoption of amendments, the Senate Judiciary
Committee passed the Bill with a vote of 22-11. 171 Barely any
resistance was encountered on the Senate floor during the 72-7
vote. 172
One of the first provisions declares traditional
surrogacy contracts, termed “genetic surrogacy” contracts
within the Bill, “absolutely null.” 173 First, the Bill mandates that
gestational surrogacy contracts shall be written. 174 After
Louisiana State Legislature, H.B. 187’s Bill Information,
http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/BillInfo.aspx?i=223852 (last visited
Oct. 26, 2014).
166 Emily Lane, Bobby Jindal Again Vetoes Bill Allowing for Legal
Surrogacy Births in Louisiana,
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/05/bobby_jindal_ag
ain_vetoes_bill.html (May 31, 2014 at 1:25 PM, updated May 31, 2014
at 10:38 PM)
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 H.B. 187’s Bill Information, supra note 165.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 H.B. 187, Reg. Sess. § 2719 (La. 2014); Enrolled House Bill 187,
http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=904605 (last
visited Oct. 26, 2014).
174 H.B. 187, Reg. Sess., at § 2720.
165
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memorialization, the contract must be signed by the
“gestational mother,” the gestational mother’s husband, if
applicable, and the intended parents. 175 With such an uncertain
statutory requirement, one could argue that the Bill would
exclude single parents from legally contracting with a
surrogate. 176
Second, the Bill states that the gestational surrogacy
contract is enforceable only if the contract is approved by a
court “in advance of in utero embryo transfer[.]” 177 The
surrogate must be at least twenty-five and no older than thirtyfive years old178 and have previously given birth to at least one
child. 179 Next, the Bill forbids the surrogate from receiving
compensation for her services. 180 Compensation, as defined in
the Bill, means “a payment of money, objects, services, or
anything else having monetary value.” 181
However,
compensation
does
not
include
182
reimbursement of actual expenses to the gestational mother
or payment for goods or services incurred by the intended
parents as a result of the pregnancy. 183 If the contract is for
“compensation,” the contract “shall be absolutely null and
unenforceable in the state of Louisiana as contrary to public
policy.” 184
Furthermore, the Bill would prohibit a contractual term
requiring the gestational mother to consent to terminate the
pregnancy “for any reason[.]” 185 “Any reason” includes
Id. at § 2720A.
See id.
177 Id. at § 2720B.
178 Id. at § 2720.1(1).
179 Id. at § 2720.1(2).
180 Id. at § 2720C.
181 Id. at § 2718(1).
182 Id.
183 Id.; contra Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *21 (permitting reasonable
payments for the pain, suffering, and other expenses related to the
pregnancy and birth).
184 Id. at § 2720C.
185 Id. at § 2720D.
175
176
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prenatal diagnoses of actual or potential disability, impairment,
genetic variation, or any other health condition, gender
discrimination, and “for the purposes of the reduction of
multiple fetuses.” 186
After the Bill received bicameral affirmation, it reached
the desk of Governor Bobby Jindal, who sought counsel from,
most notably, Reverend Gene Mills, President of the
conservative Christian non-profit organization called Louisiana
Family Forum. 187 Reverend Mills “told his contact within the
administration, ‘I could not advise Bobby sign this bill.’” 188
Reverend Mills cited two “irreconcilable differences” which led
to his advisement that Governor Jindal veto the bill. 189
To Reverend Mills, the in vitro fertilization process
involved in gestational surrogacy births generated the first
irreconcilable difference. 190 According to Reverend Mills, the
destruction of excess fetuses was “[t]echnically . . . abortion.” 191
However, the Bill expressly makes a contractual term requiring
the surrogate to have such excess fetuses removed
unenforceable, while saying nothing about the surrogate
consenting to such a procedure in the absence of the contractual
requirement to do so. In an interview, Reverend Mills
confirmed that this outside-the-contract circumvention is
where his first concern with the legislation stemmed. 192
Reverend Mills said he questioned how effectively this
provision would be enforced stating that the “police arm,
especially within the [in vitro fertilization] industry” is simply
not there. 193

Id.
Lane, supra note 166; Louisiana Family Forum, About,
http://www.lafamilyforum.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).
188 Lane, supra note 166.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Telephone Interview with Reverend Gene Mills, President,
Louisiana Family Forum (Dec. 9, 2014).
193 Id.
186
187
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The second irreconcilable difference Reverend Mills
cited was the language of the statute that was intended to
prevent "commercial surrogacy," i.e., when a surrogate is paid
to carry the child. 194 The Reverend “believed [that the]
restrictions he requested be written into the Bill to ban
surrogacy-for-pay were insufficient.” 195 This so-called
irreconcilable difference is more difficult to understand
because, again, the Bill expressly prohibits such a term. 196
Reverend Mills elaborated during an interview by stating “the
[surrogacy for-pay] restrictions were too vague.” 197 He
continued by expressing concern that “[i]n such new area of the
law, such vague language could be a detriment . . . to altruistic
surrogacy[,]” or surrogacy done for no pay or reimbursement
of expenses. 198
Reverend Mills, and perhaps others, counseled
Governor Jindal to veto the Bill, and the Bill was officially
vetoed on May 30, 2014. 199 The veto pushed the issue back to
the legislative realm for a potential supermajority override;
however, Louisiana Representative Joe Lopinto, the bill’s
sponsor, surrendered just two days after Governor Jindal’s
veto. 200 Despite the overwhelming support in both houses,
Representative Lopinto decided not to attempt to override the
Governor’s veto because such an action would place the
funding of other bills in jeopardy. 201
Representative Lopinto’s loss in the final legislative leg
has not deterred Louisiana lawmakers, who envision
surrogacy-related legislation on the horizon. 202 The Bill’s failure
to secure the Governor’s signature notwithstanding, the
deliberative process succeeded when a constructive, in-depth
Lane, supra note 166.
Id.
196 H.B. 187, Reg. Sess., at § 2720C.
197 Mills, supra note 192.
198 Id.
199 H.B. 187’s Bill Information, supra note 165.
200 Lane, supra note 166.
201 Id.
202 Id.
194
195
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discussion took place. A similar discussion may happen within
the Tennessee General Assembly if the concern of the citizenry
were high enough.

CONCLUSION
Save the complex custody determination, child support
calculation, and parenting plan for the immediate parties, the
Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Baby is relatively
uncontentious. The Court grappled a difficult legal question,
a task with which it is familiar. After predicating its power on
an assemblage of existing law, reasonable questions of
jurisprudential soundness and institutional legitimacy are
non-existent.
The decision is unlikely to stir intergovernmental hostility, and properly, the opinion fervently
calls for legislative action.
The nearly successful legislative efforts of Louisiana
exhibit the frustration some may have with the deliberative
process.
Preemptory legislative action regarding hotlycontested social issues is a rarity. In Baby, the Court, after
documenting twenty years of legislative action and strongly
noting the damage such prolonged inaction was causing, saw
its obligation clearly — to prevent further damage.
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COULD KILL SWITCHES KILL PHONE
THEFT?
SURVEYING POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR
SMARTPHONE THEFT
Matt Rietfors & Vikram Iyengar1
Stanford Law School
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, 3.1 million Americans were victimized by
smartphone theft, nearly double the total of a year before. 2 The
problem is particularly acute in major cities, where smartphone
theft is now involved in 30 to 40 percent of all robberies. 3 In San
Francisco, smartphones were stolen in more than half of total
robberies in 2012. 4 These thefts cost consumers approximately
$30 billion a year according to the FCC, 5 and law enforcement
officials worry that they pose significant public safety costs as
well. This is not hard to believe, given that 68% of theft victims
would put themselves in some degree of danger to recover their
phone. 6 With 1 in 10 device owners now victims, 7 the shocking
The authors thank Phil Malone, Professor of Law and Director of
the Juelsgaard Intellectual Property and Innovation Clinic at
Stanford Law School, and Jef Pearlman, Clinical Supervising
Attorney and Lecturer in Law at Stanford Law School, for their
guidance and helpful comments on this Note.
2 3.1 Million Smart Phones Were Stolen in 2013, Nearly Double the Year
Before, CONSUMER REPORTS (April 17, 2014),
http://pressroom.consumerreports.org/pressroom/2014/04/myentry-1.html.
3 H.R. 962 § 1(a), 2014 Leg. Counsel, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
4 Id. § 1(d).
5 Smartphone Theft Prevention Act, H.R. 4065, 113th Cong. § 2(1)
(2014).
6 Phone Theft in America, LOOKOUT MOBILE SECURITY (May 7, 2014),
https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/phone-theft-inamerica.
7 Id.
1
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growth of smartphone theft and its attendant financial and
safety costs has created an apparent epidemic.
But, is this theft problem really unique to smartphones?
The increase in stolen smartphones may simply reflect the
increase in smartphone ownership. In other words, thieves
may not specifically plan ahead and single out phones to steal.
Other electronic devices such as laptops and tablets are also
stolen regularly, but smartphone theft may occur at a greater
rate for a variety of reasons: they are smaller, easier to mine data
from, easier to repurpose post-theft, and people carry them
around more routinely with less precaution.
Whether the theft problem is unique to smartphones or
not, a solution that reduces theft of smartphones in particular
and electronic devices in general is desirable if it is possible.
Perhaps the most obvious response is to make stolen phones
less valuable. If thieves cannot access owner data or connect
phones to cellular or Wi-Fi networks, they may be less inclined
to risk stealing a smartphone. This is the crux of the leading
anti-theft proposal. By mandating implementation of a “kill
switch” that can remotely disable a phone’s essential features,
legislatures and public officials hope to disincentivize stealing
and reverse the theft trend.
This paper analyzes the potential efficacy of current
proposals to deter smartphone theft and the broader
implications they may have. It surveys arguments of leading
stakeholders, examines the relevant literature on technological
feasibility and consumer behavior, and assesses the potential
pitfalls and shortcomings in implementing a cohesive, effective
policy. Developing a sound theft-deterrence policy requires
clarity on and a better understanding of kill switch technology,
other potential approaches such as carrier registries,
smartphone theft psychology, and the mechanics of the
smartphone black market. This paper represents the first
attempt at studying and answering these questions.

I. HISTORY OF THE KILL SWITCH DEBATE
A. A CALL TO MANDATE KILL SWITCHES AND SAMSUNG’S
RESPONSE
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The movement to mandate the deployment of a kill
switch, a technological method to render a stolen smartphone
and its data unusable, first gained prominence in 2012 when
smartphone theft began increasing rapidly. The Secure Our
Smartphones (SOS) campaign, led by New York Attorney
General Eric Schneiderman and San Francisco District Attorney
George Gascon, gathered supporters around the country as it
pressured phone carriers and manufacturers to introduce a
default kill switch in new phones. 8
Following this pressure, on July 18, 2013, Samsung
proposed adding the LoJack security system, including a kill
switch designed by Absolute Software, to its smartphones at an
additional cost to consumers. 9 The LoJack system would work
through a desktop app and code buried with the phone’s
firmware. However, because most smartphones in the U.S. are
sold by carriers, Samsung needed the carriers’ approval to preinstall LoJack on phones. None of the five major carriers
agreed. 10

B. CTIA’S PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES AND RESPONSES
THERETO
Carriers
and
manufacturers,
through
their
representative CTIA—The Wireless Association, initially
denounced the SOS kill switch initiative and instead created a
collaborative registry aimed at eliminating the stolen phones
resale market. Eventually, however, intensifying scrutiny
prompted the CTIA to modify its position. It recently created
the Smartphone Anti-Theft Voluntary Commitment, in which
Office of the N.Y. Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman, Secure
Our Smartphones (S.O.S.), http://www.ag.ny.gov/feature/secureour-smartphones-sos.
9 Martyn Williams, U.S. Carriers Rejected ‘Kill Switch’ Technology Last
Year, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 24, 2014 08:42 AM),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9246557/U.S._carriers_
rejected_39_kill_switch_39_technology_last_year.
10 Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New
York, (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/agschneiderman-requests-information-leading-wireless-carriersdecision-reject-anti.
8
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signatories declare their intent to make kill switch functionality
available on all of their new phones by July 2015. 11
But many kill switch advocates argue that this voluntary
commitment falls short. Citing the need for ubiquity to ward
off thieves, consumer rights advocates and a handful of state
legislatures have pushed for mandatory, rather than voluntary,
adoption of kill switches. One such bill, California’s S.B. 962,
finally passed the state senate in May 2014 (and was signed into
law on August 25, 2014) 12 after Apple, Samsung, Microsoft, and
Google withdrew opposition on the conditions that the
implementation deadline be pushed back to July 2015 and
tablets be dropped from the bill. These companies already
include software on their phones that allows owners to lock or
erase devices from afar, but they generally accord with the
CTIA’s position of keeping anti-theft measures voluntary and
up to the discretion of consumers.

C. FINDING A WAY FORWARD
While most interested parties in the debate thus appear
to endorse a kill switch option, kill switch implementation is not
failsafe. The question remains whether current statutory kill
switch mandate proposals “will effectively deter theft without
jeopardizing public safety, personal privacy, and civil liberties,
or causing other undesirable consequences.” 13 It is entirely
possible that a kill switch solution could create as many
problems as it solves.

II. OPINIONS OF STAKEHOLDERS ON KILL SWITCHES

Smartphone Anti-Theft Voluntary Commitment, CTIA—THE
WIRELESS ASSOCIATION, (accessed February 3, 2015),
http://www.ctia.org/policy-initiatives/voluntaryguidelines/smartphone-anti-theft-voluntary-commitment.
12 H.R. 962, 2014 Leg. Counsel, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
13 California Senate, Energy, Utilities and Communications
Committee, March 24, 2014,
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?
bill_id=201320140SB962&search_keywords (click Bill Analysis tab,
then click the link titled “03/28/14 – Senate, Utilities And
Communications”).
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The debate over curbing smartphone theft has
engendered a good deal of controversy. Some legislators have
unabashedly attacked carriers and manufacturers for opposing
a public safety law in order to retain profits arising from
replacement of stolen phones. The carriers and manufacturers
respond by arguing that they present consumers with a variety
of security options, to which a mandatory kill switch would
only be a costly and burdensome addition. On the sidelines of
the debate are a number of privacy activists and technologists
who worry that mandating kill switches may enable the
possibility of widespread hacking or discourage innovation.
Finally, smartphone owners provide insights about feasibility
of security options with their relative apathy towards anti-theft
measures.

A. LEGISLATORS AND PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICIALS SUPPORT
STRONG KILL SWITCHES
Following the beginning of the Secure Our Smartphones
campaign, New York Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli publicly
pressured Google, Microsoft, Apple, and Samsung to declare
what they were doing to “assure public officials that [they are]
acting responsibly” in response to the rise in smartphone theft
or else face divestment of nearly $3 billion from the state of New
York. 14 The comments confronted the companies with acting
“disinterested when it comes to collaborating with law
enforcement agencies in the effort to develop a meaningful
technological solution that would effectively eliminate the
secondary market in which criminal elements realize their
profits.” 15
Following a decision by the major carriers to reject
Samsung’s kill switch in late 2013, supporters of a mandatory
kill switch became even less diplomatic in their allegations. San
Francisco District Attorney George Gascón accused the carriers
of rejecting the Samsung solution “so they could continue to

14 Letters from Thomas P. DiNapoli, Comptroller of the State of New
York, to Google, Microsoft, Apple, and Samsung (June 11, 2013),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/features/sos/SOS
-Letters.pdf.
15 Id.
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make money hand over fist on insurance premiums.” 16
Insurance and phone replacement costs are major components
of carrier profits, comprising $7.8 billion and $30 billion in
revenue, respectively, of the $69 billion the industry nets every
year. 17 Captain Jason Cherniss of the San Francisco Police
Department says the police have “tried to blow the whistle on
this for years . . . [while] companies have had the ability to
prevent for years . . . [and] people have been violently robbed even killed - and millions of dollars have changed hands on the
black market.” 18
Secure Our Smartphones leader Eric
Schneiderman blasted the carriers for “knowingly dismiss[ing]
technology that could save lives.” 19

B. OBJECTIONS TO MANDATORY IMPLEMENTATION
But the carriers (and manufacturers) see kill switches as
not only technologically uncertain, but also as potentially
becoming conduits of new problems. The CTIA has expressed
concern that ubiquitous kill switches would give hackers or
other undesired parties the ability to disable entire groups of
phones, with particular susceptibility for “random customers as
retaliation by a variety of persons or entities.” 20 Manufacturers
claim that they have already made commercially available and
promoted affordable anti-theft solutions, including Apple’s
Find My iPhone and Activation Lock and Samsung’s
Reactivation Lock. The major carriers of the CTIA, though
initially rejecting wholesale Samsung’s kill switch proposal in

Paul Wagenseil, Smartphone Kill Switch: What It Is, How it Might
Work, TOM’S GUIDE (May 14, 2014 9:40AM),
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/ smartphone-kill-switch-faq,news18772.html (internal quotations omitted, quoting Gascón).
17 Rachel Swan, The Life of a Stolen Phone: For the Smartphone Industry,
Theft is Part of the Business Model, S.F. WEEKLY (April 23, 2014),
http://www.sfweekly.com/2014-04-23/news/ smartphone-theftapple-at-t-iphone/full/.
18 Id.
19 Schneiderman, supra note 10.
20 CTIA--The Wireless Association, Why a “Kill Switch” Isn’t the
Answer (accessed February 3, 2015),
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Why_a_Kill_Switch_Isn_t_the_Answer.pdf
.
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2013, recently agreed to make available kill-switch solutions on
a consumer-voluntary basis. 21
This voluntary-as-opposed-to-mandatory proposal
accords with the position of many technologists and privacy
rights activists who worry that consumers may be coerced into
increased susceptibility to hackers. Further, consumers already
have a variety of security tools available to them, and legally
sanctioning more pathways for Big Brother (or Anonymous) to
intrude on consumers’ ability to communicate is concerning,
particularly in light of recent crackdowns in Egypt, BART
protests, and Occupy Wall Street. In this regard, consumer
safety may be diminished by an inability to reach emergency
services or dependent contacts.
Some technologists also fear that mandatory technology
may create a barrier to entry for smaller innovators in the
smartphone industry or even more simply create more costs
than benefits. In comments filed with the California Senate, the
San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce reminded
legislators “to be sensitive to the regulatory environment
necessary for innovation” and asserted that different
technology mandates in states across the country “could create
considerable market barriers for innovative manufacturers and
the consumers they serve, and mandating technology is usually
a recipe for the creation of an anticompetitive and anticonsumer choice environment.” 22

C. CONSUMER BEHAVIOR PROVIDES LITTLE CLARITY ON
THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF A MANDATORY KILL
SWITCH
In the midst of this debate, smartphone owners-perhaps the stakeholders with the most at stake--seem to
CTIA--The Wireless Association, Smartphone Anti-Theft Voluntary
Commitment (accessed February 3, 2015),
http://www.ctia.org/policy-initiatives/voluntaryguidelines/smartphone-anti-theft-voluntary-commitment.
22 Comments of San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce in
Senate Floor Analysis, May 7, 2014, California State Senate,
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=
201320140SB962&search_keywords (click Bill Analysis Tab, then
click the link titled “05/07/14 – Senate Floor Analysis).
21
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collectively demonstrate the least bit of interest. Less than half
of smartphone users secure their phones with a homescreen
passcode, and among those that do, the most popular passcodes
are among the simplest: 1111, 0000, and 1234. 23 Aggregating the
passcode with other phone security measures such as antivirus
software and data backup, 34% of smartphone owners take no
measures at all. 24 This seeming indifference may support the
notion that a mandatory anti-theft solution could produce
radical effects, but it may also reveal that smartphone users
simply prefer more straightforward usage with fewer security
barriers. Regardless of what it means, interested parties on both
sides of the table have mobilized consumer behavior data to
support their positions. Currently proposed kill switch bills in
state and federal legislatures, for instance, base their rationales
in consumer protection.

III. HOW THE LEGISLATION CONCEIVES OF KILL SWITCHES
While the various bills 25 active in state legislatures and
Congress differ in how they describe the ideal features of kill
switches, they all allude to kill switches vaguely as a sort of
“technological solution.” The pending federal bill goes even
further, exempting from the mandate any smartphone provider
that incorporates technology that “accomplishes the functional
equivalent of the [defined technological] function.” 26 By
keeping the definition broad, the bills enable companies to use
technology compatible with their business and design
strategies, hence making it more palatable to comply with the
mandate. However, the broad definitional scope also reflects a
degree of legislative uncertainty on what constitutes the most
effective functionality. Reflecting this point, the five pending
and passed bills--California, Minnesota, New York, Illinois, and
the federal bill--all have important differences.
Corinne Iozzio, Kill Switches Will Save Your Smartphone, POPULAR
SCIENCE (May 5, 2014),
http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/kill-switches-willsave-your-smartphone.
24 Stephen Schenck, US Smartphone Thefts Explode, Nearly Doubling
Since 2012, POCKETNOW (April 18, 2014, 5:18 PM),
http://pocketnow.com/2014/04/18/smartphone-theft.
25 See Appendix for excerpts of selected bill text.
26 Smartphone Theft Prevention Act, H.R. 4065, 113th Cong. (2014).
23
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While all of the bills agree that a kill switch must involve
software or hardware (or a combination of both) that can render
inoperable the essential features of the device to an
unauthorized user, they vary in their interpretation of
“inoperability” and “essential features.” The bills generally
accord that the kill switch should disable voice
communications, Internet accessibility, and application
functionality, but the proposed Illinois and federal bills go
further to clarify that this must be achieved “even if the device
is turned off or has the data storage medium removed.” 27 In
this regard, the Illinois and federal bills would require a
permanent solution that prevents re-programmability after the
phone is rendered inoperable.
The treatment of data also reveals the bills’ different
conceptions of kill switch functionality. The California bill, for
instance, is silent on the technology’s effect on user data,
whereas the other bills require the kill switch to either lock or
disable the stored data. The Minnesota bill requires the kill
switch to lock all data, but retain future accessibility, while the
Illinois bill would require permanent removal. The federal bill
splits the difference between the two and leaves the option open
to manufacturers and providers.
Compliance enforcement also varies from bill to bill.
Each bill, aside from Illinois’s, supports a per-phone monetary
penalty levelled against those who manufacture and sell nonconforming phones, while Illinois would require violating
providers to insure the phones for theft at no cost to the
customer. Minnesota’s bill contains additional provisions that
prevent purchasers of used or secondhand phones from buying
in cash and requires these buyers to keep records of their
purchases.
In total, the current legislative proposals are united in
calling for a mandate on some sort of technological solution that
would help consumers render some subset of key features
inoperable on a stolen phone. The various approaches on
specifics, from definitional differences to dealing with data on
a permanent or reversible basis, underscores some of the
uncertainty on how a kill switch could work most effectively.

Id. See also IL S.B. 3539 (“SIM card or data storage medium
removed”).
27
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IV. TECHNICAL ISSUES INVOLVED WITH IMPLEMENTING KILL
SWITCHES
The state and federal kill switch legislation as well as the
Voluntary Commitment from the CTIA both suffer from a
dearth of detail about technical specifications and how a kill
switch would be implemented. The bills simply call for any
hardware or software “technological solution” that is
mandatory and can survive a factory reset. 28 However, a kill
switch solution implemented entirely in software will likely not
work flawlessly, especially if the software is implemented at a
high level of abstraction—in the operating system (OS) or as an
app.

A. KILL SWITCHES IMPLEMENTED IN SOFTWARE
Software kill switches depend on users running the
latest OS and software patches necessary to enable the kill
switch feature to work. For example, Apple’s Find My iPhone 29
app and Activation Lock 30 feature in iOS 7 were designed to
function as a kill switch. Once enabled, Activation Lock is
designed to make a stolen iPhone unusable even if the phone is
reset. However, only 85% of iPhones ran iOS 7 at the time the
first smartphone bills got introduced. 31 Therefore, there was
still a large chance that a stolen iPhone either did not run iOS 7
or have the Find My iPhone app enabled. For example, a recent
theft victim had shut off the Find My iPhone app after reading
about how it had been abused by a hacker to remote-wipe tech
writer Mat Honan’s iPhone, iPad, and laptop. 32 With the large

See, e.g., H.R. 962, 2013 Leg. Counsel, Reg. Sess. § 2(b)(1) (Cal.
2013).
29 Apple Computer Inc., Find My iPhone,
http://www.apple.com/icloud/find-my-iphone.html.
30 Apple Computer Inc., iCloud: Activation Lock,
http://support.apple.com/kb/PH13695.
31 Christian Zibreg, According to Apple, 85 percent of iPhone, iPod touch
and iPad devices run iOS 7, IDOWNLOADBLOG (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.idownloadblog.com/2014/03/24/apple-85-percentdevices-ios-7.
32 Rob Pegoraro, Will Apple's ‘kill switch’ tamp down iPhone thefts?,
USA TODAY (May 4, 2014, 7:00 AM),
28
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number of smartphone offerings, OSs, and app versions on the
market today, designing a set of reasonably foolproof kill
switch apps that have similar levels of protection for users
across industry platforms will require a significant standardssetting initiative and frequent communication between
smartphone manufacturers and carriers on bug fixes,
technology updates, and software patches.
California’s kill switch bill and the CTIA’s Voluntary
Commitment would require any smartphone manufactured in
the United States for retail sale after July 1, 2015 to have a kill
switch (the latter on a voluntary commitment). However, most
users keep their smartphone models for two to three years.
Hence, even after July 1, 2015, there will be millions of
smartphones that were purchased previously running older OS
versions that do not support the kill switch. Moreover, iPhones
running iOS 7 (with the kill switch) look almost identical to
models without it. Therefore, smartphone thieves will likely
not be deterred by kill switches for a few years after July 1, 2015,
and will take the chance that a given smartphone does not have
a properly functioning kill switch. Even if a stolen iPhone has
the kill switch app installed and functional, if a user waits too
long to run Find My iPhone, that can give the thief time to
unload the device. (The average duration of time from theft to
recognition of theft is one hour.) 33

B. SOFTWARE KILL SWITCHES CAN BE BROKEN INTO
Thieves may also be able to defeat kill switches if the
user has not installed the latest software security patch. For
example, Apple recently put out a security fix for a
vulnerability that allowed a thief to disable Find My iPhone on
iOS 7 without a password. 34
That defense was also

http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/2014/05/04/wil
l-apples-kill-switch-tamp-down-iphone-thefts/8577215.
33 Phone Theft in America, LOOKOUT MOBILE SECURITY (May 7, 2014),
https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/phone-theft-inamerica.
34 Carly Page, iOS 7 Exploit Disables Find My Iphone Without a
Password, THE INQUIRER (Feb. 7, 2014, 1:10 PM),
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2327573/ios-7-exploitdisables-find-my-iphone-without-a-password.
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circumvented in cases where a user did not set a screen-unlock
passcode. 35
Most recently, hackers have even broken into Apple’s
Activation Lock installed on the latest iOS 7 with all the latest
software patches. The two hackers who call themselves doulCi
(iCloud, fashioned roughly backwards), claimed to have made
the workaround “for people who have retrieved their lost or
stolen iDevice, in an effort to recover access to contacts, email,
notes, and more.” 36 The system works by “plugging [an]
iPhone or iPad into a computer and altering a file inside . . .
trick[ing] the device into connecting to the hackers’ server
instead” and causing the phone to unlock. 37 Shortly following
the release of the doulCi hack, pictures on social media
appeared “show[ing] that thousands of locked iPhones around
the world [were] bypassed using the tool just [in the first
day].” 38 Most of the tweets thanking the two hackers come
from outside of the U.S, where stolen smartphones are shipped
and sold at a premium on the black market. 39 For example, an
iPhone 5S that costs $707 in the US costs $1,090 in Jordan and
$1,196 in Brazil. 40 The doulCi hack suggests that software kill
switches on phones are certainly not immune, even from the
work of a couple of rogue hackers.

C. REMOTE ACTIVATION OF KILL SWITCHES
A true software kill switch, as opposed to a simple lockand-wipe app, would require sending a signal to the phone
Pegoraro, supra note 32.
Stephanie Mlot, Hackers Breach Apple’s Activation Lock, PC
MAGAZINE (May 22, 2014, 9:50 AM),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2458399,00.asp.
37 Jose Pagliery, Hackers Can ‘Un-Brick’ Stolen iPhones, CNNMONEY
TECH 30 (May 21, 2014, 1:37 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/21/technology/security/icloudhack/index.html.
38 Id.
39 Alex Heath, Apple Too Late to Stop Massive iCloud Breach, Hackers
Claim, CULT OF MAC (May 21, 2014, 4:46 PM),
http://www.cultofmac.com/280189/icloud-hacker-calls-applesresponse-little-late.
40 Swan, supra note 17.
35
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over the cellular network or the Internet to “brick” the phone
by deleting the OS or by sending out a poisoned firmware
update. Absent of physical damage to the hardware, the phone
could still be made functional by installing a new OS or by
using special tools to fix the firmware. 41 iPhones, in particular,
are “jailbroken” routinely, with the smartphone running a
knock-off OS. Therefore, a purely software-based approach to
render a smartphone forever nonfunctional is unlikely to work.
A kill switch implemented in software can also be
avoided. A thief would have to shut the smartphone off
immediately after he steals it, which most experienced thieves
already do to avoid tracking software. The thief could
alternatively place the stolen smartphone into a Faraday Bag 42
that blocks Wi-Fi, cellular, and GPS signals and wait until he
reached a location without a cellular signal, e.g., a metal shed
or basement. At that point, the SIM card can be removed and
discarded, the phone can be turned on, the data wiped, and the
15-digit International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI)
number changed. 43 The carrier network, and kill switch that
depends on it, would be totally ineffective.

D. KILL SWITCHES EMBEDDED IN HARDWARE
Samsung proposed a more permanent solution, the
Absolute LoJack kill switch, 44 to carriers in 2013, but the carriers
rejected the proposal. The Absolute LoJack method embeds the
kill switch in the smartphone’s BIOS (firmware) that can
withstand a factory reset and wiping or replacing the hard

Jesse Emspak, Why a smartphone ‘kill switch’ won't deter theft,
MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Aug 27, 2013, 02:19 AM),
http://www.mnn.com/green-tech/gadgetselectronics/stories/why-a-smartphone-kill-switch-wont-deter-theft.
42 Kelsey D. Atherton, Hide From GPS With This Signal-Blocking Phone
Case, POPULAR SCIENCE (Aug. 6, 2013, 1:15 PM),
http://www.popsci.com/gadgets/article/2013-08/how-protectyourself-your-phone.
43 Emspak, supra note 41.
44 Absolute Persistent Security Software. The Only Solution That Can
Survive a Factory Reset, ABSOLUTE SOFTWARE,
http://lojack.absolute.com/en/persistent (last visited May 30, 2014).
41
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drive. However, hacker websites 45 offer instructions for
computer-savvy hackers on how to edit a smartphone’s BIOS to
disable LoJack. Hence, a truly tamper-proof kill switch would
have to be either embedded in read-only memory (ROM) or
built into the integrated circuits (ICs) on the motherboard itself.
The logic on an IC could be programmed to (1) cause the IC to
malfunction; (2) reset the memories; or (3) destroy the IC by
creating a short in the circuit. Because the kill switch would be
within the IC, detecting it and disabling it would be near
impossible. 46 In addition, the kill switch would have to be
embedded on every motherboard manufactured so that if a thief
tried to replace the motherboard on a smartphone, the new
replacement motherboard would also have the kill switch. At
this point, working around the kill switch would still be
possible for the thief. However, because a new motherboard
costs upwards of $100, 47 it might serve as a sufficient deterrence
to theft.

E. HARDWARE REDESIGNS THAT COULD WORK
Modern electronic devices, such as smartphones, have
sleep states that are in between fully on and fully off. In sleep
mode, some circuits on the smartphone are powered up and
others are powered down. 48 “These modes often allow the
device to wake up autonomously if certain conditions are met,
such as pressing a certain key or even receiving certain data
45 See, e.g., How to Remove Computrace LoJack, FREAKY ACRES,
http://www.freakyacres.com/remove_computrace_lojack (last
visited May 30, 2014).
46 Email from Mark Tehranipoor, Charles H. Knapp Associate
Professor of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of
Connecticut, to authors (May 30, 2014, 11:06 AM) (on file with
authors).
47 iPhone 5 Replacement Motherboards, EBAY,
http://www.ebay.com (search “iphone 5 replacement
motherboard”) (last visited May 30, 2014).
48 Heather Murphy, Why Snowden Asked Visitors in Hong Kong to
Refrigerate Their Phones, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 25, 2013, 9:41 AM),
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/why-snowdensvisitors-put-their-phones-in-the-fridge/?_r=0&pagewanted=all
(quoting Seth Schoen, Senior Staff Technologist, Electronic Frontier
Foundation).
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over the Internet. . . .” 49 Therefore, a kill switch that could be
activated to wake up and “brick” the smartphone even when
the smartphone were switched off by a thief would be useful.
In addition, a hardware redesign to thwart thieves that remove
the smartphone battery to evade tracking could be to insert
secondary power sources within the apparatus. “Some phones
[already] use an additional battery for memory management;
it’s unclear whether this battery could be used by logging
and/or tracking systems. . . .” 50 Such a secret secondary power
source could be used to power tracking apps and the kill switch.

F. FOOLPROOF BUT EXPENSIVE SOLUTIONS
Militaries around the world have designed “remote
shut-down” solutions on defense systems since at least 2008 to
disable ICs on equipment that might fall into hostile hands.
These generally consist of kill switches or backdoors. A
military-style kill switch manipulates the system’s software or
hardware to cause the system to die outright, for example, to
shut off an F-35’s missile-launching electronics. 51 A backdoor,
on the other hand, lets the designer gain access to the system to
disable or enable a specific function. Because a backdoor does
not shut down the entire system, hostile users remain unaware
of the intrusion. For example, a designer could use it to bypass
battlefield
radio
encryption.
Similarly,
smartphone
manufacturers or carriers could use a backdoor to continue
tracking a thief while blocking access to the owner’s sensitive
data. However, military-style designs, while foolproof, would
likely prove too expensive for commercial smartphones unless
breakthroughs in technology and design occur.
Boeing recently filed documents with the FCC to build
a tamper-proof android smartphone it calls the “Black” phone.
The “Black phone will be sold primarily to government
agencies and companies . . . related to defense and homeland

Id.
Id.
51 Sally Adee, The Hunt for the Kill Switch, IEEE SPECTRUM (May 1,
2008, 7:57 PM),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/design/the-hunt-for-thekill-switch.
49
50
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security,” says a letter accompanying the filing. 52 There are no
serviceable parts on Boeing’s Black phone and any attempted
servicing or replacing of parts would destroy the product. The
phone is sealed with epoxy around the casing and with screws,
the heads of which are covered with tamper proof covering to
identify attempted disassembly. While such a device would
provide high security indeed, the need for commercial devices
to be serviced or repaired likely precludes a specialized solution
like Boeing’s for commercial smartphones. In addition, Boeing
will not provide technical and operational information about
the product to the general public for security purposes. 53
Technical information distributed at trade shows will be
protected by non-disclosure agreements. With the proliferation
of hacker sites instructing the public on jailbreaking
smartphones and evading kill switches, commercial
smartphone companies might soon decide to follow this route
in the future.
Finally, researchers at Rice University and the
University of California, Los Angeles recently invented a new
method to protect integrated circuits (IC) against piracy. The
new method exploits the inherent variability in modern IC
manufacturing to create a unique identifier for each IC and
integrate the identifier into the IC’s functionality. 54 However,
while this novel method solves the IMEI erasing problem and
is attack-resilient, it would likely lead to a large overhead cost
for smartphone manufacturers and would be difficult to
standardize across smartphone platforms.

Letter from Bruce A. Olcott, The Boeing Company, Supplemented
Request for Confidential Treatment
FCC Identification Number H8V-BLK1 (Model: BLACK), to Joe Dichoso,
Chief Equipment Authorization Branch, Office of Engineering and
Technology, Federal Communications Commission,
https://apps.fcc.gov/eas/GetApplicationAttachment.html?id=2202
965.
53 Id.
54 Yousra Alkabani, et al., Remote Activation of ICs for Piracy Prevention
and Digital Rights Management, Proceedings of the Int’l Conference on
Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems 674-77
(2007),
http://www.cs.ucla.edu/~miodrag/papers/Alkabani_ICCAD_2007
.pdf.
52
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V. NON-KILL-SWITCH SOLUTION: CARRIER REGISTRIES AND
MOBILE DATA MANAGEMENT
A. CARRIER REGISTRY OPERATION
Seeking to deflect legislation that would mandate kill
switches for all smartphones, and seeking to avoid dealing with
the technical challenges enumerated above, U.S. carriers
implemented databases in November 2013 that use unique
GSM and LTE (advanced GSM) smartphone ID numbers to
prevent stolen smartphones from being re-activated on GSM or
LTE networks in the U.S. and on appropriate international LTE
networks. 55 At present in the U.S., consumers that lose their
smartphones may call their service provider and have service
suspended to the smartphone. 56 However, it is the consumer’s
responsibility to know the device’s make, model number, serial
number, and unique device identification number (either the
International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI) or the Mobile
Equipment Identifier (MEID) number). 57 Different smartphone
models and carriers may use GSM networks, CDMA networks,
LTE networks, or a mix of the three. 58 Therefore, a stolen
smartphone that is blocked on one registry could be activated
on a registry using a different network standard.
Additionally, consulting the registries and blocking
activation of phones reported as stolen is a voluntary action of
carriers. 59 Remote phone location, locking, and data-wiping

Letter from Brian M. Josef, CTIA Stolen Smartphones Status Update,
to Kris Monteith, Acting Bureau Chief, Consumer and Governmental
Affairs Bureau, Federal Communications Commission,
http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/default-documentlibrary/july-2013.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
56 FCC, How to Report a Lost or Stolen Smart Device,
http://www.fcc.gov/stolen-phones-contact-numbers.
57 FCC, Protect Your Mobile Device,
http://www.fcc.gov/guides/stolen-and-lost-wireless-devices.
58 European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), Mobile
Communications, http://www.etsi.org/technologiesclusters/technologies/mobile.
55

Daniel E. Dilger, Apple Gov't rep says next two iPhones were designed
under Steve Jobs, APPLEINSIDER (April 01, 2013, 12:03 PM),
59
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services depend entirely on whether the manufacturer and
carrier provides them on the particular smartphone model; the
features are not uniformly offered on all models or by all
carriers. 60 Manufacturer or third-party apps available for some
models today can locate a stolen device from a computer, lock
the device to restrict access, wipe sensitive data from the device,
and make the device emit a loud sound (“scream”) to help the
police locate it. However, carriers and manufacturers are not
required to make such apps available on all phones or on all
networks. 61
Once service is suspended on the smartphone, the
consumer cannot wipe or lock it. Monthly plan charges
continue while service is suspended, and the consumer must
have bought insurance ahead of time to get the smartphone
replaced. 62

B. AUSTRALIA’S REGISTRY PROGRAM HAS PRODUCED
RELATIVE SUCCESS
Australia implemented an IMEI blocking program a
decade ago and has deemed it successful at deterring theft with
“net blocking activity [falling] by nearly 25% from 169,000
mobile handsets blocked to 127,750 [from 2004-2011] . . . against
the background of an 80% increase in the number of mobile
services in operation over this period.” 63 The IMEI is an integral
phone “fingerprint” that is transmitted whenever the phone is
used. Supporters of an IMEI system claim that it may prove
http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/04/01/apple-govt-rep-saysnext-two-iphones-were-designed-under-steve-jobs.
60 See e.g., AT&T, Replace your lost or stolen device and suspend service,
http://www.att.com/esupport/article.jsp?sid=52993&cv=820&_req
uestid=1370759#fbid=COrGqYlcbAL.
61 Supra note 57.
62 Id.
63 Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association, Australian
Anti-Theft Mobile Phone Technology Highlighted on U.S. Television
(accessed May 21, 2014),
http://www.amta.org.au/articles/Australian.antitheft.mobile.phone.technology.highlighted.on.US.television
(additionally noting that “[t]he net blocking figures are derived from
subtracting unblocking requests (if the handset is subsequently
found and returned to its legal owner) from blocking requests”).
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more failsafe than mandatory kill switches. Speaking with
American media, Randal Markey of the Australian Mobile
Telecommunications Association highlighted the ease of
implementing and operating a shared database, which just
requires collaboration amongst carriers, and the relative
difficulty for unsophisticated thieves to wipe the IMEI
number. 64

C. PROBLEMS WITH A REGISTRY SOLUTION
However, there are a number of problems plaguing
voluntary carrier registries. Many consumers do not know
about them and do not report stolen phones. Many stores or
fly-by-night operations “will jailbreak a stolen phone ‘no
questions asked,’ and thieves can then re-activate the
smartphone with a smaller carrier that is not participating in the
registry.” 65 Carrier registries may thus simply encourage more
black market workarounds. Moreover, the registries mainly
apply in the U.S. and Europe and could encourage thieves to
ship stolen phones to other areas, where they are more valuable
because of export restrictions and tariffs. Additionally, any
projected effect of IMEI blocking on theft depends on the
assumption that thieves require cell service at all, not just in the
registry-covered areas like the U.S. and Europe. Deterrence of
an IMEI system may fail to prevent thieves who simply wish to
profit off of hardware resales, user data mining, or use of other
smartphone functions (digital music, camera, etc.). A hackproof mechanism to track and shut down stolen devices
anywhere in the world, regardless of which carrier is used and
without burdening the consumer with the responsibility of
purchasing and downloading apps (or remembering the

C.W. Nevius, An Easy Way to Curb Smart Phone Thieves, S.F. GATE
(Dec. 3, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/nevius/article/Aneasy-way-to-curb-smart-phone-thieves-2344797.php.
65 Josh Harkinson, For Apple and the Phone Companies, "All a Theft
Means Is Another Sale," MOTHER JONES (Mar. 18, 2013 8:58 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/03/stolen-iphone-theftimsi (describing San Francisco District Attorney George Gascón’s
views on mobile device makers and carriers doing little to fix the
problem).
64
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smartphone’s 15-digit IMEI number), would likely be a
stronger deterrent to smartphone theft. 66

D. MOBILE DATA MANAGEMENT
Growing employee demand for bringing their personal
smartphones to work has driven security-minded employers to
use Mobile Data Management (MDM) services provided by
third-party vendors. MDM provides increased security for
both the devices and the enterprise they connect to by
controlling and protecting the data and configuration settings
for all mobile devices in the network. 67 MDM solutions can
control the apps installed or available on an employee’s
personal smartphone and disable the camera when on company
premises. In addition, MDM software can lock and wipe a lost
or stolen smartphone, display a message on its screen, and
cause it to emit a high-volume sound. Other options include a
wireless or Bluetooth tether that ties a smartphone to a key fob
and locks or wipes the smartphone if it is separated from the
key fob by a maximum specified distance. 68 However, MDM
solutions do not prevent theft; they merely secure data in the
event of theft.

VI. THE MANDATORY KILL SWITCH SOLUTION’S RELATIVE
EFFECTIVENESS AT DETERRING THEFT
In theory, implementing a default kill switch in every
smartphone is seen as the ideal deterrent to theft because it
would decrease the expected value a thief gets from stealing
while presenting fewer points of confusion to consumers and
fewer available black market workarounds to thieves, fly-bynight operations, or crime syndicates.
However, even
assuming that a mandatory switch could be implemented
Id. (quoting Kevin Mahaffey, Chief Technology Officer, Lookout (a
maker of anti-theft smartphone apps,) “That seems like something
that is reachable[]”).
67 BYOD Requires Mobile Device Management, INFORMATIONWEEK
(May 5, 2011, 4:25 PM),
http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/byod-requires-mobiledevice-management/d/d-id/1097576?.
68 DEBORAH MORLEY, CHARLES PARKER & JANET LAVINE,
UNDERSTANDING COMPUTERS : TODAY AND TOMORROW 597 (2004).
66
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without technical difficulties or hacking susceptibility, it may
fail to deter thieves for a number of reasons. At the same time,
mandating kill switches may help correct, for consumer
security, apathy that indirectly encourages theft. Without more
information about theft incentives and characteristics, the
effects of a kill switch cannot be predicted for certain.

A. THE MANDATORY KILL SWITCH SOLUTION REQUIRES
MANY ASSUMPTIONS AND MAY MISINTERPRET
THIEVING BEHAVIOR
The premise that putting kill switches in every phone
will stop thieves from stealing phones relies upon a number of
assumptions, including that: (1) thieves specifically target
phones; (2) thieves target phones for their operability and will
actually learn of kill switches; and (3) thieves cannot benefit
from workarounds, such as hacks, which may pop up from time
to time. Because of legislative requirements, any kill switch
underpinning these assumptions must also be costless to
consumers, leading to another constraint on likely effectiveness
since more expensive and potentially more effective solutions
are foreclosed.

1. THIEVES MAY NOT SPECIFICALLY TARGET PHONES TO
STEAL
First, the increasing incidence of smartphone theft may
belie the conclusion that thieves are specifically seeking to steal
smartphones. While smartphone theft nearly doubled last year,
most of the growth came from large urban areas. 69 It is entirely
possible that spikes in smartphone theft simply reflects the fact
that more theft victims carry visible smartphones in their bags
Samantha Murphy Kelly, What’s the Worst U.S. City for Smartphone
Theft?, Mashable (Nov. 8, 2012),
http://mashable.com/2012/11/08/smartphone-theft-city/ (noting
that the top ten locations for smartphone theft are Philadelphia,
Seattle, Oakland, Long Beach, Newark, Detroit, Cleveland,
Baltimore, New York, and Boston); Phone Theft in America, LOOKOUT
MOBILE SECURITY (May 7, 2014),
https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/ phone-theft-inamerica (noting that 55% of thefts occur in urban areas).
69
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or on their person, or that smartphone owners have become less
protective of their phones as they take them all over town.
The former point may have some statistically significant
effect, as smartphone ownership has increased from 45% of
Americans in 2012 to 58% by the end of 2013. 70 Part of this may
also have to do with the fact that phones are getting bigger (and
thus more apparent to would-be-thief passersby): global
shipments of smartphones with screens over 5 inches more than
doubled from 25.6 million in 2012 to 60.4 million in 2013. 71
The latter point is also somewhat reflected in the
available data: according to a recent survey by the mobile
security firm Lookout, 44% of phones are stolen because they
are left behind in a public setting. 72 Though it may be possible
that thieves are purposefully staking out public places like
restaurants, clubs, or workplaces (the three most common
places for phone theft to occur), 73 much of the rise in theft may
simply be attributable to growing owner forgetfulness that
comes along with increased smartphone usage in public. The
fact that the average victim takes an entire hour to realize a
theft 74 probably indicates that most stolen phones are not
quickly swiped from right under the owner’s nose. More likely,
a restaurant or club patron leaves her phone on a table and
another patron (or an employee) snatches it after the owner has
left. If these circumstances are more likely to occur than specific
targeting by thieves, then kill switches may not have their
intended deterrent effect since many thieves seem to not
calculate the risks of a theft ahead of time.

Device Ownership over Time, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT
(accessed June 2, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/datatrend/mobile/device-ownership/.
71 Global Shipment of Smartphones with a Screen Size of 5 Inches or Larger,
STATISTA (accessed June 2, 2014),
http://www.statista.com/statistics/253350/shipments-ofsmartphones-with-screen-size-5-inches-or-larger/.
72 Phone Theft in America, LOOKOUT MOBILE SECURITY (May 7, 2014),
https://www.lookout.com/resources/reports/ phone-theft-inamerica.
73 Id.
74 Id.
70
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Even assuming that thieves engage in a risk calculus
before attempting a theft, they may ignore the presence of a kill
switch because they either do not know it exists or they do not
care. It is often so easy to steal a smartphone that a thief may
not mind the probability that he will be stuck with a bricked
device. Thieves’ opportunism not only takes advantage of the
fact that “people on phones can be so oblivious to surroundings
they are not aware of a potential thief” 75 but also of the 44 % of
thefts that occur when phones are left behind in public settings.
In these cases, taking a kill-switch-enabled phone presents little
risk if the thief avoids getting caught, which most often is
independent of the presence of a kill switch. If the phone is
disabled, thieves may simply discard it and seek to steal
another one.
Thieves also have another option. An inoperative
smartphone can still retain some resale value, even if only for
parts. Smartphone OS consultants and developers have
suggested that components like the camera or the screen could
fetch a price making it worthwhile to steal, while a thief could
even damage a stolen smartphone and then claim the lower
price that gadget recycling sites pay for broken hardware.
Would publicity about the mandatory deployment of
kill switches in smartphones create a powerful enough
deterrent for thieves? That depends on a number of factors,
such as (1) whether thieves would find out about kill switches
personally, or through their fences; (2) how long would it take
for theft to decrease once kill switches are deployed, which in
turns depends on how long older versions of smartphones and
OSs remain in use with consumers after the July 1, 2015
deadline; and (3) what thieves are stealing smartphones for.
The first factor above is at the center of a debate between
state legislators trying to enact kill switch bills and
manufacturers of security systems. While legislators want to
publicize the deployment of kill switches to deter theft, security
companies such as Absolute (the creator of the LoJack) 76 want
unwitting thieves to continue connecting to the internet and
75
76

Pegoraro, supra note 32 (internal citations omitted).
Absolute, supra note 44.
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cellular towers so that the company may track the thieves and
gain remote access to stolen smartphones.
The third factor above is related to whether smartphone
theft is targeted more at sensitive data than at the hardware
itself. While a stolen smartphone may fetch a thief a few
hundred dollars, access to financial apps, even for a short
period of time, may be far more valuable.
What thieves are targeting ties into kill switch technical
design choices as well. A software kill switch could protect a
phone from getting wiped and reset, but it would not protect
sensitive data encrypted on the smartphone. A hardware kill
switch would be more secure, as described in Part V. However,
while it would protect encrypted personal data, it could make
it possible for thieves to reactivate the phone for resale. “We
need to understand what the motivation is in the theft before
instilling a solution,” says Greg Kazmierczak, CTO of Wave
Systems, a provider of hardware-based encryption technology,
“What’s the most valuable component — the hardware or the
data you are storing in your device?” 77

3. THIEVES MAY TRUST THE BLACK MARKET TO ENDRUN AROUND THE KILL SWITCH
Thieves, even if they learn of and care about the
effectiveness of kill switches, may still steal because they have
access to workarounds or are willing to wait for them. In
Washington, D.C., a spokesman for the Metro transit system,
Dan Stessel, pointed out that some stolen smartphones could be
resold through buy-back programs like ecoATM kiosks that do
not require face-to-face transactions. 78 ecoATM responded
with a statement: “Our policy is not to knowingly purchase
phones with Find My iPhone activated, and we continue to
improve our technology to that end.” 79
Even if no mechanism for resale is available at the time
of theft, thieves may still impute some expected value from the
77 Jane Porter, Is a Mandatory Kill Switch the Solution to Smartphone
Theft?, FORTUNE (May 27, 2014, 7:26 PM),
http://fortune.com/2014/05/27/is-a-mandatory-kill-switch-thesolution-to-smartphone-theft.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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stolen phone by sitting and waiting for a hack or new
distribution stream. This is precisely what happened with the
doulCi hack mentioned above in Part V(B), where pictures of
groups of newly jailbroken iPhones appeared on social media
the day the hack was publicized. The hackers posted server
data corroborating claims that “more than 5,700 devices [were
hacked] in just five minutes.” 80 Precedents like these encourage
thieves that “brickable” phones may still be worth stealing, so
long as waiting for a value-adding hack to come along is
possible. The assumptions in this section highlight the
uncertain effect a kill switch may have at deterring theft, if it
even has an effect at all.

B. WHAT MINIMUM LEVEL OF KILL SWITCH TECHNOLOGY
WOULD SUFFICIENTLY DETER THEFT?
As discussed in Part V, a kill switch would be less
vulnerable to hacking or jailbreaking, as its level of
implementation gets lower. For higher levels of implementation
in software, a thief could jailbreak the smartphone (done today
for security apps installed on top of the OS), replace the OS, edit
the BIOS file, or wipe the IMEI number (listed with increasing
levels of difficulty and therefore increasing levels of deterrence
to theft). To be more secure, a kill switch should be
implemented at a lower level or directly in hardware. However,
the lower the level of implementation and more secure the kill
switch, the more expensive it will be to design and implement
for manufacturers.

1. IN SEARCH OF AN OPTIMAL KILL SWITCH SOLUTION
Designing the best kill switch is an optimization
problem: what is the minimum level of kill switch technology
needed that will prove enough of a deterrence to a thief? The
most expensive military-style solutions may not be needed as
long as there is a sufficient deterrence to reduce theft by a
desired amount. As with most optimization problems, an
optimal solution would depend on the value of the inputs and
ensuring the correct inputs have been chosen. It is hard to
predict what factors of a kill switch would be optimal. In Figure
80

Heath, supra note 39.
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1, we illustrate an example graphical representation of theft
deterrence versus kill switch technology, showing how the cost
of a kill switch and the cost of cracking it could lead to an
optimal solution.

Figure 1. Illustration of the potential relationship
between kill switch technology and levels of theft deterrence.
Making no special effort has little to no theft deterrence.
Multiple carrier registries for difference carriers and different
wireless standards (CDMA, GSM, and LTE) that carriers must
only voluntarily consult provides a slightly higher level of
deterrence. Using a single, shared carrier registry that carriers
may be required to use to block stolen IMEI numbers by law, as
in the case of Australia’s EMTA, provides an even higher level
of theft deterrence. Mandating the most secure (and expensive)
military-style solution, such as the Boeing black phone, may
provide the maximum possible level of theft deterrence.
However, the expense of implementing it may not be
commercially feasible: a cheaper hardware implementation
alternative may be provide nearly as much deterrence at a farreduced cost.
The optimal solution may be a mixed
software/hardware implementation at the knee of the curve
that provides a high level amount of theft deterrence at a
cheaper cost.
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2. A SIMPLISTIC MODEL OF THEFT BEHAVIOR
An empirical study on theft deterrence versus kill
switch technologies that takes into account factors such as the
notice of a kill switch to thieves, the amount of implementation
cost that industry is willing to absorb if mandated by law, and
the cost of jailbreaking each level of kill switch technology
would be useful to flesh out what an optimal solution may look
like. Finally, a study on whether smartphone thieves are
rational actors would be useful. This is because models such as
the one illustrated above operate on a number of assumptions
that may be incorrect. The following simplified model of
thieving behavior demonstrates that—assuming thieves are
rational actors—much is unknown about why thefts occur. If a
kill switch solution misunderstands the reason for theft, it may
prove costly and ineffective. For example, a thief’s decision in
deciding to steal a smartphone can be represented by the
following equation.
Steal if: U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] > 𝑈𝑈[|𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)|],

where U represents utility, E(phone) represents the expected
value of the stolen smartphone, and E(caught) represents the
expected value of getting caught. U[E(phone)] may be calculated
as follows.
U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = {[1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ, 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ) − 𝑝𝑝(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)]
∗ 𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)]}
+ {[𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ, 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ) − 𝑝𝑝 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)]
∗ 𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)]} + 𝛽𝛽,

where 𝛽𝛽 represents any extraneous positive or negative utility
(over the sale value) that a thief gets from successfully stealing
and selling a phone. Further, U[|E(caught)|] may be calculated
as follows.
U[|𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)|] = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) ∗ |𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)|

60

4 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2016)

If we assume a 15% catch rate of thieves and a 75%
probability of a thief evading capture and encountering an
unbreakable kill switch, we have the following incentive
structure:
U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = (.1)* 𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] +

(.6)* 𝐸𝐸[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)] + 𝛽𝛽.

To continue working through the simplified model, assume a
thief can net $200 profit on average for fencing a jailbroken
phone and a $100 profit on average from either selling the parts
on a kill-switch-enabled phone or (if available) paying a hacker
to bypass the kill switch. A thief can expect:
U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = 80 + 𝛽𝛽;

Steal if : 80 + 𝛽𝛽 > 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)

A rational thief will therefore steal the phone so long as
the expected value of stealing a phone (here, 80 + 𝛽𝛽) exceeds
the expected value loss from being caught. Assuming that 𝛽𝛽 is
nominal and the probability of being caught remains 15%, a
rational thief will steal a phone unless his expected value loss
from being caught is greater than roughly $533:
(. 15) ∗ 𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) ≥ 80,

𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢: |𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)| ≥ ≈ 533

To take it a step further, even assuming that a thief has
a 100% chance of either being caught or encountering a kill
switch (say, 𝑝𝑝(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) = .15 and 𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ, 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ) =
.85), the thief may still gain utility from selling the parts or
awaiting a hack to bypass the switch:
U[E(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)] = (0)* 200 + (.7)* 100 + 𝛽𝛽 = 70 + 𝛽𝛽;

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: 70 + 𝛽𝛽 > 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡);
(. 15) ∗ 𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡) ≥ 70,

𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢: |𝐸𝐸(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡)| ≥ ≈ 467

Thus, a rational thief who fully comprehends the existence and
effect of a kill switch ubiquitous on all phones could still decide
to steal a phone, if only to make a profit off of selling hardware
or data on the black market.
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Clearly, this exercise does not purport to represent the reality of
thieving behavior, but rather to show how difficult it is to
understand the rationale behind stealing a phone. An endless
number of additional assumptions can be introduced to the
model (such as a negative effect on utility when encountering a
kill-switch-enabled phone to represent confusion), and the
model still remains a gross oversimplification of reality. The
core assumption that thieves are rational actors is also
incredibly dubious. Most phone thieves probably won’t bother
to calculate a detailed incentives equation like the one above,
and thus they may not respond well to changing incentives (like
the introduction of kill switches).

C. COULD VIGILANTISM HURT THE KILL SWITCH’S SAFETY
OBJECTIVE?
The stated objective of both the SOS initiative and the
various kill switch bills in state legislatures is to increase
consumer safety by preventing (violent) theft. However, only
11% of smartphone theft involves a robber taking a smartphone
from a person. 81 Moreover, 68% of theft victims reported a
willingness to resort to vigilantism to recover their
smartphones. 82 New apps such as Find My iPhone offer GPS
tracking capabilities for those desperate to recover their
smartphones, stirring worries among law enforcement officials
that people are putting themselves and others in danger. 83
“Some have been successful,” said George Gascón, the San
Francisco district attorney and a former police chief, “others
have gotten hurt.” 84
Pursuing a thief can lead to violence, especially when
people arm themselves—hammers are popular—while hunting
for stolen smartphones. A New Jersey man was arrested after

LOOKOUT, supra note5.
Id.
83 Ian Lovett, When Hitting ‘Find My iPhone’ Takes You to a Thief’s
Doorstep, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2014), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/us/when-hitting-find-myiphone-takes-you-to-a-thiefs-doorstep.html.
84 Id.
81
82
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he tracked his stolen smartphone and ended up attacking the
wrong man, mistaking him for the thief. 85
A kill switch could lead to increased violence in three
ways. First, the way in which it is implemented could make it
easier to track a stolen smartphone and take the law into one’s
own hands. Second, a thief who knows that an owner can brick
a stolen smartphone may violently attack the owner during the
robbery to prevent the owner from recovering and “bricking”
the stolen smartphone too soon. Third, if the “bricked”
smartphone displays the owner’s address, as some security
apps and MDM solutions do, that could invite retribution from
a frustrated thief. 86 Further investigation of whether a kill
switch implementation would increase vigilantism and
violence above the level already occurring with apps such as
Find My iPhone is critical before defining a kill switch standard
and settling on a particular implementation.
However, vigilantism is also fueled by the dismissive
responses that victims of theft receive from manufacturers and
service carriers. For example, a victim who tracked his stolen
smartphone to a particular house and called AT&T was given
two options by the carrier: either deactivate the phone and buy
a new one, or find a cop willing to subpoena AT&T for
information, file a lengthy police report, and go through a long
bureaucratic process. 87 Manufacturers and carriers have little
incentive to help a victim recover a device because the
manufacturer profits by hawking a replacement phone; and the
carrier profits by locking the crime victim into a new contract,
then opening an account with whomever ends up with the
stolen phone. 88 Carriers even profit from the specter of phone
theft, by selling expensive insurance policies to protect their
users. A mandatory kill switch could reverse this trend and
potentially reverse the need for vigilantism by turning stolen
smartphones worthless or promoting their recovery.

D. EXEMPT DEVICES COULD REDUCE THEFT DETERRENCE

Id.
MORLEY, supra note 68.
87 Swan, supra note 17.
88 Id.
85
86
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As we describe in Part V, the millions of older versions
of smartphones still in use by the deployment deadline would
defeat the theft deterrence objective of the kill switch legislation
by around two years. In addition, the presence of other exempt
devices would also drag the level of deterrence downward. For
example, the California Senate Energy, Utilities, and
Communication Committee listed the following exempt
devices that would not be required to have a kill switch.
All devices that fall within the exception for
resale and pawnbrokers; All devices sold out of
state and brought into California; All devices
currently in the market, which customers
typically replace every 18 to 24 months; All
devices provided “free” as part of a promotion
or a wireless lifeline plan; and All devices that,
even if rendered inoperable by a kill switch, may
have value for parts. 89
Such devices would continue to have value for resale on the
black market. Moreover, the potentially large number of such
devices in use would incentivize thieves to take their chances
with a kill switch and continue with smartphone theft.

E. The Power of Default
The various pieces of legislation mandating a kill switch
for smartphones have provisions stating that each smartphone
sold must have the kill switch enabled but that consumers
should have the ability to disable the kill switch upon purchase.
On the other hand, the CTIA and third-party security app
vendors such as Absolute would prefer that any kill switch be
deployed on an opt-in basis, with consumers choosing whether
to opt in to the program. While an opt-in program puts
consumer choice front and center in deciding how a kill switch
89 California Senate, Energy, Utilities and Communications
Committee, March 24, 2014,
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?
bill_id=201320140SB962&search_keywords (click Bill Analysis tab,
then click the link titled “03/28/14 – Senate, Utilities And
Communications”).
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would be deployed, the choice of whether a kill switch program
is opt-in or opt-out will have a significant impact of whether kill
switches will be adopted by the majority of smartphone
owners.
The choice of the default position is based on three
assumptions from behavioral economics.
First, more
consumers stay with the default than would choose to do so if
forced to choose. 90 Second, only consumers who prefer the optout choice will opt out. And third, where carriers oppose the
default position, they will be forced to explain it to smartphone
owners, resulting in well-informed decisions by consumers.
However, Professor Willis asserts, in the privacy context, that
these assumptions are unlikely to hold.
The default position, such as an opt-in kill switch,
favored by companies is often surrounded by a powerful
campaign to keep consumers there, but a default position set
contrary to company interests can be met with an equally
powerful campaign to drive consumers out. 91 Therefore,
companies can either bolster the mechanisms behind the inertia
that leads consumers to stick with defaults or they can weaken
them to induce consumers to opt out. Rather than forcing
companies to facilitate consumer exercise of informed choice,
many defaults leave companies with opportunities to play on
consumer biases or confuse consumers into sticking with or
opting out of the default. 92 However, to really deter theft,
smartphones will require near–100 % adoption, such that
thieves stop taking the chance that a given smartphone will
have the kill switch disabled.

F. TRACKING LOCAL SMARTPHONE SALES AND INCREASED
PENALTIES FOR IMEI WIPING
In 2013, New York State Senate Co-Leader Jeffrey Klein
and Assemblyman Jeff Dinowitz, Chair of the Assembly’s
Consumer Affairs and Protection Committee, introduced new
legislation to require smartphone sellers to prove that they are

Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy By Default?, 29 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 61 (forthcoming 2014).
91 Id.
92 Id..
90
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the rightful owners of the phones they sell. 93 The objective of
the legislation is to curtail the local black market for stolen
smartphones. Non-compliant sellers face the possibility of
steep fines or jail time. 94 The state lawmakers hope that this
legislation would stop stolen smartphones being sold at
neighborhood stores, laundromats, and flea market stands.
The legislation would require smartphone sellers to
provide detailed receipts for every phone sold, including the
IMEI number. It is hoped that these records could provide
additional information on how and where stolen phones move
in the marketplace. However, Arieanna Schweber of Absolute
Software claims that although the bill could make the sale of
stolen mobile phones locally more difficult, it will not diminish
the demand for stolen devices. 95 This is because the majority of
stolen smartphones are now being shipped abroad. Therefore,
local legislation will likely be inadequate to address the global
issue.
Also in 2013, U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer
reintroduced legislation that would make it a federal crime to
wipe an IMEI number by imposing a five-year criminal
penalty. 96 Senator Schumer noted that without a criminal
penalty for tampering with IMEI numbers, thieves could
simply alter the IMEI number to evade carrier registries and
reactivate a smartphone phone. Because the bill has the full
support of the CTIA and the FCC, it could prevent reactivation
of stolen smartphones. However, it may have little deterrence
value if smartphones are primarily being stolen for an
international black market.

VII. ADDITIONAL CONCERNS AND PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES
OF A MANDATORY KILL SWITCH

S. 5976, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22761(c) (West 2014) (“The
knowing retail sale of a smartphone in California . . . may be subject
to a civil penalty”).
95 Arieanna Schweber, New York Legislators Propose Law to Reduce
Black Market for Mobile Devices, INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 21, 2013),
http://theft319.rssing.com/browser.php?indx=16105444&item=24.
96 S. 1070, 112th Cong. (2013).
93
94
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A government-mandated kill switch, as opposed to
allowing individuals to make their own security choices, raises
several additional concerns and risks of misuse and
surveillance.

A. GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL
Although Internet companies and government agencies
already track bulk and targeted data on the Internet,
individuals today have the ability to erase and block tracking
cookies, prevent the transmission of specified local data, and
even use encryption technology, given enough technical
savvy. 97 However, mandatory phone kill switches have the
potential to significantly increase government surveillance and
control over speech and political behavior. On August 11, 2011,
the Bay Area Rapid Transit system (BART) shut down
cellphone service to four stations in San Francisco in response
to a planned protest, because in July 2011 protesters disrupted
BART service in response to the fatal shooting of a passenger by
BART police. 98 BART first approached carriers directly and
asked them to turn off service. Later, a BART officer asserted
that “BART staff or contractors shut down power to the nodes
and alerted the cell carriers” after the fact. 99 A smartphone kill
switch that the government can control by exerting authority
over carriers could even more greatly empower the government
to squelch political protests by disrupting smartphone service
and making organization and coordination of citizen
movements or protests difficult.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) compared
BART’s actions with those of former President Hosni Mubarak
of Egypt who ordered the shutdown of cellphone service in
Thomas Claburn, Kill Switches: Phones Just the Start,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Feb. 19, 2014, 9:06 AM),
http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/mobile-devices/killswitches-phones-just-the-start/d/d-id/1113887.
98 Eva Galperin, BART Pulls a Mubarak in San Francisco, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Aug. 12, 2011),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/08/bart-pulls-mubarak-sanfrancisco.
99 Id. (quoting James Allison, deputy chief communications officer for
BART).
97
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Tahrir Square in response to peaceful, democratic protests in
2011. 100 Moreover, British Prime Minister David Cameron is
considering new, broad censorship powers over social
networks, such as Facebook and Twitter and mobile
communication in the UK. 101 The ability to peremptorily
control smartphone kill switches could have grave concerns for
free speech and democracy. However, BART was able to shut
down cellphones without a kill switch. Therefore, whether kill
switches really represent a broad enlargement of the
government’s power requires information on how much a kill
switch would add to the government’s current ability to turn
off smartphone communications. The advantage of a kill switch
that the government has the ability to control is that it could
prevent theft of trade secrets and national secrets from stolen
smartphones. Further study would be welcome on how this
would work with or without the consent of the smartphone’s
owner.

B. INSECURE NON-OWNER CONTROL
As the CTIA points out, even if a kill switch is
technologically feasible, it could have serious risks. If a
mandatory kill switch is created, every smartphone would have
the capability. Depending on the implementation, the “kill”
message could be known to every operator and could not be
kept secret. 102 A private party with malicious intent could
therefore replicate the “kill” message, such as a text or other
message sent to the smartphone to disable it. In another
scenario, if “killing” a smartphone requires a call to the carrier,
that call could be placed by an identity theft who does not
possess the smartphone or an abusive spouse who actually
owns the family account to which his wife’s smartphone is tied.
Where a smartphone is disabled by the malicious use of a “kill
switch,” the safety of the user may be jeopardized, as in the
Id.
James Kirkup, UK Riots: Tougher Powers Could Curb Twitter, THE
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 12, 2011, 8:20 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8697142/UKriots-tougher-powers-could-curb-Twitter.html.
102 CTIA, Why a “Kill Switch” Isn’t the Answer,
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Why_a_Kill_Switch_Isn_t_the_Answer.pdf
.
100
101
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abusive spouse scenario, because the wife will be unable to
make emergency calls.
By sending multiple messages, such as by incrementing
the telephone number or IMEI number, groups of smartphones
could be disabled. This could be used to disable entire groups
of customers, such as the Department of Defense, the
Department of Homeland Security or emergency services and
law enforcement. 103 If the kill switch is a permanent switch, a
smartphone could be disabled forever. The risk of denial of
service could be far too large. Therefore, the carrier community
maintains that control of operation (and denial of service) be
embedded in the network and not at the smartphone-level. 104

C. FARADAY BAG WORKAROUNDS
Driven by high prices for non-contract smartphones
overseas, the underground trade of stolen smartphones has
now become a global enterprise that connects violent street
thieves in American cities with buyers as far away as Hong
Kong, according to law enforcement and the wireless industry.
Jerry Deaven, an agent with the Department of Homeland
Security, which is tasked with preventing the trafficking of
stolen goods, told The Huffington Post that traffickers are
responsible for “a tremendous amount of phones being shipped
out of the country,” adding that “some organizations are
shipping a couple million dollars worth of phones per
month.” 105 Some stolen smartphones are placed into Faraday
Bags immediately after being stolen to block GPS tracking.
Further study is required on whether a Faraday Bag could be
used to circumvent a kill switch, and, if so, whether a
smartphone stolen in the U.S. could then be activated abroad.
How about a stolen smartphone with a “kill switch” taken from
Id.
Id.
105 Gerry Smith, Inside the Massive Global Black Market for Smartphones,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2013, 2:56 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/13/smartphone-blackmarket_n_3510341.html?utm_hp_ref=iphone-theft.
103
104
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California in a Faraday Bag to Arizona or Nevada, states
without corresponding kill switch legislation. Ultimately the
answers to these questions will help determine whether a kill
switch would be a better solution than carrier registries, and, if
so, help drive the design of an optimal kill switch.

D. MINIMIZING THE BURDEN ON SMARTPHONE OWNERS
Finally, the amount of user effort needed to deal with
kill switch systems, including notifying carriers in the event of
theft or loss, reversing the data wipe and "un-bricking" a
smartphone after recovery, or heading off the kill command in
the event a misplaced smartphone is found, should not burden
smartphone owners in the same way passwords do. For
example, computer users today are required or strongly
encouraged to employ different, long, and complicated
passwords on each of multiple devices: laptops, tablets,
desktops; and multiple accounts: financial websites, health
websites, company logins, Google, etc. 106
The Office of California Attorney General Kamala
Harris advises users and businesses on computer security,
including using firewalls, anti-virus software, and complex
passwords. 107 However, passwords have done little to prevent
hacking of sensitive information and cyber-attacks. California
businesses and the government have experienced 300 separate
data breaches exposing the personal information of more than
20 million customer accounts during the past two years. 108
Complex password requirements therefore simply burden
users without actually preventing hacking. Any proposed kill
switch technology and carrier response protocols should be
Chenda Ngak, The 25 Most Common Passwords of 2013, CBS NEWS
(Jan. 21, 2014, 11:14 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-25most-common-passwords-of-2013 (“[T]he top three passwords of
[2013] are ‘123456,’ ‘password’ and ‘12345678’.”).
107 State of California, Office of the Attorney General, Is Your
Computer Secure?, http://oag.ca.gov/privacy/facts/onlineprivacy/computer-secure.
108 Don Thompson, California to Step Up Cybersecurity Efforts After
Hundreds of DatauBreaches, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 27, 2014,
10:26 AM),
http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_25240431/californiastep-up-cybersecurity-efforts-after-hundreds-data.
106
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designed to minimize the burden on users while burdening
smartphone thieves instead. A study on the lessons the
industry or analysts have learned from the failed decades-long
password experiment would be useful to prevent repeating this
costly mistake on smartphone kill switches.

VIII. EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES:
PATCHWORK REGULATION IN A NATIONAL /
INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE
The decentralized nature of the mandatory kill switch
movement presents a host of concerns for proper
implementation of an effective and democratic solution. The
practical reality of state-by-state piecemeal legislation is that the
bigger, more influential states tend to drive policy. Thus, while
Minnesota has passed its kill switch legislation and gained a
first mover’s advantage, pragmatically the bill only applies to
phones sold or purchased new in Minnesota. This is not to say
that threats of foreclosing a state market will have no effect on
phone providers—risking infringement of the Minnesota bill
may encourage all phone manufacturers and carriers to comply
with the kill switch mandate. However, patchwork state
mandates of kill switches may do little to deter thieves,
particularly where there is doubt over where the phone was
bought.
The real test of the legislation’s viability (and the site of
potential legal challenges) however arises in the larger states
where more phones are sold. Hence, California and New York
are the likely battlegrounds for policy development and
industry regulation.
Because roughly one-eighth of all
Americans live in California, and Apple and Google are based
there, the California law may very well produce an immediate
national default. 109
This potential California effect risks legislating national
policy at the state level and may very well overstep the ability
of other democratically elected leaders to have a say in how kill
109 Wagenseil, supra note 16. See also Elizabeth Weise, Google,
Microsoft to add “kill switches” to phones, USA Today (June 20, 2014,
3:11 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/06/20/googlemicrosoft-kill-switches/11083511/.
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switches should be adopted, if they should at all. The CTIA
claims, for instance, that the Minnesota bill creates interstate
commerce concerns “because it heavily burdens the national
wireless device and service market by dictating operational and
technical specifications of mobile devices.” 110 At the same time,
coordinating state legislation is potentially challenging,
unnecessary, and time-consuming. According to the Secure
Our Smartphones initiative, twenty-three state Attorneys
General support the proposal, among many other district
attorneys and other state political figures. 111 Many of these
states whose attorneys general support a mandatory kill switch
may simply prefer to conserve political resources and allow
other states, like California, to drive the policy. Kill switch
opponents, however, will then likely argue that such a proposal
has no opportunity to be debated by democratically elected
state representatives, who may have valuable input on the
matter. In truth, kill switch bills are not passing legislatures
easily. There are only five state bills and one federal bill passed
or pending, and California’s version was rejected once in the
state senate before narrowly passing recently. 112 The federal kill
switch bill, which would pose fewer of the risks that accompany
state piecemeal legislation, has experienced little movement
since being announced in February 2014.
Technological mandates in general are difficult to
accomplish successfully by government legislation, much less
state-by-state legislation. As the CTIA explains, there is little
reason to “limit consumer choice by mandating the use of any
solution . . . [because] [a]ny mandated technology standard will
quickly become outdated in the fast-moving world of wireless
Jamie Hastings, Vice President of External & State Affairs, CTIA—
The Wireless Association, Testimony in Opposition to Minnesota
House File 1952, Minnesota House Commerce and Consumer
Protection Finance and Policy Committee, March 19, 2014,
http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/LegislativeActivity/ctia-testimony-in-opposition-to-minnesota-house-file-1952requiring-kill-switches-on-mobile-devices.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
111 Secure Our Smartphone Initiative Members, Office of New York
Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman,
http://www.ag.ny.gov/sos/initiative-members.
112 Chloe Albanesius, California State Senate Rejects Smartphone KillSwitch Bill, PC MAGAZINE (April 25, 2014, 10:35 AM),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2457117,00.asp.
110
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applications and technology.” 113 The private sector’s hesitance
to accept government technology mandates is not
unreasonable, particularly in a sector of rapid innovation like
mobile phones. Politicians, many of whom have little technical
comprehension of the issue, are likely not the ideal decisionmakers on how technology must be used.
Nonetheless, there is a fitting example of an effective
technological mandate on a similar issue as the smartphone kill
switch. Car theft laws, passed in the 1980s and 1990s,
successfully decreased auto theft by increasing penalties for
thieves and mandating implementation of anti-theft vehicle
identification numbers on the engine, transmission, and other
main body parts (which became illegal to remove). 114 This
movement, however, was aided in large part by federal
legislation, namely the 1984 Motor Vehicle Theft Law
Enforcement Act, which federally implemented the above, and
the 1994 Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Act, which mandated
federal cooperation with states to create an opt-in program
whereby volunteers would consent to law enforcement
stopping the car if it were operated in certain conditions (such
as late at night). 115 Further, the anti-auto-theft movement had
federal oversight of exported cars to check for owner vehicle
identification numbers. 116
Clearly, no such solution is viable for smartphones,
which are smaller and harder to track. While no authoritative
data exists on this point, the international black market
certainly provides an integral boon to smartphone theft.
Especially in countries where smartphones are not widely
imported, stolen phones can sell for incredibly high amounts
that only reinforce the motive to internationally traffic stolen
phones. In March 2013, California charged two men with
operating a stolen phone trafficking ring to Hong Kong from
which they made over $4 million in a year. 117 Another man
Jamie Hastings, supra note 110.
National Auto Auction Association, History of Auto Theft
Legislation: Federal Legislation, (accessed June 5, 2014),
http://www.naaa.com/NAAA_Legislative/history_auto-theft.html.
115 Id.
116 Id. (under the 1984 Motor Vehicle Theft Law Enforcement Act).
117 Gerry Smith, Inside the Massive Global Black Market for Smartphones,
Huffington Post (July 13, 2013, 2:56 PM),
113
114
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being charged reportedly bought iPhones from people at coffee
shops for $250 to $350 and trafficked them on his person to
Vietnam, eleven at a time, making trips as often as he could,
apparently making enough profit to justify the trips. 118
Anecdotes such as these highlight the limits with even a
comprehensive federal regulation aimed at deterring
smartphone theft. A patchwork approach of kill switch
mandates risks exploitation by both inter-state limitations and
international black market workarounds. Mandatory kill
switches, regardless of how effective they may seem, face many
roadblocks to attaining their stated goal of deterring theft.

IX. CONCLUSIONS AND A CONCISE LIST OF OPEN QUESTIONS
As we have shown in this paper, the stakeholders in the
kill switch debate, including legislators, smartphone
manufacturers, and carriers are each operating on the basis of a
large number of assumptions and unknowns, including the
following:
• What an optimal technical implementation of a kill
switch at no additional cost to the consumer would be,
including whether it should be implemented in
software, hardware, or an automated form of the
present manual IMEI blocking registries;
• What role MDM solutions and carrier registries will
play in or out of an environment in which kill switches
are deployed;
• Whether the large increase in smartphone theft is
because thieves are specially targeting smartphones or
whether smartphone theft is only incidental or
unrelated to typical robberies;
• Whether an effective kill switch will actually deter theft
or only incentivize them to ship more stolen
smartphones to the international black market; and
• Whether a kill switch presents concerns, such as
government surveillance and malicious activation or
circumvention.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/13/smartphone-blackmarket_n_3510341.html.
118 Id.
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In addition to the assumptions and unknowns above,
there are significant practical concerns about actually
implementing a kill switch at no cost to the consumer across
varying industry smartphone platforms and operating systems
by the legislation’s deadline of July 1, 2015. A necessary first
step to such an implementation would be for the wireless
industry to properly define kill switch standards so each
manufacturer could conform their hardware, operating
systems, and design platform accordingly. The short runway
presented by the state bills allows very little time for such
standard-setting activity. Requiring a solution too soon may
not consider the balance between (1) the nature, urgency and
magnitude of the problem, and (2) the cost, harm to innovation,
and burden on the wireless industry of any mandated change.
For example, in discussing the possibility of adding a theftresistant “kill switch” to future iPhone models, Apple noted
that the next two generations of the iPhone have already been
developed, and were designed before Steve Jobs’s death in late
2011. 119 Therefore, the challenges of effectively implementing a
technological mandate too quickly could be a significant
burden on smartphone manufacturers to modify their planned
pipeline of designs.
Developing sound policy to deter smartphone theft
would therefore benefit from more in-depth investigation of
smartphone theft psychology, the mechanics of the black
market for smartphones, the merits of technological solutions,
and how to most effectively implement an overall solution. The
time for such investigation is now, as the landmark California
legislation’s mandate goes into effect on July 1, 2015.

APPENDIX: SELECTED TEXT OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
There are four state bills and one federal bill demanding
mandatory kill switches: California S.B. 962; Minnesota H.B.
1952; Illinois S.B. 3539; New York A.B. 8984; and the federal
Smartphone Theft Prevention Act, H.R. 4065. Minnesota’s bill
was signed into law on May 14, 2014, while California’s bill
Daniel E. Dilger, Apple Gov’t Rep Says Next Two iPhones Were
Designed Under Steve Jobs, APPLEINSIDER (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:03 PM),
http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/04/01/apple-govt-rep-saysnext-two-iphones-were-designed-under-steve-jobs.
119
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passed the state senate on May 8, 2014 and became law on
August 25, 2014. What follows is a brief description of key text
from the bills.
California legislation S.B. 962 applies to smartphones
manufactured and sold in California on or after July 1, 2015. It
requires these smartphones to “[i]nclude a technological
solution . . . [that] can render the essential features of the
smartphone inoperable to an unauthorized user” (emphasis
added). This technological solution “may consist of software,
hardware, or a combination of both software and hardware.”
Here are some selected quotes from the bill, with underlines of
key phrases:
• “The technological solution should be able to
withstand a hard reset or operating system
downgrade, come preequipped, and the default
setting of the solution shall be to prompt the
consumer to enable the solution during the initial
device setup.”
• “‘Essential features’ of a smartphone are the ability
to use the device for voice communications, text
messaging, and browse the Internet, including the
ability to access and use mobile software
applications.”
• “The technological solution shall be reversible, so
that if the rightful owner obtains possession of the
device after the essential features of the smartphone
have been rendered inoperable, the operation of
those essential features can be restored by an
authorized user.”
• “An authorized user of a smartphone may
affirmatively elect to disable or opt-out of enabling
the technological solution at any time.”
• “In order to be effective, antitheft technological
solutions need to be ubiquitous, as thieves cannot
distinguish between those smartphones that have
the solutions enabled and those that do not.”
• “The Legislature finds and declares that the
enactment of a uniform policy to deter thefts of
smartphones and to protect the privacy of
smartphone users if their smartphones are
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involuntarily acquired by others is a matter of
statewide concern.”

Minnesota H.B. 1952, now passed as law, becomes
effective on July 1, 2015 on all smartphones sold or purchased
new in Minnesota. It provides that these smartphones “must
be equipped with technology designed to render the device
inoperable in the event of theft or loss.” Here are some selected
quotes from the bill:
• “Smart phone does not include an electronic reader,
tablet, or other similar device not primarily intended
for two-way voice communication.”
• “[Must] be reversible in the event of the smart
phone’s recovery by its owner”
• “Lock all of the smart phone’s user data, and ensure
that it is only accessible to the user or a law
enforcement officer subject to a valid search
warrant”
• “Render the smart phone core functionality
inoperable on any wireless telecommunications
service provider’s network globally”
• “Prevent the smart phone from being reactivated
without a passcode or other similar authorization,
even if the device is reprogrammed, is turned off
and subsequently turned back on, has its network
connectivity disabled and subsequently re-enabled,
or has its SIM card removed”
New York’s proposed A.B. 8984 (which did not make it
out of the legislative committee) would be applicable to any
advanced mobile communications device sold in New York on
or after July 1, 2015, with “advanced mobile communications
device” defined very similarly to California’s definition with
the exception of including tablets. A.B. 8984’s description of the
kill switch functionality is also highly similar to California’s,
and its legislative intent tracks the rationale of California as
well. The following two quotes are also of note:
• “It is the further intent of the legislature to prohibit
any term or condition in a service contract between
a customer and a commercial mobile radio service
provider that requires or encourages the customer to
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disable the technological solution that renders the
customer’s smartphone or other advanced
communications device useless if stolen.”
“The rightful owner of an advanced mobile
communications device may affirmatively elect to
disable the technological solution after sale.
However, the physical acts necessary to disable to
the technological solution may only be performed
by the end-use consumer or a person specifically
selected by the end-use consumer to disable the
technological solution and shall not be physically
performed by any retail seller of the advanced
mobile communications device.”

Illinois proposed S.B. 3539 (which did not make it out of
the legislative committee) would apply immediately upon
passage to any smartphones manufactured and sold in Illinois.
S.B. 3539 is similar to the other legislation, but uniquely would
require all violating providers to insure the phones at no cost to
the consumer, rather than levying a per-phone monetary
penalty. The following quotes are of note:
• “‘Smartphone’ means a cellular phone that is built
on a mobile operating system and possesses
advanced computing capability. Features a smart
phone may possess include, but are not limited to,
built-in applications, Internet access, digital voice
service, text messaging, e-mail, and Internet
browsing.”
• “[P]ermanently remove all saved data on the
device”
• “[R]ender the smart phone completely inoperable
on any wireless telephone service provider’s
network, including a wireless telephone service
provider’s global network”
• “[P]revent the smart phone from being reactivated
or reprogrammed without a password or other
similar authorization”
• “[D]isable the device even if it is turned off or the
SIM card or other data storage medium is removed”
• “[B]e reversible if the device is recovered by its
owner.”
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The federal proposed Smartphone Theft Prevention Act,
H.R. 4065, would have applied beginning January 1, 2015 on
any mobile device manufactured in the U.S. or imported for sale
to the public in the U.S. (it did not make it out of legislative
committee). It would have covered any “‘mobile device’
[which] means a personal electronic device on which
commercial mobile service or commercial mobile data service is
provided” and included an exemption for any technology that
“accomplishes the functional equivalent of the function”
defined in the bill as being able to remotely and costlessly:
• “Delete or render inaccessible from the device all
information relating to the account holder that has
been placed on the device”
• “Render the device inoperable on the network of
any provider of commercial mobile service or
commercial mobile data service globally, even if the
device is turned off or has the data storage medium
removed”
• “Prevent the device from being reactivated or
reprogrammed without a passcode or similar
authorization after the device has been rendered
inoperable or subject to an unauthorized factory
reset”
• “[R]everse any action . . . if the device is recovered
by the account holder.”
In response to these pieces of legislation, the CTIA has
produced its own voluntary opt-in commitment for carriers and
manufacturers. The main provisions are as follows:
• Remote wipe the authorized user’s data that is on
the smartphone in the event it is lost or stolen.
• Render the smartphone inoperable to an
unauthorized user (e.g., locking the smartphone so
it cannot be used without a password or PIN),
except in accordance with FCC rules for 911
emergency communications, and if available,
emergency numbers programmed by the authorized
user (e.g., “phone home”).

COULD KILL SWITCHES KILL PHONE THEFT?
•

•
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Prevent reactivation without authorized user’s
permission (including unauthorized factory reset
attempts) to the extent technologically feasible
Reverse the inoperability if the smartphone is
recovered by the authorized user and restore user
data on the smartphone to the extent feasible (e.g.,
restored from the cloud).

BITCOIN: THE CONFLICTING CURRENCY
SEAN GREENWALT, B.A.
INTRODUCTION
Bitcoins are a new and successful form of virtual
currency or digital money. A bitcoin is an electronic item of
value that can be used as a medium for exchange of goods
and services and even conversion to real currency backed
by recognized national governments. Like all new
conceptions that break traditional boundaries, bitcoins or
virtual currencies are still misunderstood from a legal
perspective. Currently, no federal legislation has been
created with respect to virtual currencies, and regulatory
bodies such as the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), the U.S.
Department of Treasury and Financial Crime Enforcement
Network (“FinCEN”), and the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) have all been left to interpret existing
law against the new monetary medium. Meanwhile, federal
courts have only occasionally ruled on the legal status of
bitcoins themselves, but at all times found that the virtual
currency should be treated as a form of online money. While
the federal court rulings are still in infancy, they may pose
complications for certain federal regulatory bodies that
wish for the bitcoin currency to be legally treated as
property such as the IRS.

PROSPECTUS
This note will break down what bitcoins are and
how the federal government is currently classifying and
treating them, before moving towards analyzing how
bitcoins will be classified in the future once full harmony is
reached between all the branches of government. The note
will: analyze the main federal court cases (there are only
three); explain how the federal government has reached the
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classification of bitcoin as money before applying its
significance to IRS, Treasury and SEC publications; and
look at the inconsistent treatment of bitcoins throughout the
government. The note will go on to analyze the IRS and
other regulatory bodies and their treatment of bitcoins as
either property or at least “not currency,” and whether or
not it matters that the federal courts, and regulatory bodies
are inconsistently treating bitcoins for criminal and tax
purposes. Finally, the note will touch on the legislative
opinion (or lack thereof) on bitcoins and how current laws
are meant to apply to them.
Part I of this note will give the history and origin of
bitcoins, and explain where the concept of virtual currency
came from. Parts II and III will discuss the inner workings
of the bitcoin system and how it survives as a viable
currency without a third party facilitator to back its value.
Part IV explains the current U.S. government treatment of
bitcoins by breaking the topic down into subparts for each
government branch: subpart A is the judicial branch,
subpart B is the executive branch, subpart C is the
legislative branch, and subpart D will showcase state
sovereign bitcoin treatment. Part V and VI will analyze the
current state of affairs and determine a likely path for the
legal future of bitcoins and whether or not the different
apparatus’s of the U.S. government have to be in harmony
in their respective bitcoin treatment. Finally, the conclusion
will consider all the relevant factors discussed within the
note in determining the correct current legal standard for
bitcoins.

BITCOINS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM
I. IN THE BEGINNING THERE WAS BITCOIN
Bitcoins are the first open source digital currency to
operate over a peer to peer payment network. 1 Bitcoin is the
world’s first decentralized digital payment system. 2 It does
Bitcoin Project, Frequently Asked Questions,
https://bitcoin.org/en/faq (last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
2 Jerry Brito & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers,
Mercatus Center, George Mason University, 3 (2013),
1
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not require a bank or a middleman. 3 Bitcoins have been
described as “cash for the internet” by some of the
software’s core developers. 4
Bitcoins stemmed from the idea of “cryptocurrency” as coined by one Wei Dai in 1998. 5 The idea was
a new form of currency that used encryption to control
inflation and transactions, instead of a centralized
authority. 6 The bitcoin concept itself and supporting
software specifications were first published in 2009 by one
Satoshi Nakamoto to a cryptography mailing list. 7
Nakamoto left bitcoin development in 2010, and details of
his past and whether or not he was a real person or just a
pseudonym have been speculative ever since. 8 However,
the bitcoin concept continued to grow and has since been
fostered by a group of “core developers.” 9 Bitcoin itself is
simply openly shared software that any developer could
review or even make their own version of. 10
Bitcoins are not technically controlled by anyone.
While a group of core developers improve and manage the
software, the core developers have no power to force bitcoin
users to use a completely changed bitcoin software. 11
Bitcoins will only work when there is a consensus of users
using the same software version, and therefore all users and
developers have a strong motivation to keep the bitcoin
system constant. 12
II. BITCOIN 101
For the average bitcoin user, the digital currency is
simply a computer application that provides a digital
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Brito_BitcoinPrimer.pd
f.
3 Id.
4 Bitcoin Project, supra note 1.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, Wired (Nov. 23,
2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/11/mf_bitcoin/all/.
9 Bitcoin Project, supra note 1.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
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“wallet” and allows for bitcoins (the form and
denomination of the digital currency) to be sent and
received in an effort to create consideration. 13 The value of
bitcoins are not derived from any precious metal or
government, but only what people believe they are worth. 14
However, what makes bitcoins special is that they created a
solution to a fundamental problem that plagued all past
incarnations of virtual currency.
The issue with past decentralized digital currency is
that it lacked a trusted third party intermediary. 15 For the
majority of transactions over the internet, a service such as
PayPal or Visa records the transaction and keeps a record or
a “ledger” of the user’s account balance. 16 Without such
third-parties to act as ledgers, decentralized digital
currencies could easily fall prey to “double-spending”. 17
This means the digital currency could possibly be spent
multiple times. 18 The double-spending problem arises from
the format of digital currency: if the currency is truly just a
digital computer file, what is to stop its circulators from
simply copying the file and sending it to multiple
destinations?
Bitcoins are the first format of digital currency to
solve the problem of double spending.19 Bitcoins
accomplish this feat by creating a public ledger called the
“block chain” that records every user’s transaction. 20 All
new transactions are checked against the block chain to
ensure that previous bitcoins are not being used again by
the same user. 21 Each bitcoin transaction is verified by
requiring the parties to “sign” their transaction with a key
code. 22 Every signature includes two types of key codes: a
public key and a private key. 23 The two types of keys are
Bitcoin Project, supra note 1.
Brito & Castillo, supra note 2, at 4.
15 Id. at 3.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19Id. at 4.
20 Bitcoin Project, supra note 1.
21 Brito & Castillo, supra note 2, at 4.
22 Id.
23 Id.
13
14
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used in every signature help prevent fraud and double
spending. 24
Although each user has a public and private key to
use as a signature for each transaction, the public keys are
not linked to anyone’s identity. 25 This helps bitcoin
transactions stay anonymous, but also raises concerns of
criminal activity. However, the anonymity of bitcoins is
only half-fold. Each bitcoin transaction and public key
records the user’s IP address which can be tracked to them
in case of illegal activity, but there is nothing to stop a user
from using a proxy server for each transaction to hide their
real IP address either. 26 In this regard, bitcoin transactions
can be analogized to cash and a form of public receipt.
Finally, it is speculated, as the bitcoin currency becomes
more adopted, it will become more and more regulated in
line with banking and financial regulations, and total
anonymity will become much more difficult. 27

III. DO STORKS DELIVER BITCOINS?
Since there is no central bank or authority in control
of the bitcoin supply, the bitcoin software application
creates new bitcoins based off of users who voluntarily
verify the “block chain” transactions as discussed earlier. 28
These users that verify the block chain are called “miners”
and in exchange for their work they receive new bitcoins or
an actual transaction fee. 29
However, the bitcoin mining process is more
complicated than just verifying a signature; transactions can
only be verified by using computing power to solve
complex math problems. 30 The equations are designed to
become more complicated as more bitcoins are mined, and
as more bitcoins are mined, transaction fees will replace

Id.
Id. at 8.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 9.
28 Id. at 5.
29 Bitcoin Project, supra note 1.
30 Brito & Castillo, supra note 2, at 7.
24
25
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bitcoins as compensation for mining. 31 The bitcoin system is
designed like a traditional money system based off precious
metals or items of value because the number of bitcoins that
can ever be mined has been limited to 21 million as part of
the software’s parameters. 32 This is in opposition to most
government monetary structures that operate under fiat
conditions where the amount of money in circulation can be
continuously created. However, similar to the fiat system is
the fact that bitcoin value is only as much as the public
ascribes to it.

IV. DOES UNCLE SAM KNOW ABOUT THIS?
Unfortunately, there is a dark side to bitcoin use,
and things are not as homologous as they could be within
the United States Government branches. For the purpose of
judicial proceedings, the U.S. District Courts and executive
regulatory bodies are split on whether bitcoins qualify as
money or property.

A. TELL IT TO THE JUDGE
On August 6, 2013, the Eastern District of Texas, in
SEC v. Shavers, decided whether or not Investments in a
Bitcoin Trust were considered securities under federal
securities law. 33 It was the first bitcoin definition case heard
around the world.
The Defendant was charged by the SEC with
operating a Ponzi scheme, where investors invested into his
Bitcoin Trust. 34 The Defendant argued that the Bitcoin Trust
investments were not securities by simple virtue, that
bitcoins are not money. 35 The SEC countered that
investments in bitcoins and the Bitcoin Trust are investment
contracts, and therefore, qualify as securities. 36
Id.
Id.
33 SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018,
at *3-4 (E.D. TX. Aug. 6, 2013).
34 Id. at 2-3.
35 Id. at 4.
36 Id.
31
32
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A “security” is “any note, stock, treasury stock,
security future, security-based swap, bond… [or]
investment contract” (Emphasis added). 37 In pertinent
part, an “investment contract” is any contract, scheme, or
transaction involving an investment of money. 38
The Court held that the Bitcoin Trust investment did
amount to an investment of money. 39 However, even more
importantly, the Court specifically identified bitcoins as a
“currency or form of money.” 40 In fashioning its
determination of whether or not the Bitcoin Trust
investments constituted an investment of money, the Court
first notes that “it is clear that bitcoin[s] can be used as
money.” 41 Bitcoins can be “used to purchase goods or
services, and as [the Defendant] stated, used to pay for
living expenses.” 42 While the Court did note that bitcoins
are limited to “those places that accept it as currency,” the
Court also reasoned that this was not a hindrance because
bitcoins can also be exchanged for many strong currencies
such as the U.S. Dollar, Euro, and Yen. For these reasons,
the Court felt that bitcoins do qualify as a “form of
money.” 43
United States Magistrate Judge Amos Mazzant
wrote not only the first opinion by a United States District
Court on the issue of whether bitcoins constitute money, but
he likely also wrote the strongest opinion to this day in
terms of diction on the issue. Judge Mazzant comes right
out and calls bitcoins a “currency or a form of money” 44 It
is important to note that this opinion was written before an
applicable IRS Notice which states bitcoins should be
treated as property (at least for tax purpose, but including
tax crimes). 45 However, the ruling was decided after the
15 U.S.C.S. § 77b (LexisNexis 2016).
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018, at *4 (citing SEC v. W. J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946)).
39 Id. at 5.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 4.
42 Id. at 4-5.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 5.
45 Internal Revenue Service, I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2 (Mar. 25,
2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf.
37

38Shavers,
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U.S. Department of Treasury, Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued an official
Guidance on March 18, 2013, that stated bitcoins are not a
form of currency or legal tender. 46 It’s unclear whether the
Defendant in Shavers relied upon the FinCEN Guidance or
his own logic for his argument. Regardless, Judge Amos
makes no reference to persuasive or binding authority on
either side of the issue.
What stands out about the Shavers ruling is the fact
that it rests on practicality and common knowledge. Since
there is limited federal precedent on the issue, instead of
looking to outside sources and persuasive authority, Judge
Mazzant simply states the attributes of bitcoins in a very Res
Ipsa Loquiter fashion and comes to the conclusion that
bitcoins are indeed money. In later federal cases, a common
theme will be using common sense and common definitions
of money, while ignoring technical definitions of electronic
software or property.
Summary judgment was ruled in favor of the SEC
and against Shavers on September 18, 2014. 47 No appeal had
been filed against the determination of bitcoins as money
ruling, which was a central jurisdiction issue to the case, as
of March 3, 2015.
On July 9, 2014, the Southern District of New York,
in United States v. Ulbrict, involved a Defendant charged
with money laundering conspiracies that involved the
operation of a website known as the Silk Road, which acted
as an online marketplace for illicit goods and services. 48
The Defendant was charged under 18 U.S.C §
1956(h) with participation in a money laundering
conspiracy. 49 The contested element of money laundering
conspiracy by the Defendant involved:

FinCEN Guid. FIN-2013-G001, 1 (Mar. 18, 2013),
http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013G001.pdf.
47 SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130781,
at *38. (E.D. Tex. Sep. 18, 2014).
48 United States v. Ulbricht, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93093, at *1-2.
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014).
49 Id. at 66.
46
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“It was part and an object of the conspiracy
that … the defendant, and others … knowing
that the property involved in certain
financial transactions represented proceeds
of some form of unlawful activity, would
and did conduct and attempt to conduct
such financial transactions, which in fact
involved the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity[.]” (emphasis added). 50

Under the above money laundering statute, a
financial transaction is “the movement of funds by wire or
other means, … or involving one or more monetary
instruments[.]” 51 The term “monetary instrument”
includes: bank checks, personal checks, the currency or coin
of a country, money orders, or negotiable instruments or
investment securities. 52
The Defendant challenged the money laundering
charge by claiming it was impossible for him to launder
money because bitcoins are not “monetary instruments”
that can form the basis of financial transactions. The
Defendant, for his defense, cleverly relied on a very recent
IRS Notice that confirmed the IRS would treat virtual
currency as property and not currency for tax purposes. 53
The Defendant also referenced FinCEN’s recent Guidance
that declared virtual currencies are not “legal tender,” nor
do they have the attributes of real currency which need to
be issued by a country. 54
The Court disagreed, and found the Defendant’s
contention and cited support unpersuasive. The Court
stated that “neither the IRS, nor FinCEN ha[ve] addressed
the question of whether a ‘financial transaction’ can occur
with bitcoins[,]” nor do they have any power to amend and
interpret the money laundering statute for the Courts. 55 The
Court concluded that “financial transaction” is broadly
Id. at 67.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4) (2016).
52 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(5) (2016).
53 See Ulbright, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93093 at 69-70 (citing I.R.S.
Note. 2014-21).
54 Id. (citing FinCEN Guid. FIN-2013-G001).
55 Id. at 69.
50
51
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defined, and it includes all movements of “funds” by any
monetary instrument or other means. 56 The Court applied
the ordinary meaning to the term “funds” because the
definition was not included in the money laundering
statute. 57 Citing to the dictionary definition, “funds” are
defined as “money” and “money” is defined as “an object
used to buy things.” 58
The Court held from these definitions that bitcoins
are indeed encompassed under the term “financial
transaction.” 59 The District Court Judge was either very
careful not to explicitly state that bitcoins are funds or
money or simply pressed for time, but the deduction is selfevident by the Court’s conclusion that bitcoins are
encompassed under “financial transactions,” which include
all movement of funds. 60 The Court held that “[p]ut simply,
‘funds’ can be used to pay for things in the colloquial sense.
Bitcoins can either be used directly to pay for certain things
or can act as a medium of exchange [and] … the value of
bitcoins lie in their ability to pay for things[.]” 61
The Ulbirct Case was the second in a line of three
District Court cases that have shown resistance to any
persuasive authority in regards to the monetary status of
bitcoins, including the previous SEC v. Shavers case. Judge
Forrest, of the Southern District of New York, at times even
appeared hostile to the contention that bitcoins were
anything but money. From an objective point of view, the
interpretation the Court took towards bitcoin was very
practical, opting for a common sense breakdown of what
bitcoins are meant to do, while avoiding technical semantics
of currency and bartering.
A little over a month later, on August 18, 2014, the
Southern District of New York was faced again with the

Id.
Id. at 69-70.
58 Id. at 70 (citing Cambridge Dictionaries Online,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/americanenglish/funds?q=funds (last visited July 3, 2014)).
59 Id. at 71.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 70.
56
57
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issue of whether or not bitcoins qualify as money. 62 This
time with one District Court Judge Jed Rakoff presiding.
The Defendant was charged with operating an unlicensed
money transmitting business under 18 U.S.C. § 1960. 63
18 U.S.C. § 1960 includes references to the words
“money” and “funds.” Under Section 1960, “money
transmitting” is the “transferring funds on behalf of the
public by any and all means.” 64 The Defendant argued that
bitcoins do not qualify as money under Section 1960, and
used the FinCEN Guidance ruling that states bitcoins are
not a currency. 65
The Court disagreed, and like previous cases,
looked to the plain meaning of the words “money” and
“funds.” 66 In this case the court took the time to explain (via
footnote) that words like “funds” or “money” deserve an
ordinary dictionary definition, contrary to any Black Letter
Law definition because the statute 1960 does not even
“remotely” suggest that the words are legal “terms of art,”
thus ordinary meanings are intended, although under most
Black Letter definitions, the result would be the same. 67 The
court found that “money” in ordinary context means
“something generally accepted as a medium of exchange,
measure of value, or a means of payment.” 68 Prominently,
an example of money includes “money of account” which
is “a denominator of value or basis of exchange which is
used in keeping accounts and for which there may or may
not be an equivalent coin or denomination of paper
money.” 69 “Funds” were also defined as “available money

United States v. Faiella, No. 14-cr-243, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116114 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2014).
63 Id. at 2.
64 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2).
65 Faiella, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116114 at 6.
66 Id. at 2.
67 Id.
68 Id. (quoting Merriam-Webster Online, http://www. merriamwebster.com/dictionary/money (last visited Aug. 18, 2014).
69 Id. at 2 (quoting Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/money (last visited Aug. 18,
2014)).
62
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[or] an amount of something that is available for use: a
supply of something.” 70
The Court held that it was obvious bitcoins qualify
as money or funds under their ordinary meanings. 71
Reasoning that “bitcoin[s] can be easily purchased in
exchange for ordinary currency, acts as denominator of
value, and is used to conduct financial transactions. 72 For
the first time, we see a Court cite to persuasive judicial
authority too, quoting SEC v. Shavers, “[i]t is clear that
bitcoin[s] can be used as money … to purchase goods or
services.” 73 The Court also found that Section 1960,
although legislated in 1990, was written to combat
“evolving threats” such as “nonbanking financial
institutions” that “convert street currency into monetary
instruments” for the purpose of drug sales. 74
Judge Rakoff in the Southern District of New York
writes a very broad opinion, but leaves no question as to
what bitcoins are; they are money. In a way, his opinion
seems much more well-rounded than his counterpart Judge
Forrest in Ulbrict. Judge Rakoff made sure to specifically
state that bitcoins are money, and actually cited to
persuasive authority for the first time (albeit he bypasses the
previous Southern District case in favor of SEC v. Shavers).
However, what makes the Faiella opinion unique,
compared to Shavers and Ulbrict, is that the “ordinary”
definition used is much more inclusive than either of the
previous cases. Where Shavers simply stated a practical
common knowledge view that bitcoins are money because
they act like money, Ubrict, while not citing to Shavers,
seemed to solidify the notion that bitcoins are money by
using a dictionary definition. 75 It appears not all dictionary
definitions are created equal though. Ubrict used the
Id. at 2-3 (quoting Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/money (last visited Aug. 18,
2014)).
71 Id. at 3.
72 Id.
73 SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130781,
at *38, 4 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 18, 2014).
74 Id. at 4 (quoting S. Rep. 1010-460, 1990 WL 201710 (1990).
75 See SEC v. Shavers, 2014 U.S. Dist. at 4-5, Contra United States v.
Ubrict, 2014 U.S. Dist. at 70
70
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Cambridge dictionary to determine that “funds” are
defined as “money” and “money” is defined as “an object
used to buy things” 76 Faiella (most likely intentionally) used
a much broader definition from Merriam dictionary:
“[M]oney” in ordinary context means
“something generally accepted as a medium
of exchange, measure of value, or a means of
payment. Prominently, an example of
money include “money of account” which is
“a denominator of value or basis of exchange
which is used in keeping accounts and for
which there may or may not be an equivalent
coin or denomination of paper money.”
“Funds” were also defined as “available
money [or] an amount of something that is
available for use: a supply of something.” 77
The difference is immediately apparent between
both definitions. While the Cambridge definition (money is
an object used to buy things) seems very broad, the Merriam
version (something accepted as a medium of exchange or
payment means) goes even further, even implying that if
bitcoins were simple bartering chips that they would be
classified as money.
Faiella also attempts to use legislative intent to
bolster its conclusion. It is a creative effort to use a Senate
Report from 1990 that references “evolving threats,” but it’s
very likely this would not hold water in a Court of Appeals
because of the large time span since it was authored and the
creation of bitcoin in 2008, especially with how fast digital
progress occurs year to year. 78 Faiella, was the final of three
U.S. District Court cases to address the classification of
bitcoins, and it was the first to start using persuasive judicial
and legislative authority. It is likely that the case will be

76 United States v. Ulbricht, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93093, at *1-2, 70
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014) (citing Cambridge Dictionaries Online).
77 United States v. Faiella, No. 14-cr-243, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116114, at 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2014) (quoting Merriam Online
Dictionary).
78 See S. Rep. 1010-460, 1990 WL 201710 (1990).
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used as reference point for future cases whether they be in
a District or Court of Appeals.

B. THE EXECUTION
The United States Department of Treasury Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network or FinCEN was the first
regulatory body to issue a statement regarding bitcoins.
FinCEN issued a Guidance on March 18, 2013, concerning
FinCEN’s regulations involving exchanging or using virtual
currencies. 79 The Guidance makes no reference to bitcoins,
but discusses in depth virtual currencies, which includes
bitcoins. 80 The Guidance’s purpose was to clarify the
applicability of the regulations that implement the Bank
Secrecy Act (“BSA”) to persons “creating, obtaining,
distributing, exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual
currencies.” 81 The guidance does not go as far to quantify
virtual currency as property, but it does state that virtual
currency is not “real” currency or legal tender. 82
Under FinCEN regulations, currency (also described
as “real currency”) is defined as “coin and paper money of
the United States or of any other country that [i] is
designated as legal tender and that [ii] circulates and [iii] is
customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in
[its] country of issuance.” 83 FinCEN contrasts currency to
“virtual currency” by defining virtual currency, for the first
time, as “a medium of exchange that operates like a
currency in some environments, but does not have all the
attributes of real currency.” 84 The Guidance continues to
note that “virtual currency does not have legal tender status
in any jurisdiction.” Further, virtual currencies that have
“an equivalent value in real currency, or act[] as a substitute

FinCEN Guid. FIN-2013-G001, 1 (Mar. 18, 2013),
http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013G001.pdf.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
79
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for real currency” are referred to as “convertible virtual
currency.” 85
The FinCEN Guidance has been used as support in
several United States District Court cases to help argue that
bitcoins do not qualify as money, but as property. While the
Guidance holds only persuasive authority because it only
concerns the implementation of the BSA (more on the BSA
later), a main distinction in the judicial definitions of
currency versus the FinCEN definition is the element of a
country of issuance. 86 However, even though the FinCEN
does not wish for bitcoins to be an official currency, they
may still wish to have them treated as money for crime
enforcement, thus, making the distinction between
currency and money null. Courts have looked to the plain
ordinary or dictionary meanings of money, which for the
most part only requires an item to be a medium of exchange,
where under FinCEN a real currency must be backed by the
trust of a sovereign nation. Further, the FinCEN Guidance
makes no reference to what virtual currencies are classified
as, and nowhere in the Guidance can the word “property”
be found. 87
Ironically enough, the FinCEN Guidance requires
those who exchange bitcoins to register as Money Services
Businesses, which is a type of financial institution that deals
with cash, checks or currency exchanges. 88 Although the
FinCEN Guidance gives bitcoins a sub-currency like
designation, it is clear that the department wishes bitcoins
to be treated much closer to money or cash than as property
as the IRS and others may hope, as well as why Courts have
not been persuaded to consider bitcoins as property.
Bitcoins currently do not have status as legal tender
in any one jurisdiction, but they are being used as a form of
money in many. 89 In March 2014, the IRS ruled that virtual
currency, including bitcoins, should be treated as a form of

Id.
Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 3.
89 Internal Revenue Service, I.R.S. Note. 2014-21, 1 (Mar. 25, 2014),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf.
85
86
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property instead of actual money. 90 This means that bitcoins
could begin acting more as stock and less than an item that
immediately trades for goods and services. 91 This
unfortunately raises undesirable tax issues such as
appreciation, and much more record keeping for legal
transactions. 92 For Example, if a person bought $10 worth of
bitcoins, and the bitcoins appreciate in value to $500, and
then are used to buy a deluxe easy bake oven. The $490
realized is now a taxable profit as far as the IRS is concerned.
It is likely many may try to ignore the tax consequences
because bitcoins are not in heavy circulation at the moment,
but such a scenario could be a huge stumbling block to the
success of virtual currency in the mainstream. The IRS’s
Notice by far is the most direct regulatory opinion
classifying bitcoins as property and not money. This has
made it a favorite of defendants in court arguing against
money laundering charges, but the persuasive authority of
the IRS’s ruling on criminal law seems to be limited at best.
The Federal Elections Commission (“FEC”) also
released a recent advisory opinion on bitcoins after a federal
Political Action Committee submitted the question of
whether federal political committees and candidates may
accept bitcoin donations. 93 The FEC decided to allow bitcoin
donations, but avoided classifying them as money or nonmoney directly stating they concluded bitcoins are “money
or anything of value” under the Federal Election Campaign
Act. 94 However, the advisory opinion also stated that for
reporting purposes, bitcoins should be reported as in-kind
donations and not cash. 95 However, this is likely meant to
solve the problem of fluctuating bitcoin value and the “cash
on hand” reporting requirement of PACs. Interestingly
Id. at 2.
Alex Hern, Bitcoin is legally property, says US IRS. Does that kill it
as a currency?, The Guardian (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/ technology/2014/ mar/31/
bitcoin-legally-property-irs-currency.
92 Id.
93 Len E. Goodman, F.E.C. Op. 2014-02 (May, 8, 2014),
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/2014-02.pdf.
94 Id. at 2. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i); see also 11 C.F.R. §
100.52(d)(1).
95Id. at 8.
90
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enough, a bitcoin worth $50 donated to a PAC, would be
allowed to appreciate to $5000 and be converted to cash
without issue despite the $2600 cash limit on
contributions. 96
The Security Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is
primarily responsible for enforcing federal securities law
and regulating the securities industry and stock and options
exchanges, including electronic security markets. 97 The SEC
has used the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a, and
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, as a basis
to prosecute at least one offender who created a Ponzi
scheme that involved investing in bitcoins. 98 As seen above,
the Court found these laws to have authority over bitcoins
and other virtual currency. In order to do this, the Shavers
Court had to declare that bitcoins were indeed money, and
therefore under the jurisdiction of these laws. The SEC
seems more in line with the FinCEN in their desired
treatment of bitcoins as both would prefer the currency to
be treated more like cash money, in contrast to the IRS’s
newfound position which advocates for bitcoins to be
treated as property.

C. POWER TO THE PEOPLE
The United States legislative branch has not passed
any definitive law concerning bitcoins whatsoever at this
time. 99 Congressional action on bitcoin has been limited to
only two occasions where the Senate Committee on Finance,
in May 2013, and the Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs committee, in August 2013, sent letters to various
federal agencies to survey their treatment of virtual
currencies. 100 Both of these actions took place before the IRS
Id.
About the SEC: What We Do, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last
visited Jan. 10, 2015).
98 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a, see also Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a. SEC v. Shavers, 2014 U.S.
Dist.
99 Craig Elwell, Cong. Research Serv., R43339, Bitcoin: Questions,
Answers, and Analysis of Legal Issues, 9 (2014).
100 Id. at 9.
96
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issued their 2014 Notice and their results lacked a clear
consensus and answer as to how virtual currencies were to
be treated for tax reporting purposes and national security
threats. 101
The Congressional Research Service prepared a
report specifically on bitcoins (not virtual currency in
general) on July 15, 2014. 102 While the report is not in any
fashion binding law, it will likely be the first resource used
by lawmakers as it is prepared specifically for members of
congress, assuming congress can pass a law before the
information becomes outdated in the fast moving digital
world. While the report did not make any definitive
statement as to whether bitcoins should be classified as
money instead of property, the report at times simply
referred to bitcoins as “digital money” as well as
“currency.” 103 However, the report omits any reference to
the recent IRS Notice 2014-21 even though it was published
after the notice. The Congressional Service Report also
recognized that the status of bitcoins is still up to
determination when it referenced the above Shavers
decision stating “[the SEC] successfully convinced a federal
district court that bitcoins are money.” 104 The report also
quickly notes that bitcoins are not legal tender, and no
merchant is required to accept them as a form of payment,
unlike the actual U.S. dollar. 105
A central power of the congress, granted by the U.S.
Constitution, is its authority to “coin money [and] regulate
the value thereof.” 106 Although no specific law has been
passed to regulate bitcoins or other virtual currencies,
bitcoins are finding treatment under two main areas of law:
Federal Anti-Money Laundering laws and Federal Taxation
law.
Federal Anti-Money Laundering laws such as 18
U.S.C. § 1956 and 1957 prohibit engaging in financial
transactions that are designed to finance illegal activities or
Id.
Id. at ii.
103 Id. at 9.
104 Id. at 11.
105 Id. at 6.
106U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
101
102
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involve proceeds of such activities. 107 Most money
laundering crimes involve financial institutions, which
triggers transaction reporting requirements under the Bank
Secrecy Act (“BSA”). 108 The Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act complements the BSA by
requiring these financial institutions, designated as “money
services businesses” (“MSBs”), to file suspicious activity
reports when cash transactions break certain monetary
thresholds set by the Secretary of Treasury office. 109 MSBs
may include check cashers, foreign currency exchangers,
traveler’s and cashier’s check issuers, prepaid cards, and
money wire transmitters. 110 MSBs are all required to register
with the Department of Treasury.
At first glance, it may not appear that the BSA
concerns bitcoins at all. However, as previously referenced,
FinCEN has used the BSA as their legal authority to require
bitcoin exchanges that convert U.S. or foreign currency into
bitcoins or vice versa to be registered as an MSB. 111 This was
memorialized in the FinCEN Guidance issued on March 18,
2013 concerning virtual currency. 112 Such an action does not
appear to stretch the law either because the purpose of the
BSA is to deter under the table, cash or cash-like, financial
transactions. Bitcoins can readily be exchanged for US
currency, and therefore, would need to be treated as a form
of cash under the law to avoid easy exploitation of antimoney laundering laws. Whether or not this cash-like
treatment of bitcoins under the BSA can be used to bolster
an argument against the IRS’s recent declaration that
bitcoins are to be considered property is yet to be seen.
As discussed above, the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 have been successfully

18 U.S.C. § 1956–1957 (2016).
Craig Elwell, Cong. Research Serv., R43339, Bitcoin:
Questions, Answers, and Analysis of Legal Issues, 9, 14 (2014).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 FinCEN Guid. FIN-2013-G001, 1 (Mar. 18, 2013),
http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013G001.pdf.
112 Id.
107
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proven in court to apply to bitcoins and virtual currencies
of the like. 113
The tax law applicable to bitcoins is limited to the
IRS’s recent Notice 2014-21. Congress has passed no statute
or federal taxation code regulation specifically addressing
virtual currencies. Currently the federal taxation law
regarding bitcoins is solely vested in the IRS’s treatment of
the currency, which leaves the bitcoin designation as
property for tax reporting purposes as discussed in the
previous section. Unlike the FinCEN that uses anti-money
laundering laws as the basis of its virtual currency
treatment, the IRS did not include in its Notice the general
tax law it used as authority to couple bitcoins into the
property designation. 114 Calls to the IRS Notice Author
Keith Aqui for further comment have not been returned as
of Mar. 4, 2015. 115
International law is also a concern for bitcoin’s
future because virtual currency has no geo-political bounds.
A recent study by the European Central Bank (similar to the
United States’ Federal Reserve) speculated that based on the
growth of virtual currency, international regulation will be
inevitable. 116 The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”)
currently is not permitted to acquire currency not issued by
one of its members. Some concern has been raised over the
IMF’s ability to combat a speculative attack via virtual
currency such as bitcoin against the traditional currency on
one of its member countries. 117

D. CO-EQUAL SOVEREIGNS AT-LARGE

SEC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130781, at *3-4.
Internal Revenue Service, I.R.S. Note. 2014-21, 1 (Mar. 25,
2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf.
115 Id. at 6.
116 European Central Bank, “Virtual Currency Schemes,” (October
2012),
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencysch
emes201210en.pdf.
117 Craig Elwell, Cong. Research Serv., R43339, Bitcoin:
Questions, Answers, and Analysis of Legal Issues, 9, 16 (2014).
113
114
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Several states have begun regulating bitcoins, with
even more following suit every year. 118 The typical issue
state regulators face is whether bitcoins fall under current
money transmission statutes or whether new regulations
are required to monitor bitcoin use and prevent possible
money laundering and fraud. 119 Some states, like Texas,
have simply issued Guidance’s suggesting that bitcoins do
not qualify as money and therefore businesses dealing in
bitcoins do not need money transmitter licenses. 120
However, other states, such as Washington, have decided
that bitcoins (and all virtual currencies) do fall within their
money transmitting statutes and therefore businesses that
deal in bitcoin exchange have been required to apply for
money transmitter licenses. 121
Two states that have particularly led the charge in
bitcoin state monetary policy are New York and
California. 122 New York, one of the major financial hubs of
the world, is currently gearing up for a massive bitcoin
licensing regime. 123 Meanwhile, California has recently
become the first state enacting law that gives virtual
currency legal money status as opposed to mere legal
tender or currency status. 124 Similar paths may follow or
Peter Luce, State Virtual Currency Regulatory Heat Map,
Payment Law Advisor (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://www.paymentlawadvisor.com/2014/12/19/statevirtual-currency-regulatory-heat-map/.
119 Id.
120 However, businesses that deal in converting virtual currency
to another country’s currency do need to obtain a money
transmitter license. Jerry Wang, State of Texas Issues Memorandum
on Virtual Currencies, Payment Law Advisor (April 14, 2014),
http://www.paymentlawadvisor.com/2014/04/14/state-oftexas-issues-memorandum-on-virtual-currencies/.
121 Luce, supra note 115.
122 Craig Elwell, Cong. Research Serv., R43339, Bitcoin:
Questions, Answers, and Analysis of Legal Issues, 9, 11 (2014).
123 Stan Higgins, New York Reveals BitLicense Framework for bitcoin
Businesses, Coindesk (July 17, 2014),
http://www.coindesk.com/new-york-reveals-bitlicenseframework-bitcoin-businesses/.
124 Pete Rizzo, California Governor Grants bitcoin 'Legal Money'
Status, Coindesk (June 29, 2014),
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are already paving the way like California and New York.
Furthermore, Texas’ designation of virtual currency as
non-money could cause unintended consequences in their
state courts.

I. EMPIRE STATE OF MIND

New York proposed its first major bitcoin or virtual
currency regulations on July 17, 2014 and then, after
comment period, released proposed updates on February 4,
2015. 125 The proposed regulations were issued by the New
York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”). 126
The main thrust of the proposed rules is that
businesses “that receive, transmit, store or convert virtual
currency for customers; buy and sell virtual currency as a
customer business; control, administer or issue a virtual
currency; or perform conversions between bitcoin and fiat
or any value exchange will need to be licensed to operate in
New York.” 127 The revised version made an exception for
virtual currency software developers, persons using bitcoin
for “non-financial means,” and possible conditional licenses
for virtual currency startup companies. 128 Further,
Merchants that merely accept bitcoins as a form of payment
are not subject to the proposed licensing requirements nor
are merchants that use bitcoins for investment purposes
only. 129 For the most part, the proposed regulations appear
aimed at entities solely involved in making money (outside

http://www.coindesk.com/california-governor-grants-bitcoinlegal-money-status/.
125 Higgins, supra note 120; see Pete Rizzo, Breaking Down New
York's Latest BitLicense Revision, Coindesk (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.coindesk.com/breaking-down-new-yorkbitlicense-revision/.
126 New York State Department of Financial Services, Regulations
of the Superintendent of Financial Services: Virtual Currencies, Title
23, Ch. 1, Pt. 200 (Proposed Feb 4, 2015).
127 Luce, supra note 115.
128 Rizzo, supra note 122.
129 Luce, supra note 115; see Rizzo, supra note 122.
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of long-term investment) from virtual currencies
themselves.
Record keeping methods to prevent fraud and
money laundering are the main tools of the NYFDS
regulations. Accounts and transaction records with verified
party identities, capital and balance statements, as well as
quarterly financial reports are all expected to help bring
virtual currency into the monetary mainstream. 130 Further,
all transactions involving value over $10,000 are expected to
be reported the day of their request. 131 The NYFDS’ revised
regulations are only subject to comment for only 30 days,
and will likely go into effect without much change from this
point. 132 NYFDS’ rules and regulations are important
because many states that have not undertaken virtual
currency guidance will likely be influenced by such a large
state with a booming financial sector. While the proposed
rules in regulations do not specify that bitcoins are money,
from the treatment they are receiving from the NYFDS, it’s
all but implied that bitcoins and bitcoin related business’ are
being considered in the same manner as businesses that
deal in cash money exchange.
II. THE GOLDEN STATE

California has become the first state to legally
recognize bitcoins and other virtual currencies as legal
money. 133 Assembly bill 129 was signed into law on June 28,
2014, which recognized nontraditional mediums of value as
actual money such as rewards points and digital currencies,
which were technically illegal under previous unenforced
law. 134 However, the measure was largely symbolic because
the law does nothing to regulate bitcoins further, besides
slapping a monetary label on them. 135 Still, in terms of the
Id.
Id.
132 Rizzo, supra note 122.
133 A.B 129, Ch. 74 Gen. Assmb. (Ca. 2014).
134 Pete Rizzo, California Governor Grants bitcoin Legal Money’
Status, Coindesk (June 29, 2014),
http://www.coindesk.com/california-governor-grants-bitcoinlegal-money-status.
135 Id.
130
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classification of bitcoins as money, it certainly sets a
precedent for other states and even the federal government.
The actual regulation of virtual currency in
California will come from the California Department of
Business Oversight (“DBO”), which has yet to formally rule
on virtual currency regulations, but has given some hints as
to the direction it’s taking. 136 The DBO has indicated that it
is currently exploring options for how it would license
bitcoin operators and how virtual currencies fit into current
California money transmitter regulations. 137 However, in
response to rumors that Coinbase, a prominent bitcoin
exchanger, received regulatory approval to operate a
bitcoin exchange in California, the DBO affirmed that while
bitcoin exchanges are permissible as of January 2015, the
DBO has still not decided whether or not to regulate such
exchanges under California’s money transmission
statutes. 138

V. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE BITCOIN
Bitcoins are the first viable form of virtual or digital
currency that does not have a third party regulator. This
allows for greater anonymity (but not total) as well as
greater uncertainty in the value of bitcoins. It is likely the
use of bitcoins will continue to grow, but the prospect of
over-regulation by the IRS and other regulatory bodies
could be a threat to their use in large quantities or
mainstream commercial transactions. Alternatively, the
continuing classification of bitcoins as money or currency
by the Courts could make its use unattractive to criminals
as well. All of this is not even tied to the extreme volatility
of bitcoins as an item of value either.
It is clear that the IRS is resisting the classification of
bitcoins as actual money or currency. Contrast this to the
SEC and FinCEN that for the purpose of crime enforcement
Id.
Stan Higgins, California Regulator: Coinbase Exchange 'Not
Regulated or Licensed’, Coindesk (Jan. 27, 2015),
http://www.coindesk.com/california-regulator-coinbaseexchange-regulated-licensed/.
138 Id.
136
137
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are much more apt to have bitcoins treated like cash or
securities involving money. SEC went as far as suing an
individual in court to prove bitcoins are money under the
law. Perhaps this does not matter for the purpose of
taxation, but at some point the IRS will likely find itself in
court over a tax crime involving bitcoins, even if it is just a
failure to pay property tax. When this day comes,
supposing congress has not yet acted, it will be highly
probable that there will be a majority of case law and other
treatment by regulatory bodies designating bitcoin as cashmoney type asset and not capital.
On the other hand, Federal Courts see no reason to
dive into the technicalities of virtual currency. The
reasoning of all three main District Court opinions
concerning bitcoin can be summed up as: if it looks like a
duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck… it is a
duck. The no nonsense, practical approach of the District
Courts is likely to continue, especially with the Faiella
opinion using the most persuasive authority in its analysis;
look for the Faiella opinion to pop up in most future bitcoin
classification cases because it used the most authority and
most encompassing definition for “money” (as well as
rebutting any claim that money should be construed as a
technical legal term of art). 139
It appears a technical refusal of bitcoin as property
(involving the details of software engineering and
reasoning of regulatory bodies) may be reserved for the
Appellate Courts or a very overzealous District Court
judge. However, it appears that bitcoins will likely stay as
money for the purpose of criminal charges because it would
be a heavy toll on public policy to allow drug traffickers and
conspirators to get away with money laundering because in
the semantic technical sense they are not dealing with real
money. This leads to the speculation that bitcoins will
almost certainly stay classified as money in the Federal
Courts. How this may affect future tax law if and when
bitcoins become mainstream is up to dispute.
While it may not be something that matters initially,
eventually there will be a legal action that intertwines
United States v. Faiella, No. 14-cr-243, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116114 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2014).
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criminal and tax law that will require the issue of whether
bitcoins are classified as money or property to be addressed.
This note predicts it will occur in the federal courts within
the next 20 years if the issue is not congressionally settled.
When a court finally hears the bitcoin classification issue,
the IRS’s property definition will likely be outbalanced by
the forming precedent.
The legislative branch is in a unique position
because they will ultimately be the last ones to act on bitcoin
law, but will also have the final authority on the subject as
well. It would be naïve to believe that no regulation will
occur from bitcoin legislation. Bitcoins and virtual currency
of the like will be regulated, as is every new legal entity or
conception. The question is how, and will it be
constitutional? Certain state legislatures have already taken
the lead to classify bitcoins as legal money, but real
treatment of the currency is being left up to state regulators
anyway, so the gesture may merely be symbolic.
There will also be a number of unseen interests
involved when creating the first bitcoin legislation. These
will include the governmental interests that favor bitcoin
regulation such as the SEC, IRS, FinCEN, FEC, and even
state governments could be affected. Based off of the actions
and publications from the various regulatory bodies, the
IRS will likely be the only one to favor a property
designation. However, there is no downside for the SEC or
FinCEN if bitcoin can constitutionally maintain its tax status
as property and still be considered as money for criminal
prosecutions and civil recoveries. In a perfect world, the
government would get more tax revenue, and prosecute
citizens as they find most convenient. Other balancing
interests include U.S. citizens that use bitcoins, especially
U.S. businesses that accept bitcoins and may face adverse
tax consequences. North America’s major bitcoin
exchanger, Coindesk, as well as other bitcoin arbitrators
such as Bitpay, will all have high stakes in future bitcoin
regulations. Most nongovernmental entities will likely
favor a monetary treatment of bitcoins for all legal
occasions.

VI. THE FUTURE IS NOW
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The federal courts seem unlikely to budge in their
classification of bitcoins as money. The logical follow up
question is: why should they? Most cases that find
themselves debating the legal status of bitcoin involve drug
trafficking money launderers or Ponzi scheme operators; all
of which come charging into court with the IRS notice or
FinCEN guidance claiming bitcoins cannot be money.
However, bitcoins are a new creation, and it is the judge’s
job to “discover” the law through a multitude of factors,
including public policy, until lawmakers say contrary.
Bitcoins are a situation where blind reading of
regulatory directions would lead to absurd results. Bitcoins
are already a magnet for controversial and illegal purchases
because of their difficulty to track. To allow a legal cloud for
online criminal activities would create a situation that the
bitcoin creator and core developers never intended. Money
launderers and scammers could walk free on a mere
technicality of diction and aging statutes under a strict
interpretation of money. From the District Court opinions,
this notion has not been lost on the judiciary either. There is
simply no way drug traffickers, money launderers and
investment con-artists are going to avoid justice so
contritely. If an Appellate Court ever heard the issue, an
affirmation of bitcoins as money would be a mere formality
to set a higher precedent. The attorneys of these defendants
must obviously feel that there is enough conflict in the IRS
Notice and other regulatory publications to mean
something. However, according to the decisions of the
federal courts, what they likely mean is that the current tax
treatment of bitcoins is in danger. If bitcoins are ever to be
universally classified as property and not money, the
decision is not going to come from the federal courts.
Regulatory publications are not all encompassing
nor fully consistent either. While the FinCEN Guidance
does not go as far as stating bitcoins are money, it does
require those business dealing in bitcoin currency exchange
be registered as money service businesses in order to be
regulated under the Bank Secrecy Act. 140 FinCEN can refuse
FinCEN Guid. FIN-2013-G001, 1 (Mar. 18, 2013),
http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013G001.pdf.
140
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to label bitcoins as money until the cows come home, but
the purpose of the BSA is to regulate the flow of cash
money, and by including bitcoins, they are effectively
labeling it as de facto cash money. The FEC opinion allowing
political campaigns to accept bitcoins as donations left the
question of their money status up to interpretation. The
opinion itself described, bitcoins as “money or anything of
value,” but for FEC reporting purposes, the donations
should be reported as “in-kind” or property donations. 141
While this may lean in favor of treating bitcoins as property,
it was likely not intended to be a definitive answer, but a
solution to fluctuating bitcoin value and the “cash on hand”
reporting requirement of political campaigns.
Finally, there is the IRS Notice proclaiming that
bitcoins should be treated as property for tax purposes. 142
Treating bitcoins as property and subjecting them to capital
gains treatment is not likely to spur their growth, especially
as more businesses look to accept bitcoins for payment of
normal goods and services. While the criminal law
determinations on bitcoin’s money status may seem like a
separate realm to some, they will not remain separate
forever. At a certain point, a company is likely to sue the IRS
for a refund for the difference in tax revenue between
capital gains and cash transaction. When this occurs, the
appeals court (after the tax court inevitably agrees with the
IRS) will look to a multitude of factors for its decision,
including public policy and similar court decisions. Does
this mean the federal courts will unilaterally strike down
the IRS’s tax designation of bitcoins? Perhaps not, but likely
so. Like the previous federal judicial opinions that look
beyond the strict interpretation of text, the odds do not look
great for the IRS. Tax evasion, money laundering,
investment fraud, and the like; all go hand in hand. The
momentum of the federal judiciary is swinging in favor of
classifying bitcoins as money, and public policy supports
this. A decision to the contrary (affirming bitcoins as
property) is only sure to bring more criminals out of the
Len E. Goodman, F.E.C. Op. 2012-02 (May, 8, 2014),
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/2014-02.pdf.
142 Internal Revenue Service, I.R.S. Note. 2014-21, 1 (Mar. 25,
2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf.
141
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woodwork claiming precedent against their bitcoin related
crimes under money statutes.

THE FINAL VERDICT
The future of bitcoins is still uncertain. At certain
times, its future looks stable, where bitcoin companies are
even sponsoring college football bowl games. 143 On the
opposite end of the spectrum, there is a major bitcoin
exchange marketplace declaring bankruptcy after hackers
infiltrated its security network. 144 However, what is certain
is the fact that a revolution in monetary exchange has
begun. There are many roadblocks to virtual currencies
mainstream acceptance, but it is no longer a hypothetical
venture of a pseudonymous man in his mother’s basement.
The law will have to play catch up or different agencies will
lose synergy in the new challenges that face them when it
comes to tax shelters, money service businesses, and money
laundering. These early days of bitcoin use will one day be
compared to the early days of internet use.
More legal clarity is needed for bitcoins to become a
mainstream success. Congress must pass a law verifying the
tax regulations, and giving designated authority to
regulatory bodies for crime enforcement concerning
bitcoins. Without such an action, bitcoins and virtual
currency will continue to be used as money in the “wild
wild west” of the internet. Bitcoins already operate in the
gray lines of regulation and criminality. Tax shelters will
become much more frequent if the duties of each regulatory
body and tax law is not reformed. Further, the IRS will
likely be challenged in court down the road for its

Michael Casey, BitPay to Sponsor St. Petersburg Bowl in First
Major bitcoin Sports Deal, Wall Street Journal,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/bitpay-to-sponsor-st-petersburgbowl-in-first-major-bitcoin-sports-deal-1403098202.
144 Rachel Abrams and Nathaniel Popper, Trading Site Failure
Stirs Ire and Hope for bitcoin, New York Times (Feb. 25, 2014),
dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/trading-site-failure-stirs-ireand-hope-for-bitcoin/.
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inconsistent treatment of bitcoin, whether or not it is
actually constitutional. 145

This note is dedicated to my wonderful fiancée Angela
Swagler, and in memory of Sterling Earhart.
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FEDERAL PROGRAM BRIBERY, NEW
FEDERALISM, AND THE MISSING
FEDERAL INTEREST
Jacob Baggett1
I. INTRODUCTION
In October of 1983, Donald V. Morano stood before the
United States Supreme Court and argued his position in
Dixson v. United States. 2 In his thick New England accent, he
argued that his clients, city officers responsible for the
management and expenditure of federal funds, were not
“public officials” within the definition of a federal bribery
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, which prohibits offering something
of value to a public official with the illicit intent of
influencing an official act. If his clients were not public
officials within the meaning of the statute, then they could
not be convicted under the statute.
At a superficial glance, a question of this nature would
appear immaterial. The defendants were criminals who
misappropriated funds for an amount of personal gain.
Why care whether federal or state law pursued them? They
Jacob Baggett, Juris Doctor (2015) and former Editor-in-Chief of
the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review. The author would
like to thank Assistant Professors Akram Faizer and Melanie
Reid for their substantive knowledge, valuable criticism, and
unwavering encouragement.
2 465 U.S. 482 (1984) (holding that executives of private,
nonprofit corporation having operational responsibility for
administration of federal housing grant program within city
under terms of subgrant from city were “public officials” within
meaning of federal bribery statute, and thus were subject to
prosecution under statute).
1
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were malefactors; they deserved punishment; (seemingly)
end of story. However, a second, more careful look reveals
the issue was not only material, but foundational-foundational in that the prosecutorial authority and role of
the federal government was arguably beyond the federal
scope, i.e., beyond the role of the federal government.
Fearing the Court would rule unfavorably in Dixson,
Congress quickly augmented § 201 by passing 18 U.S.C. §
666, which detailed federal program bribery. Section 666
serves as a statutory mechanism for the federal prosecution
of bribery and corruption of persons who are not federal
employees or “public officials” under § 201. It is § 666 which
draws similar, arguably more complicated, foundational
issues.
The role in and authority of the federal government to
prosecute federal corruption charges levied against state
and local officials has historically been a relatively
uncontentious issue. However, the development of socalled New Federalism principles articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in, most notably, United States v.
Lopez 3 and United States v. Morrison, 4 caused far-reaching
stir. The stir’s effect raised the question of whether § 666, the
bribery statute applicable to state and local officials, was
legislated with proper congressional authority.
Part One of this note will discuss the elements and
jurisprudential evolution of § 201, which criminalizes the
bribery of federal officials and the payment or receipt of
official gratuities. Part Two will detail federal program
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding the Gun Free School Zone Act
exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause authority, since
possession of gun in local school zone was not economic activity
that substantially affected interstate commerce).
4 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding the Commerce Clause did not
provide Congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision
of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), inasmuch as the
relevant provision was not regulation of activity that
substantially affected interstate commerce).
3
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bribery under § 666, which criminalizes the bribery and
corruption of non-federal employees, including state and
local officials. Part Three will dissect New Federalism and
its impact on the discussion surrounding the federal interest
on which congressional authority to pass § 666 rests. Finally,
Part Three, set against the backdrop of one of Tennessee’s
infamous corruption investigations, Operation Rocky Top,
will attempt to provide a solution to the illusive, missing
federal interest in the prosecution of corrupt state and local
officials by adding a requirement to § 666’s jurisdictional
hook. Such a solution potentially satisfies federalism
principles while keeping the federal anti-corruption statues
intact.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF § 201
Due to the supplementary nature of § 666, it is nearly
impossible to meaningfully discuss § 666 without
addressing the statutory section which it supplements, §
201. Section 201 covers two branches of corruption: bribery 5
and illegal gratuities. 6 Both bribery and illegal gratuities
require proof that (1) with illicit intent, (2) something of
value was requested, offered, or given to a (3) public official,
with the goal of (4) influencing an official act. 7
An act of bribery differs from an illegal gratuity in a crucial
respect, the intent element. Bribery 8 requires quid pro quo—
an official act in exchange for something of value. 9 An
illegal gratuity, on the other hand, requires that the thing of
value be offered or solicited “otherwise than as provided for
the proper discharge of [the federal official’s] official
duty[.]” 10 In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of

18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2014).
18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2014).
7 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2014).
8 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (2014) (applicable to the offeror/payor);18
U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2014) (applicable to the offeree/payee).
9 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2014).
10 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2014).
5
6
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California, 11 the Court elaborated on this distinction. The
Court stated that the illegal gratuities prohibition, 12 unlike
the bribery statute did not require a connection between the
offeror’s intent and the specific official act. Thus, for the
purposes of illegal gratuities, the intent requirement is
satisfied if the offeror sought merely “to build a reservoir of
goodwill” which may be connected to a future or past
unspecified act. 13

A. QUID PRO QUO AND CORRUPT INTENT
Under § 201’s bribery prohibition, the corrupt intent
element is intertwined with the concept of quid pro quo.
Foundationally, in United States v. Johnson, the Tenth Circuit
held that “[section 201’s intent element required that] the
government must show the money was knowingly offered
to an official with the intent and expectation that, in
exchange for the money, some act of a public official would
be influenced.” 14 The money must be given with more than
“some generalized hope or expectation of ultimate benefit
on the part of the donor.” 15
An adjacent issue is what if the illegal quid pro quo bargain
goes unfulfilled? Under § 201, the offense is complete when
a bribe or gratuity is either offered or solicited. 16 The
bargained for act need not be done to give rise to criminal
act. Additionally, if the offeree never performs the
requested action or has no authority to perform, a
criminally briberous act has nonetheless been committed. 17

526 U.S. 398 (1999).
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2014) (applicable to the
offeror/payor); 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B) (2014) (applicable to the
offeree/payee).
13 Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 405.
14 United States v. Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir. 1980).
15 Id. (citing United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir.
1976)).
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2014).
17 United States v. Valle, 538 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2008).
11
12
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As an illustration, in United States v. Valle, the defendant, an
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent, solicited a
$20,000 bribe from an immigrant in return for removing
“criminal charges” from the immigrant’s file. 18 The
defendant knew the file contained no criminal charges, and
as a result, he argued that he never intend to follow through.
Thus, he argued, he could not be convicted. 19 The court
rejected this argument, citing the Second Circuit case of
United States v. Meyers. 20 In Meyers, 21 a defendant
unsuccessfully asserted the defense that he was
“playacting,” i.e., never intended to commit the act for
which the bribe was exchanged. 22
In response to such reasoning, Judge Weiner offered an
intriguing dissent in Valle. 23 He reasoned that if the offeree
has no legal authority or actual ability to do the official act,
then the offeree could “never have specifically intended to
deliver the quid pro quo required by Sun-Diamond. . . .” 24
Valle is significant because it is an ideal example of the
statutory interpretative lengths to which courts have gone
to expand the conduct covered under § 201’s umbrella, as
evidenced by Judge Weiner’s well-reasoned specific-intent
objection to the majority’s holding.
Moreover, if § 201 had been ruled inapplicable to the facts
of Valle, it is not as if the defendant would have walked out
the courthouse doors. Under the same facts, the defendant
was convicted of extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 872. 25 The
extortion statute, unlike § 201, required no interpretational
gamesmanship to fit the crime.

B. BRIBERY AND GRATUITIES- “OFFICIAL ACT”
Id. at 343.
Id.
20 Id. at 347.
21 United States v. Meyers, 692 F.2d 823 (2nd Cir. 1982).
22 Id. at 831.
23 Valle, 538 F.3d at 350 (5th Cir. 2008) (Weiner, J., dissenting).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 352.
18
19
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Another element of § 201 requires that the briberous actor seek to
influence an “official act.” 26 Generally, courts have also read the
“official act” language broadly to force the statute fit the crime. 27
In United States v. Biaggi, the court held that the statute “refers to
‘any’ action taken on a matter brought before the public official in
[the official’s] capacity.” 28
However, the D.C. Circuit had a different perspective on the
interpretation of “official act.” In Valdes v. United States, 29 the D.C.
Circuit read the “official act” requirement narrowly. In that case,
an officer searched a law enforcement data base to obtain vehicle
registration information in exchange for cash from an undercover
informant. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the “officer’s actions”
lacked a sufficiently “formal” relationship to his official duties,
and thus, an official act was not influenced. 30 The court provided
a helpful example:
[A]sking questions (of people, databases, and real
evidence) is certainly a part of investigating. . . .
But it would constitute an enormous expansion
of the gratuities provision to define “action” on a
“matter” as encompassing every question asked
and answered, or even every question that
somehow parallels those an official might ask as
part of his official duty and whose answer might
entail a use of government resources. It would
bring under the clause a broad range of
moonlighting activities that in any way
paralleled an official's regular work (and perhaps
that of a broad spectrum of fellow workers, as
well). Thus, a Department of Justice lawyer who
used a government Westlaw account to look up a
legal question for a friend would be, in the

18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(a).
See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 97-99 (2nd Cir.
1988).
28 Id. at 98.
29 Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en
banc).
30 Id. at 1342-3.
26
27
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dissenters' view, “deci[ding]” a “question” that
might “be brought before [him].” 31
This D.C. Circuit rationale signaled that the seemingly everexpanding, nearly-boundless scope of federal corruption statutes
must have limits.

C. BRIBERY AND GRATUITIES - “THING OF VALUE”
Section 201 also requires that the offeror offer, or the offeree
accept, something of value for an official act. The “thing of
value” has been understood to comprise anything that has
a subjective value to the accepting party, the offeree. 32 The
Second Circuit, in United States v. Williams, 33 held that
“corruption of office occurs when the officeholder agrees to
the misuse of his office in the expectation of gain, whether
or not he has correctly assessed the worth of the bribe.” 34

D. BRIBERY AND GRATUITIES- “PUBLIC OFFICIAL” AND
DIXSON V. UNITED STATES
As the final, heavily litigated element, § 201 requires that
the bribe or gratuity be offered, requested, or received by a
“public official” or a “person who has been selected to be a
public official.” 35 This element brings us squarely back to
the Supreme Court chamber in October of 1983 with Donald
Morano. Following opening pleasantries and rehearsed
opening points, the degree to which most Justices were
unconvinced by Morano’s defensive argument was evident

Id. at 1326.
See generally 1 SARAH N. WELLING ET AL, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAW AND RELATED CIVIL ACTIONS § 7.3 (1988).
31
32

United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2nd Cir. 1983).
Id. at 623.
35 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) & (2) (2014).
33
34
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from the tone of their questions and responses to Morano’s
less-than-helpful answers. 36
In the midst of oral argument, Morano’s sympathizers
showed their cards as well. For instance, during the
government’s segment, Justice O’Connor stated, “It is
somewhat of a concern to think that any potential recipient
of federal money might be subject to [§ 201].” 37 The
government’s advocate, Richard G. Wilkins, responded by
stating, “Certainly, it is a matter of some concern, but . . . [§
201] applies only to a person acting for or on behalf of the
United States in an official function, so it isn’t just anyone
who receives some sort of federal fund or some sort of
federal subsidy.” 38
The Court found the government’s answer persuasive
because it echoed similar sentiments in its majority opinion.
The majority held that § 201 was a comprehensive statute
applicable to all persons performing activities for or on
behalf of the United States. 39 Articulating in more detail, the
Court pronounced “the proper inquiry [when determining
whether an individual is a public official] is not simply
whether the person had signed a contract with the United
States or agreed to serve as the Government’s agent, but
rather whether the person occupies a position of public trust
with federal responsibilities.” Thus, in Dixson, despite
Congress’s fear it would rule otherwise, the Court
concluded that “[t]he government has a strong and
legitimate interest in prosecuting [local officials in charge of
distributing federal funds] for their misuse of government

Dixson v. United States- Oral Argument, Oyez: U.S. Supreme
Court Media, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,
http://www.oyez.org/cases/19801989/1983/1983_82_5279#sort=vote.
37 Dixson v. United States- Oral Argument, Oyez, at 34:15 (Justice
O’Connor speaking).
38 Dixson v. United States- Oral Argument, at 34:23 (Richard G.
Wilkins speaking).
39 Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 496 (1984).
36
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funds,” due to the fact that these officials had the sort of
national, public trust Congress intended to encompass. 40

E. JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S DISSENT IN DIXSON
In Dixson, Justice O’Connor found the majority’s “public
officer or employee with federal responsibilities” answer to
be overly inclusive and vague, and she sought to provide
legal ammunition to those who might challenge the
majority’s broad interpretation of “public official” in the
future. Her dissent, in which an unlikely cast of Justices
Brennan, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined, maintained the
position that grantee autonomy, i.e., the independence and
relatively high level of discretion of a state or local grantee
with regard to how federally granted funds are used,
should be determinative. 41 “The main defining
characteristic of the category is the principle of grantee
autonomy: although grants impose conditions on the use of
grant funds, grantees are left considerable discretion to
design and execute the federally assisted programs without
federal intrusion.” 42 As a result, grants-in-aid to state or
local governments, managed and dispersed by their state
and local employees or contractors, should be treated as
categorically different from other types of federal
activities. 43 Thus, Justice O’Connor reasoned, § 201 was not
applicable to facts of Dixson. 44
Justice O’Connor expounded on this concept of grantee
autonomy by explaining the principle has particular
importance in two circumstances. First, grantee autonomy
Id. at 482.
Id. at 508 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
42 Id. (citing 41 U.S.C. § 504 (definition of “grant” requires that
“no substantial involvement is anticipated between the executive
agency, acting for the Federal Government, and the State or local
government or other recipient during performance of the
contemplated activity”)).
43 Dixson, 465 U.S. at 508 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 510-11.
40
41
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is strongest in “block grant” programs, such as the program
at issue in Dixson. “In such programs, federal control over
the spending of the distributed funds is minimized, and the
grant recipient cannot plausibly be said to be acting for
anyone but itself.” 45 Second, due to longstanding federalism
principles, “the principle of grantee autonomy applies with
special force when federal grant recipients are state or local
governments.” 46 She stated:
Such principles must shape the construction
of the statutory language . . . [And] demand
a strong presumption that state and local
governments are carrying out their own
policies and are acting on their own behalf,
not on behalf of the United States, even when
their programs are being funded by the
United States. 47
In the years that followed Dixson, circuit courts embraced
the “public officer or employee with federal
responsibilities” rationale of the majority and were
reluctant to seize and act on the grantee-autonomy
distinction articulated in Justice O’Connor’s dissent. 48
As a final note, the expansion of § 201’s applicability
widened further in 2001 when a private citizen, who
performed some delegated government function, was held
to be a “public official.” In United States v. Thomas, 49 the Fifth
Circuit held that a prison guard who was employed by a
private company, which contracted with the Immigration
Id. at 509.
Id.(citing See Shapek, MANAGING FEDERALISM:
EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRANT-IN-AID
SYSTEM (1981)).
47 Dixson, 465 U.S. 509-10 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Strissel, 920 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1990)
(executive director of city housing authority who distributed
HUD funds); United States v. Velazquez, 847 F.2d 140 (4th Cir.
1988) (county deputy who worked in local jail with contract to
house federal prisoners).
49 240 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2001).
45
46
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and Naturalization Service to run a prison, and who
performed the same duties, had the same responsibilities
and potential criminal culpability as a federal prison
guard. 50

III. 18 U.S.C. § 666 - FEDERAL PROGRAM BRIBERY
Congress feared the Supreme Court would rule the
opposite way it did in Dixson, i.e., that the defendants, city
employees in charge of dispersing and managing federal
funds, were not public officials under § 201, so as an
uncharacteristically preemptive measure, Congress
augmented § 201 with § 666 while Dixson was being
litigated. 51 This federal program bribery statute is a
mechanism by which the federal prosecution of bribery may
be undertaken against persons who are not federal
employees or “public officials.” Rather than predicate the
statutes applicability on federal employment or public
official status, § 666 predicates its applicability on the
receipt of federal “benefits.” 52
The statute makes it a federal criminal offense if (1) an agent
of a state, local government or agency (2) corruptly solicits
or accepts anything of value of $5,000 dollars or more (3)
intending to be influenced in connection with any
transaction the state or local organization for whom the
agent works, and (4) such organization receives $10,000 in
federal benefits within a year’s time. 53
The statute met its first major challenge in 1997 when the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer whether
government must prove the bribe at issue, in some way,
affected federal funds before the bribe violated §
Thomas, 240 F.3d at 448.
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 58 (1997).
52 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2014).
53 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) & (d)(5) (2014). The statute provides the
applicable punishment, a fine and imprisonment of “not more
than ten years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2014).
50
51

118

4 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2016)

666(a)(1)(B). The case, Salinas v. United States, involved the
chief deputy of a state prison facility. 54 The facility housed
several federal prisoners, and in exchange for housing
them, the state facility received considerable federal funds,
and these funds easily constituted $10,000 in benefits
required by § 666. 55 The chief deputy at the facility received
two designer watches and a truck, which had a value
greater than $5,000, in exchange for allowing a federal
prisoner conjugal visits. 56
The defense made a nexus argument which would require
the federal government to prove that the bribery affected
federal funds in order to convict a state or local actor under
§ 666. Focusing on the word “any” in § 666(a)(1)(B), the
Court stated the statute broadly encompassed an agent of a
state or local government which receives $10,000 in federal
benefits be influenced or rewarded in connection with any
business, transaction, or series of transactions of the defined
organization, government or agency. 57 As a result, the
Court held that the “expansive and unqualified [language],
both as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered”
does not support the argument that federal funds must be
affected before the acts could be criminal in nature. 58

A. 18 U.S.C. § 666 - CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
CHALLENGE TONED IN FEDERALISM
The Salinas opinion was equivocal, and as an aftereffect, a
circuit split developed on the issue of whether the criminal
acts prohibited by § 666 required any type of nexus between
the corrupt act and a risk to federal funds. To address this
split, the Court heard the case of Sabri v. United States. 59 As
a ramification of the presented nexus issue, congressional
Salinas, 522 U.S. at 52.
Id. at 54.
56 Id. at 55.
57 Id. at 57.
58 Id. at 52.
59 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
54
55
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authority to enact § 666 became integral to the proceedings
and decision.
Sabri concerned a member of the Minneapolis Community
Development Agency (“MCDA”) and a real estate
developer. 60 Both were accused of violating § 666(a)(2)
when each was involved in bribes and kickbacks, which
exceeded $5,000, relating to various regulatory approvals
and eminent domain proceedings. 61 Minneapolis received
approximately $29,000,000 per year in federal funds, and
the MCDA received $23,000,000 per year, which easily
satisfies the statute’s other jurisdictional requirement. 62
Sabri raised a facial challenge to the statute when he argued,
“the law can never be applied constitutionally because it
fails to require proof of any connection between a bribe or
kickback and some federal money.” 63 The Court replied that
it “do[es] not presume the unconstitutionality of federal
criminal statutes lacking explicit provision of a
jurisdictional hook[,]” 64 the nexus between the corrupt act
and federal funds. Further, the Court expressed, “there is no
occasion even to consider the need for such a requirement
where there is no reason to suspect that enforcement of a
criminal statute would extend beyond a legitimate interest
cognizable under Article I, § 8.” 65 The Court further stated:
Congress has authority under the Spending
Clause to appropriate federal moneys to
promote the general welfare, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1,
and it has corresponding authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl.
18, to see to it that taxpayer dollars
appropriated under that power are in fact
spent for the general welfare, and not
Id. at 602.
Id. 602-3.
62 Id. at 602.
63 Id. at 604.
64 Id. at 605.
65 Id.
60
61
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frittered away in graft or on projects
undermined when funds are siphoned off or
corrupt public officers are derelict about
demanding value for dollars. 66

After losing the first portion of the Spending Clause round,
the petitioner went into the remainder of the round
wielding Morrison 67 and Lopez. 68 In those cases of similar
rationale, the Court reasoned, it would be necessary “to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States.” 69 Thus, the congressional authority to enact such
statutes was not present. In Sabri, however, the Court found
that no pile of inference upon inference was needed. The
federal government was within its “power to keep a
watchful eye on expenditures and on the reliability of those
who use public money[.]” 70
In a final effort, the petitioner asserted that the condition
attached to such funds, i.e., that their misuse would result
in criminal culpability, was unduly coercive under the
Tenth Amendment-related test established in South Dakota
v. Dole. 71 If such were held true, then § 666 would be
unconstitutional. However, the Court quickly distinguished
Dole from the facts of Sabri by aptly stating that § 666 brings
“federal power directly to bear on individuals who convert
public spending into unearned private gain,” not on a
State’s public policy decision-making ability, as in Dole. 72

Id.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
68 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
69 Id. at 608 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567).
70 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 608.
71 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
72 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 601.
66
67
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Concurring, 73 Justice Thomas expressed his doubt about the
federal government’s interest his colleagues used to justify
the congressional authority to enact § 666 under the
Spending Clause. He reasoned that merely noting the
fungible nature of money does not explain how the federal
government could gain an interest in all instances of local
bribery. Justice Thomas provided an example: “noting that
‘[m]oney is fungible,’ . . . for instance, does not explain how
there could be any federal interest in ‘prosecut[ing] a bribe
paid to a city's meat inspector in connection with a
substantial transaction just because the city's parks
department had received a federal grant of $10,000[.]’” 74
Justice Thomas concluded the federal interest in the bribe at
issue in Sabri was comparably attenuated, “yet the bribe is
covered by the expansive language of § 666(a)(2).” 75

B. THE ACADEMIC DISCOURSE SURROUNDING § 666
Sabri was announced in 2003, the same term as McConnell v.
FEC. 76 McConnell held that the federal government’s interest
in combatting corruption outweighs the ever-important
First Amendment rights involved in the political process. 77
This decision coupled with Sabri, “confirm[ed] the high
priority that the Court places on the National Government’s
authority to fight corruption at any level in order to protect
the democratic process and public confidence in it.” 78

Id. at 610 (Justices Kennedy and Scalia also concurred, but only
for the purpose of revoking their indorsement of Part III of the
opinion, which the authoring justices deemed an “afterword”).
74 Id. at 623 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing United States v.
Santopietro, 166 F.3d 88, 93 (2nd Cir. 1999)).
75 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 601 (Thomas, J., concurring).
76 McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003),
overruled by Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558
U.S. 310 (2010).
77 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143-44, overruled by Citizens United, 558
U.S. 310 (2010).
78 George D. Brown, Carte Blanche: Federal Prosecution of State and
Local Officials After Sabri, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 404 (2005).
73
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Accordingly, George D. Brown, Professor of Law at Boston
College Law School, labeled the Court’s 2003 term the
“Anti-Corruption Term.” 79
Further, Brown predicted these two cases could be seen as
“two important steps down the road toward more vigorous
anti-corruption efforts.” 80 On a federal level, the federal
government’s concern with the efficiency of its operations
is clear. 81 However, the federal government’s interest in
“sub-national”
corruption
is
significantly
more
attenuated. 82 Brown posed, “What concern is to
Washington if Smallville is inefficient, lax on ethical
standards, and even allows their salaries through liberal use
of municipal property and funds?” 83
First, “the conduct of all government officials is something
the public views in unitary terms, regardless of the level at
which it occurs. Thus, corruption at any level can
undermine confidence in the system as a whole.” 84 This
argument is “short on empirical justification” 85 but has an
“intuitive appeal.” 86 In other words, at the time this article
was written, no studies had been conducted much less
conclusively proven that members of the general public
were unable to distinguish between federal, state, and local
officials. Even if such a distinction could not be made in the
minds of average citizens, it is unlikely that such a lack of
understanding or misconception provided a solid basis for
establishing the federal government’s interest necessary for
§ 666’s legislation.

Id. at 405.
Id. at 407.
81 Id. at 409.
82 Id. at 409-10.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 410.
85 Id.
86 Id.
79
80
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Second, Brown stated that “interstate externalities” may be
offered as a federal government’s interest. 87 Essentially,
corruption in State A may affect State B. This inferencebased justification is “the familiar race to the bottom
argument for national intervention.” 88 Brown dismissed
both of these potential federal interests as “hardly
overwhelming.” 89 Moreover, conceivable federal interests
used to justify federal prosecution of state and local actors
under federal bribery programs “run directly counter to . . .
New Federalism.” 90

IV. NEW FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL ANTI-CORRUPTION
STATUTES
The late 1990’s and early 2000’s saw, perhaps, the main
thrust of the resurgence of federalism principles. 91 “New
Federalism,” as it was dubbed, is essentially two principles:
an emphasis on the Constitution’s enumeration of federal
powers as limiting the powers of the federal government, 92
and the concept of states as quasi-sovereign, largely
autonomous entities owed great respect by the co-equal
national government. 93 New Federalism principles are
likely the most controversial Rehnquist Court legacies. 94

Id.
Id.
89 Id. at 411.
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31
N.M. L. REV. 7, 7 (2001) (“[T]here has been a revolution with
regard to the structure of the American government because of
the Supreme Court decisions in the last few years regarding
federalism.”); Lynn Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist
Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 195 (2001).
92 See, e.g., Pritnz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929-30 (1997).
93 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 47, 54, 72, 76 (1996).
94 Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, The Spending Power,
and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (2003).
87
88
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One prevailing theme of the Rehnquist Court’s New
Federalism “insiste[d] that it is the task of the Justices to
enforce both textual and structural limitations on federal
power – i.e., that ‘political safeguards are not enough[.]’” 95
Structural federalism is sometimes said by
the Justices not only to facilitate optimal
outcomes through competition and choice,
or diversity and experimentation; the Court's
decisions and reasoning are animated as well
by claims that decisionmakers and
regulators ought to be “accountable” to
those they serve, and that this accountability
is enhanced by the dual sovereignty and
decentralization
preserved
by
our
96
Constitution.
It is from this view of the Constitution’s “text, history, and
structure” 97 that produces the congressional authority
battle played out in the context of federal corruption
statutes. Particularly at issue is the federal government’s
power or authority to enact legislation which reaches state
and local officials.

A. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORITY TO ENACT § 666: HENNING’S
CORRUPTION LEGACY

Id. at 15 (citing See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards
Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951
(2001)).
96 Garnett, 89 CORNELL L. REV. at 20 (citing See, e.g., Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“We have addressed the heightened federalism and
nondelegation concerns that agency pre-emption raises by using
the presumption to build a procedural bridge across the political
accountability gap between States and administrative
agencies.”)).
97 Garnett, 89 CORNELL L. REV. at 22.
95
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Peter J. Henning, Professor of Law at Wayne State
University, offered a potential source of congressional
authority to enact § 666 by offering a novel argument that
the Constitution has an “Anti-Corruption Legacy.” 98
Henning argued that congressional involvement in the
prosecution of state and local official is not a threat to
federalism. 99 In fact, Henning believed federalism is
strengthened by federal prosecution of such crimes because
corruption at state and local levels undermines the balance
federalism creates. 100
In support of congressional authority to combat corruption
at the federal level, Henning cited:
“Bribery” as one of the grounds for
impeachment; the prohibition of both
change in the President's compensation
during his term of office and of his receipt of
“‘any other Emolument from the United
States, or any of them”’; the prohibition on
federal officeholders' receipt of emoluments
from foreign sources; the prohibition on
members of Congress being appointed “to
any federal office ‘which shall have been
created, or the Emoluments whereof shall
have been encreased during such time’ that
the member was in office[; and,] [t]he
Appropriations
Clause
requir[ing]
congressional authorization before [the
executive] can disburse funds.” 101
Taken in conjunction with one another, Henning asserted
these Constitutional provisions are “structural standards
98 Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of State
and Local Corruption, 92 KY. L.J. 75, 80-2 (2003).
99 Id. at 81-2.
100 Id.
101 George D. Brown, Carte Blanche: Federal Prosecution of State and
Local Officials After Sabri, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 415-416 (2005)
(citing Henning, 92 KY. L.J. at 86-7).
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designed to limit the possibility of corruption in the Federal
government.” 102
Regarding Constitutional provisions creating structural
standards applicable to the federal government combatting
corruption at the state level, Henning cites two
constitutional provisions: the Seventh Amendment
guarantee of a jury trial and the Article III provision for
diversity jurisdiction of federal courts. 103 Both, in his view,
provide a certain level of protection against corrupt state
and local government bias in judicial proceedings. 104
Henning’s “Anti-Corruption Legacy” argument regarding
the federal government’s authority to criminalize acts of its
own employees is unnecessary. The federal government has
a clear interest in and authority to regulate the acts of its
employees which are likely to undermine the employee’s
duties. Thus, Henning likely made those points for
purposes of boosting his Anti-Corruption Legacy argument
relating to the criminalization of acts of state and local
officials.
After close examination, the inferences and logical backflips
needed to find congressional authority to criminalize and
prosecute various acts of state and local officials under this
Anti-Corruption Legacy argument are hardly persuasive
due to their less-than-concrete nature. Such inferences may
frighten a jurist or academician wishing to build a
congressional authority argument on such a basis. George
D. Brown agreed that Henning’s an argument is “hardly
dispositive” 105 and he, along with Adam H. Kurland,
discussed another potential source of congressional power
to regulate the conduct at issue, the Guarantee Clause.

B. KURLAND AND THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE

Henning, 92 KY. L.J. at 87.
Id. at 89.
104 Id. at 91.
105 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 417.
102
103
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Kurland, Professor of Law at Howard University, a strong
advocate for prosecution on a federal level, wrote that
federal prosecution of state and local officials on the basis of
congressional authority such as the Commerce Clause was
dubious. 106 Thus, Kurland looked elsewhere in the
Constitution for congressional authority. His search led him
to examine the Guarantee Clause. The Guarantee Clause
states, “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government[.]” 107
Kurland believes:
[T]he primary federal interest in combating
local corruption . . . is based on the principle
that the public is entitled to honest
government at all levels. The faith that the
citizenry places in all levels of government is
the foundation of the republic. Thus,
anything that erodes that foundation is of
substantial federal interest. The citizens of
the United States are therefore entitled to
federal protection from abuses of power by
those who govern. 108
Further, Kurland saw the Guarantee Clause as akin to the
Fourteenth Amendment in that he views it as “a
constitutional provision that necessarily intrudes on state
sovereignty and alters the normal federal state balance.” 109
Additionally, Kurland believed the Guarantee Clause could

Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal
Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 486
(1989).
107 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
108 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 418 (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL.
L. REV. at 376-77).
109 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 419 (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL.
L. REV. at 459).
106
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be a source of congressional power to enact a generally
applicable anti-corruption statute. 110
The immediate benefit of his thesis is that it is a plausible
basis for “dealing directly with the problem of the
prosecutions: validation under a general statute, of those
prosecutions.” 111 However, Congress has never taken such
a broad view of its power. 112 More importantly, recent
Supreme Court discussion of the Guarantee Clause seems
to view the clause more “as a source of state autonomy than
a font of federal power.” 113 Thus, New Federalism,
discussed previously, blocks the Guarantee Clause from
being a source a federal power, at least as it is currently
viewed.

V. OPERATION ROCKY TOP - AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE
STUDY & RESTRICTING § 666’S SCOPE BY ADDING A
JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT
A. OPERATION ROCKY TOP
By 1985, fearing circumvention of Tennessee’s strict
gambling prohibitions, the Tennessee General Assembly
began to heavily regulate charitable bingo operations,
which were generating an estimated $31 million a year. 114
Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 420 (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL.
L. REV. at 452-53).
111 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 420.
112 Id. (citing Kurland, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. at 493).
113 Brown, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. at 420 (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at
918-9 (listing the Guarantee Clause among provisions that
reflect the Constitution's commitment to state sovereignty)).
114 Interview with Tennessee State Senator Randy McNally,
Chairman of the Finance, Ways, & Means Committee, in Oak
Ridge, TN. (Mar. 21, 2015); Ronald Smothers, Tennessee
Republicans See an Election Weapon in State’s Bingo Scandal, N.Y.
TIMES, January 28, 1990, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/28/us/tennesseerepublicans-see-an-election-weapon-in-state-s-bingoscandal.html.
110
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For instance, the legislature began limiting the times a
person could play within a specified time period and the
types of prizes which could be won. 115 During this time, the
Secretary of State’s office oversaw compliance with the
relevant bingo law and regulations. 116
In the fall of 1985, then-state Representative James R.
“Randy” McNally (“McNally”), who represented a portion
of East Tennessee, received a call from a member of the local
chapter of the Fraternal Order of Eagles (“Eagles”), an
organization geared toward health-related charitable
efforts, 117 and the member told McNally of concerns he had
with the bingo practices of a local branch of the Army &
Navy Union (“Army-Navy”), 118 an armed services veteran’s
social organization. The Eagles member explained that
Army-Navy was not adhering to Tennessee law in various
ways. 119 Consequentially, McNally began to investigate the
law and Army-Navy. 120
Simultaneous to investigating the matter, McNally
contacted Secretary of State’s office, and expressed his
concerns about the practices of the Army-Navy branch, and
he asked the office to look into Army-Navy’s practices. 121 By
February of 1986, McNally said he was frustrated because
his efforts to prompt the Secretary of State to investigate

115 Interview with Tennessee State Senator McNally (Mar. 21,
2015) (on file with author).
116 Gentry Crowell, 57; Top Tennessee Aide, N.Y. TIMES, December
22, 1989, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/22/obituaries/gentrycrowell-57-top-tennessee-aide.html.
117 Fraternal Order of Eagles, About,
http://www.foe.com/About.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
118 Army and Navy Union, Home,
http://www.armyandnavyunion.org/home/ (last visited Mar.
22, 2015).
119 Interview with Tennessee State Senator McNally, supra note
115.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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“were going nowhere.” 122 At approximately the same time,
McNally received a call from three fellow House members,
and one in particular asked McNally to meet with a Bingo
Association lobbyist. Initially, McNally was reluctant;
however, as a courtesy, he consented. 123
At the end of the same legislative work week, McNally met
with the lobbyist at the Hermitage for a luncheon to discuss
bingo practices. 124 McNally explained that “the meeting
went normally until the [lobbyist] said some of the
legislators that [the lobbyist] dealt with liked to get their
money during campaign season, and others liked the
money to be spread out over the year.” 125 McNally found
the statement deeply unsettling. 126 What type of money was
the lobbyist talking about-- campaign contributions or
something else? Even if he were only referencing legal
campaign contributions, why would the legislators prefer
the funds be “spread out” over the year?
He considered the statement over the weekend, and
returned to Nashville the proceeding Monday but was
unsure how to proceed. 127 He worried about being framed
as an “alarmist.” 128 As a Rotary Club member, McNally
attended a Rotary meeting that Monday, and the civicdriven message conveyed by the meeting, pushed him to
delve deeper into the lobbyist’s statement, regardless of the
potential political and social ramifications. 129 He called the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“F.B.I.”). 130
A call screener at the F.B.I.’s Nashville office answered the
phone, obtained the necessary information, and told
Id.
Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
122
123

FEDERAL PROGRAM BRIBERY, NEW FEDERALISM, AND THE MISSING FEDERAL INTEREST

131

McNally he would be contacted soon. 131 Within five
minutes, they called back. 132 F.B.I. agent, Richard Knudsen,
expressed that the F.B.I. was interested in McNally’s
information. 133 Additionally, McNally learned that
Knudsen had been working in conjunction with an agent of
the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“T.B.I.”), Roger
Farley, on this matter. 134
McNally was instructed not to initiate conversations with
the Bingo Association’s lobbyist. 135 McNally said, “if [he]
called, I was supposed to tell them, ‘I was ok; I was satisfied’
with the legality of their operation.” 136 Approximately two
weeks after the Hermitage luncheon, another player
revealed himself. 137
W.D. “Donnie” Walker (“Walker”), head of the Charitable
Solicitations division of the Secretary of State’s office,
contacted McNally, and ominously asked, “everything
ok?” 138 McNally gave an affirmative response, but the
interested parties must not have been convinced because a
week later, while McNally was on his way to a committee
meeting in the General Assembly’s main office building, the
War Memorial Building, the Bingo Association’s lobbyist
handed McNally a white envelope, and said, “we
appreciate you.” 139
As a result, he was immediately faced with a crucial
decision: whether to risk raising alarm by skipping the
committee meeting and reporting the event, or go to the
meeting with an envelope filled with unknown content in
his coat jacket’s side pocket. 140 After a brief moment of
Id.
Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
131
132
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consideration, McNally called Agents Knudsen and
Farley. 141 The agents told McNally to leave the immense, yet
crowded, office building without being seen, and they
would pick him up immediately. 142
After stopping at nearby fast-food restaurant, the agents
took the envelope from McNally, examined it, and
preserved it as evidence. 143 Upon opening the envelope,
McNally found three hundred dollars. 144 At the direction of
the agents, McNally made a recorded phone call to the
lobbyist. 145 McNally thanked him for the money and
expressly asked whether it should reported as a campaign
contribution. 146 The lobbyist said they did not intent to
report it, and neither should he. 147
A lull in the relevant events occurred until June of 1986
when the “drop dead” contribution reporting date
approached. 148 McNally was concerned about whether to
report the three-hundred dollars because the Secretary of
State oversaw the reporting and recording of
contributions. 149 The F.B.I. was proceeding with a particular
degree of caution because Abscam, a corruption
investigation ending with the overturning of several
charges due to entrapment issues, was a not-so-distant
memory. 150 The F.B.I. and T.B.I. wanted more evidence, so
when the lobbyist in question came calling, they sent
McNally to meet with him in July of 1986. 151
Prior to the meeting, set to take place at the Regas in
Knoxville, McNally was fitted with a wire and transmitting
Id.
Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
141
142
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device. He was “sweating bullets” during the dinner. 152 The
conversation centered around lobbying and the ArmyNavy matter. 153 The lobbyist explained that he knew “how
the [legislative] game was played.” 154 With McNally (and
investigating officials) listening, he proceeded to tell
McNally that the game is best played when a lobbyist can
get close to a legislator, obtain money for the legislator to
vote a certain way on a hotly-contested bill, and the
legislator and lobbyist split the corresponding illegal
funds. 155 To the investigators’ and McNally’s deeper
surprise, the lobbyist cited specific votes and members the
lobbyist had helped influence. 156
The dinner had gone on quite some time when suddenly
McNally heard the previously set codeword over the
Regas’s intercom system. 157 He quickly excused himself,
and met with agents in the men’s bathroom. 158 Apparently,
the tape recorder he was wearing was nearly out of
recording capacity, and McNally was forced to end the
dinner quickly without raising suspicion. 159 McNally
returned to the table, and the dinner ended anti-climatically
with no further material facts developing, and to much
disappointment, no money was exchanged. 160
Tapes in hand, the F.B.I. brought the case before
Washington officials. 161 After reviewing the tapes, the
investigation received high priority, i.e., reinforcements

Id.
Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
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were deployed. 162 Most notably, the F.B.I. sent an
undercover agent to pose as a lobbyist. 163
In September of 1986, another major effort to gather
evidence occurred. 164 The lobbyist, Walker, and McNally
met in the parking lot of an East Tennessee hospital. 165 With
the F.B.I. and T.B.I. watching, McNally received onethousand dollars after feigning dissatisfaction with the
prior bribe. 166 Serendipitously, reports of a peeping Tom
had been made to the local police, and the entire
surveillance of the event was almost exposed when a local
police unit rolled by and saw the surveillance van. 167
Thinking the van may be connected to the peeping Tom
reports, the local police officer got out, and began asking
questions of the T.B.I. and F.B.I. agents within. 168 Quickly,
the agents identified themselves, and asked the officer to
leave. 169 Meanwhile, McNally calmed the lobbyist and
Walker, who had seen the local police unit, by telling them
to “just be cool.” 170 When the officer left, the parties went
their separate ways. 171
In November of 1986, McNally was elected to the Tennessee
Senate. 172 Nearly three years later, the investigation was
publicly announced by the F.B.I. and T.B.I. 173 Many and
varying federal indictments were issued as result of the
information gathered as a result of the information collected
by F.B.I, the T.B.I., and McNally. 174 Particularly, the lobbyist
Id.
Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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and Walker were offered plea deals in return for
cooperation. 175 Both initially rejected. 176 However, the ‘big
break” in the case occurred when Walker became a witness
for the prosecution. 177 “Mr. Walker . . . pleaded guilty in a
plea agreement and provided details of how he helped
operators obtain fraudulent charters as charities so that they
could legally organize bingo games.” 178
Walker detailed that he arranged “secret partnerships” in
the operations for some current and former elected officials,
and he helped organize the bingo operators into a group
called ''the Association,'' whose goal was funneling money
to legislators willing to become a part of a secret
partnership. 179 “Armed with Mr. Walker's testimony, grand
juries began their indictments. Among those indicted were
a former member of the Alcoholic Beverage Commission, a
labor leader, a former legislator, and State Election
Commissioner and an incumbent legislator[,]” 180 as well as
the previously discussed defendants.
Operation Rocky Top reached its highest political actor with
Secretary of State. After testifying before the federal grand
jury, the Secretary was called another time. 181 Knowing that
the recall was likely to end in his indictment, he committed
Id.
Id.
177 Ronald Smothers, Tennessee Republicans See an Election Weapon
January 28, 1990,
in State’s Bingo Scandal, N.Y. TIMES,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/28/us/tennesseerepublicans-see-an-election-weapon-in-state-s-bingoscandal.html.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Tennessee Secretary of State Dies after Suicide Attempt, DAILY
NEWS, Bowling Green, Kentucky , Page 4-A, December 21, 1989,
available at
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1696&dat=19891221
&id=9PMaAAAAIBAJ&sjid=kkcEAAAAIBAJ&pg=7052,6125595
&hl=en.
175
176
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suicide. 182 In response to the revelations of the investigation,
the Tennessee General Assembly established new, more
rigid ethical boundaries: limits on campaign contributions
and new lobbying restrictions. 183 However, perhaps federal
intervention was unnecessary.

B. AN ADDITIONAL JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT
The rationale used by the Court to support congressional
authority to pass § 666 is arguably unconvincing. The highly
policed Commerce Clause provided no basis; the Taxing
and Spending rationale of Salinas and Sabri is wanting;
Henning’s “Anti-Corruption Legacy” begged for serious
inferences, and the Guarantee Clause provided no help in
the face of the resurgence of Federalism principles, i.e., New
Federalism.
If, as a counterfactual, § 666 were found to have been
without congressional authority and Senator McNally had
accepted the bribes offered, the F.B.I.’s lack of power to
investigate the matter would not cause the sky to fall on the
heads of the people of the State of Tennessee. The State, a
quasi-sovereign federalism partner, would address the
matter from an investigatory, prosecutorial, and
adjudicative role. Specifically, the T.B.I.’s white collar
division would investigate, seek to prosecute, and have the
matter of public corruption adjudicated.
At the heart of federal corruption statutes is the lack of trust
the federal government has in states to discover, investigate,
and fairly adjudicate a matter of corruption which involves
the state’s local and/or state-level officials. The federal
assumption essentially is that a state from which corruption
spawns is thereby ill-equipped to help itself, to address the

Id.
Interview with Tennessee State Senator McNally, supra note
115.
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matter. This assumption is a fallacy of the worst order. It is
a generalization.
All states in which corruption exists are not necessarily
unable to address the matter merely because a corrupt act
germinated within its boundaries. A determination as to
whether the state is capable of addressing the matter must
be made with regard to the nature and extent of the corrupt
activities at issue. If the corrupt activities are so pervasive
as to call reasonable doubt as to whether the state agency or
branch of government in charge of investigating,
prosecuting, or adjudicating the matter can fairly handle the
matter then, perhaps, federal intervention is needed.
Otherwise, the state should be allowed to address the
matter with its agents and under its criminal law.
To effectuate this policy, § 666’s jurisdictional hook need
only be amended. The jurisdictional hook currently
requires, an agent of a State, local government or agency to
corruptly solicit or accept anything of value of $5,000 or
more, and such organization of which that agent is a part
receive $10,000 in federal benefits within a year’s time. 184 It
should be amended to additionally require that “there be
reasonable belief that the state agency or agencies with
jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute, or adjudicate the
alleged corrupt matter will be unable to fairly decide
whether to proceed with the matter due to potential bias,
political or otherwise, created by the pervasive nature of the
corruption scheme at issue.”
This additional requirement would, in effect, remedy the
generalization fallacy at the heart of § 666 as well as curb the
nearly boundless scope of the statute. The concern
regarding the lack of significant, traceable federal interest
articulated by Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Sabri would
also be quieted because the federal government could
articulate reasonable doubt as to the ability of the state to

184
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handle the state or local matter, and thereby gain an interest
in legislating and enforcing § 666.
Take Justice Thomas’s city meat inspector example.
Recalling his concurrence in Sabri, Justice Thomas was
unpersuaded by the argument that the fungible nature of
money gave rise to a federal interest in prosecuting a bribe
paid to a city's meat inspector in connection with a
substantial transaction just because the city's parks
department had received a federal grant of $10,000. 185 The
additional jurisdictional requirement as to the ability of the
state to handle the matter of the unsavory meat inspector
would add significant weight to the federal government’s
interest that Justice Thomas felt unconvincingly light (or
non-existent).
To have palpable impact, the suggested additional
jurisdictional requirement would necessarily have to be one
which is proven to the jury at the time of trial. From an
evidentiary perspective, for the federal government to able
to proceed with the prosecution of the meat inspector, they
would be required to produce evidence showing that the
state would be unable to fairly decide whether to further
investigate and potentially prosecute because, to extend
facts of the example, the meat inspector’s unscrupulous
behavior was merely a small tributary of a much larger,
pervasive corruption scheme—a scheme which reasonably
could leave a state-led investigation without the ability to
fairly decide whether to proceed.
Specifically, the federal government would be required to
produce evidence showing that the local or state regulatory
agency in charge of the meat inspector’s compliance with
applicable law was tainted by the corruption scheme.
Ideally, the federal government would produce evidence,
such as video recordings, financial statements, or
collaborative testimony, which demonstrates further bribes
or a portion of the briberous scheme reached the highest
185
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overseeing local and state actors as to render those actors
without the ability, due to their involvement, to execute
their investigative duties.
In the context of Operation Rocky Top, if McNally had
taken a $5000 bribe, § 666 would be applicable because the
State of Tennessee receives far more than $10,000 in federal
benefits in a year’s time, and the bribe would have been in
connection with his capacity as a legislator. Should the
additional jurisdictional element suggested have existed
then, the federal prosecutor would have had to demonstrate
to the jury that the T.B.I., the state prosecutorial authority,
or state adjudicating body was unable to fairly decide
whether to proceed with the matter due its bias, political or
otherwise, created by the pervasive nature of the corruption
scheme.
Ideally, the prosecutor would present lawfully obtained
testimony, recordings, or official or business records which
would show that the bingo-related illegal funds or political
influence spread from the legislature and into the relevant
investigatory department of the T.B.I., the prosecuting
official, or adjudicative body as to taint a link in the state’s
criminal justice process.
Specifically, the new element could have been satisfied by a
prosecutorial showing of the scheme’s taint reaching the
relevant, white-collar arm of the T.B.I. or the local judicial
official who would likely hear the case if filed. Such a
showing would demonstrate a reasonable belief that the
pervasive nature of the corruption scheme at issue
destroyed the objective stance of state agency tasked with
the investigation, prosecution, or adjudication of the
Association’s bingo-related practices. A taint of this nature
would, in effect, render the state’s justice process unable to
properly address the corruption matter. Upon that
evidentiary showing, then federal interdiction into a state or
local corruption matter would be proper.
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However, the facts of investigation fell short of this
jurisdictional requirement due to the fact that no evidence
was presented that the corruption scheme reached into the
T.B.I. or the state court system which would have
adjudicated the matter. Had these been contemporary
events and had the additional jurisdictional hook been in
place, the State of Tennessee’s semi-autonomous nature
would have been respected and left undisturbed by federal
intervention.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since Dixson, courts have seen the scope of § 201 become
nearly boundless, and cases limiting its scope have had a
nominal effect. 186 By preemptively passing § 666, Congress
further augmented the scope federal corruption crimes.
After discussing various potential sources of congressional
authority, the unconvincing Spending Clause rationale was
revealed. Startlingly, the Court stated that the federal
interest required for congressional authority to pass § 666
stemmed from the fact that $10,000 in federal funds were
merely in the vicinity of corruption. In the face of New
Federalism, such logic, such a tenuous articulation of
federal interest cannot stand. However, a solution was
presented.
The additional requirement to § 666’s jurisdictional hook,
i.e., the federal government would be required to forbear
intervention into what could largely be qualified as an intrastate matter unless the federal government could
demonstrate the state’s inability to help itself, would
significantly lessen the tenuous nature of the federal interest
as well as satisfy New Federalism principles, at least from a
theoretical perspective.
To demonstrate the jurisdictional requirement’s pragmatic
efficacy, Operation Rocky Top, a Tennessee corruption
See, e.g., Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(en banc).
186
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investigation, served as case study in which examples of
how such a requirement could be met with a sufficient
evidentiary showing. In short, the requirement would place
a duly heavy burden on a federal prosecutor pursuing a §
666 action against a state actor, but that is precisely the
point. Such a heavy burden is necessary to give the federal
government its required interest in the criminal matter and
comport with New Federalism principles. The additional
jurisdictional requirement reins federal authority, and by
predicating federal authority on a respect for a state’s semiautonomous nature, the federal government is placed in an
on-deck posture.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Libertarians may be unique in many regards, but
their views on immigration do not qualify. They are as
divided as is the rest of the population on this issue. Some
favor open borders, and others oppose such a legal milieu.
The present paper may be placed in the former category. It
will outline both sides of this debate in sections II and III.
Section IV is devoted to some additional arrows in the
quiver of the closed border libertarians, and to a refutation
of them. We conclude in section V.

II. ANTI OPEN BORDERS
The libertarian opposition to free immigration is
straightforward and even elegant. 1 It notes, first, a curious
Peter Brimelow, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT
AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995); Jesús Huerta De Soto,
A Libertarian Theory of Free Immigration, 13 J. OF LIBERTARIAN
STUD. 187, 187-97 (1998); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, DEMOCRACY,
THE GOD THAT FAILED: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
1
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bifurcation in international economic relations. In the case
of both trade and investment, there must necessarily be
two 2 parties who agree to the commercial interaction. In the
former case, there must be an importer and an exporter;
both are necessary. Without the consent of both parties, the
transaction cannot take place. A similar situation arises
concerning foreign investment. The entrepreneur who
wishes to set up shop abroad must obtain the willing
acquiescence of the domestic partner for the purchase of
land and raw materials. And the same occurs with financial
transactions that take place across national borders. Both
lender and borrower must approve; otherwise, this
interaction cannot possibly occur.
Matters are entirely different regarding labor
mobility. Here, in the absence of any immigration
restrictions, the migrant, without anyone’s by-your-leave
except his own, simply shows up on the territory of the
receiving country. Nor is this only a mere failure to attain
MONARCHY, DEMOCRACY AND NATURAL ORDER (2001); John
Hospers, A Libertarian Argument Against Opening Borders, 13:2 J.
OF LIBERTARIAN STUD. 153 (1998); Stephan Kinsella, A Simple
Libertarian Argument Against Unrestricted Immigration and Open
Borders, LRC BLOG (Sept. 1, 2005),
http://archive.lewrockwell.com/kinsella/kinsella18.html;
Bionic Mosquito, Open Borders: Case Study, BIONIC MOSQUITO
(Nov. 5, 2015), http://bionicmosquito.
blogspot.ca/2015/11/open-borders-case-study.html; Matthew
Reece, The Pragmatic Libertarian Case Against Open Borders, THE
ZEROTH POSITION (Nov. 24, 2015), https://reece.liberty.me/thepragmatic-libertarian-case-against-open-borders; Llewellyn
Rockwell, Open Borders Are an Assault on Private Property, MISES
DAILY ARTICLES (Nov. 16, 2015),
https://mises.org/library/open-borders-are-assault-privateproperty; Murray Rothbard, Nations by Consent: Decomposing the
Nation-State, 11 J. OF LIBERTARIAN STUD. 1 (1994); Eric Ruark, The
(Il)logic of Open Border Libertarians, FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION, (May 21, 2014); Jared Taylor, THE REAL AMERICAN
DILEMMA: RACE, IMMIGRATION, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA
(American Renaissance 1998).
2 Or more
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symmetry. Something far more important, at least for this
version of libertarianism, is involved. Without mutual
consent, it is charged, such movement constitutes trespass.
Or, in some versions of this argument, it is in effect forced
integration. Thus, from this quarter it is not at all clear that
open immigration is the libertarian position. Indeed, the
very opposite is true. Without limitations, restrictions, this
is antithetical to libertarianism. In other words, private
property rights are one of the two very bedrocks of this
philosophy. 3 Free and open immigration violates private
property rights, and this is incompatible with freedom. Free
immigration is an open sesame for trespass. 4

III. THE CASE FOR OPEN BORDERS
Those libertarians in favor of free immigration 5 are
not without a defense of their position, even in the face of
Along with the non-aggression principle (NAP). See HansHermann Hoppe, THE ECONOMICS AND ETHICS OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY: STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PHILOSOPHY, 31823 (1993); Jacob Huebert, LIBERTARIANISM TODAY, 27-39 (2010);
Stephan N. Kinsella, Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free
Society, 11 J. OF LIBERTARIAN STUD. 132 (1995); Stephan N.
Kinsella, New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory,
12:2 J. OF LIBERTARIAN STUD. 313 (1996),
http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/12_2/12_2_5.pdf; Murray
N. Rothbard, FOR A NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO,
2-53 (1973).
4 Others have vigorously pursued their critiques of the open
border libertarians. See Bionic Mosquito, Open Borders: Case
Study, BIONIC MOSQUITO (Nov. 5, 2015), http://bionicmosquito.
blogspot.ca/2015/11/open-borders-case-study.html; HansHermann Hoppe, On Free Immigration and Forced Immigration,
LRC BLOG (Jan. 1970),
https://www.lewrockwell.com/1970/01/hans-hermannhoppe/on-free-immigratiohun-and-forced-integration/.
5 Chris Berg, Open the Borders, 26 POL’Y 3, (2010); Walter Block, A
Libertarian Case for Free Immigration, 13 J. OF LIBERTARIAN STUD.
167, (1998) [hereinafter Block, Libertarian Case]; Walter Block,
3
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The State Was a Mistake, MISES INSTITUTE (2004),
https://mises.org/library/state-was-mistake (last visited Sept.
4, 2016); Walter Block, Radical Libertarianism: Applying Libertarian
Principles to Dealing with the Unjust Government, Part I, 27
REASON PAPERS 117, (2004); Walter Block, Hoppe, Kinsella
and Rothbard II, Immigration: A Critique, 22 J. OF LIBERTARIAN
STUD. 593, (2011) [hereinafter Block, Immigration: A Critique];
Walter Block, Rejoinder to Hoppe on Immigration, 22 J. OF
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 771, (2011) [hereinafter Block, Rejoinder to
Hoppe]; Walter Block, Rejoinder to Todea on the ‘Open’ Contract of
Immigration, 8 SCI. J. HUMANISTIC STUD. 52, (2013) [hereinafter
Block, Rejoinder to Todea]; Walter Block, Contra Hoppe and Brat
on Immigration, MGMT. EDUC. SCI. TECH. J., Jan. 2016, at 1; Walter
Block & Gene Callahan, Is There a Right to Immigration? A
Libertarian Perspective, 5 HUM. RTS. REV. 46 (2003); Donald
Bourdreaux, Absorbing Immigrants: Does America Have the Space
and Resources to Allow Open Borders?, FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC
EDUCATION (2002), https://fee.org/articles/absorbingimmigrants (last visited Sept. 4, 2016); Donald Bourdreaux,
Immigration: The Practice of Principle, CAFE HAYEK (2013),
http://cafehayek.com/2013/06/immigration-the-practice-ofthe-principle.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2016); Bryan Caplan, Why
Should We Restrict Immigration?, 32 CATO J. 5, (2012); Bryan
Caplan, My Path to Open Borders, OPEN BORDERS: THE CASE
(2013), http://openborders.info/blog/my-path-to-openborders/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2016); Bryan Caplan, America
Should Open Its Borders: My Opening Statement for the Reason
Immigration Debate, LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY (2014),
http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2014/04/america_should.
html (last visited Sept. 4, 2016); Richard Ebeling, Freedom To
Move: Personal Liberty or Government Control, Part I, EPICTIMES
(2015), http://www.epictimes.com/07/23/2015/personalliberty-or-government-control/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2016);
Richard Ebeling, Practicing Freedom: Markets, Marriage, and
Migration, EPICTIMES (2015),
http://www.epictimes.com/richardebeling/2015/08/practicing
-freedom-markets-marriage-and-migration/ (last visited Sept. 4,
2016); THE CASE FOR FREE TRADE AND OPEN IMMIGRATION,
(Richard Ebeling & Jacob Hornberger eds., 1995); Albert
Esplugas & Manuel Lora, Immigrants: Intruders or Guests? A reply
to Hoppe and Kinsella, 22 J. OF LIBERTARIAN STUD. 185, (2010); Max
Fisher, How Ending Birthright Citizenship Would Change
Immigration, THE ATLANTIC (2010),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/08/how-
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(1986); Michael Huemer, Is There a Right to Immigration?, 36 SOC.
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inevitably leads to homogeneity is incredibly weak, OPEN BORDERS:
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this seeming overwhelming case against it. The open
borders libertarian asks, is immigration necessarily a
violation of property rights? When put in this way, it is clear
that it is not. For example, suppose an Asian, or an African,
or a Mexican, or a Martian for that matter, were to catapult 6
into a completely unowned parcel of land that has never
before been homesteaded. 7 For example, consider some
Perhaps arriving by helicopter, or space ship in the case of the
Martian.
7 For the libertarian, homesteading is the sine qua non of private
property rights. See Walter Block, Earning Happiness Through
Homesteading Unowned Land: a comment on 'Buying Misery with
Federal Land' by Richard Stroup, 15 J. OF SOC. POL. AND ECON.
STUD. N.2, 237-254 (1990); Walter E. Block, Homesteading City
Streets; An Exercise in Managerial Theory, Planning and Markets,
Vol. 5, No. 1, 18-23, (2002), http://wwwpam.usc.edu/volume5/v5i1a2s1.html; Walter E. Block, On
Reparations to Blacks for Slavery, Human Rights Review, LRC BLOG
(2002), https://www.lewrockwell.com/lrc-blog/reparationsblacks-slavery/; Walter E. Block and Guillermo Yeatts, Economics
and Ethics of Land Reform: A Critique of the Pontifical Council for
Justice and Peace’s ‘Toward a Better Distribution of Land: The
Challenge of Agrarian Reform, J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L., Vol.
15, No. 1, 37-69 (1999-2000); Water E. Block and Michael R.
Edelstein, Popsicle sticks and homesteading land for nature preserves,
ROMANIAN ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AND BUSINESS REVIEW, Vol.
7, No. 1, pp. 7-13 (2005),
http://www.rebe.rau.ro/REBE%207%201.pdf; Per Bylund, Man
and Matter: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Justification of
Ownership in Land from the Basis of Self-Ownership, (June 2005)
(master thesis on file with Lund University),
http://www.lunduniversity.lu.se/o.o.i.s?id=24965&postid=1330
482; Per Bylund, Man and Matter: how the former gains ownership
of the latter, LIBERTARIAN PAPERS, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2012),
http://libertarianpapers.org/articles/2012/lp-4-1-5.pdf; Hugo
Grotius, Law of War and Peace (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, (1625);
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private
Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy, (1993); HansHermann Hoppe, Of Private, Common, and Public Property and the
Rationale for Total Privatization, LIBERTARIAN PAPERS, Vol. 3, No. 1,
1-13 (2011), http://libertarianpapers.org/2011/1-hoppeprivate-common-and-public-property/; Stephan N. Kinsella, A
libertarian theory of contract: title transfer, binding promises, and
6
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territory in the midst of Alaska, or in some isolated part of
the Wyoming Rocky Mountains. Our immigrant starts to
mix his labor with this land that has never been touched by
human beings. 8 What law that a libertarian must respect
has this Asian, African, Mexican, or Martian violated? It is
not clear that he has acted unlawfully 9 at all. Rather, the
very opposite is the case. If the statists try to remove him
from these immigrant land claims, it is they¸ not he who is
the trespasser, the NAP violator, the disrespector of private
property rights. This is a clear case, as clear as can be. Such
an immigrant homesteader acts entirely within the limits of
libertarian law. 10 A more debatable example concerns other
inalienability, 17 J. OF LIBERTARIAN STUD. 11 (2003),
http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/17_2/17_2_2.pdf; Stephan
N. Kinsella, How we come to own ourselves, MISES DAILY ARTICLES
(Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.mises.org/story/2291; Stephan N.
Kinsella, Homesteading, Abandonment, and Unowned Land in the
Civil Law, MISES DAILY ARTICLES (May 22, 2009),
http://blog.mises.org/10004/homesteading-abandonment-andunowned-land-in-the-civil-law/; John Locke, An Essay
Concerning the True Origin, Extent and End of Civil Government, 1719 (1948); John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, Chap.
5, (1955); Ellen Frankel Paul, Property Rights and Eminent Domain,
(1987); Samuel Pufendorf, Natural Law and The Law Of Nations,
(1673); Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian
Manifesto, 32 (1973); Michael Rozeff, Communities, Immigration,
and Decentralization, LRC BLOG (Dec. 14, 2005),
http://www.lewrockwell.com/rozeff/rozeff51.html; Carl
Watner, The Proprietary Theory of Justice in the Libertarian
Tradition, JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIES, Vol. 6, No. 3-4, 289316 (1982), http://mises.org/journals/jls/6_3/6_3_6.pdf.
8 The Bureau of Land Management of the U.S. Government of
course claims these parcels, but as they have not homesteaded
them either, the libertarian need not support such land titles.
9 At least not according to the libertarian NAP law.
10 Bionic Mosquito appears to be ambivalent on this issue. On the
one hand, he asserts: “I suppose, given my logic above, I could
conclude that Block’ s immigrant squatter on the top of the
Rocky Mountains now ‘ owns’ the land under his feet – at least
until the owner (taxpayer, government – it really doesn’ t matter
at the moment) defends it and removes him. Which the state
will, via the US military (or some similar agency).” Bionic
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property owned by the government that has not been totally
empty of human habitation: parks, roads, forests. Suppose
an immigrant were to set up shop in one of those places, in
the face of a population that, through inaction, in effect
acquiesces in continued state ownership. My own view is
that anyone, citizen or outsider, who would do so would be
in the right. 11 However, I readily acknowledge, this is a far
more complicated claim than the one concerning entirely
virgin territory and one I shall not pursue in the present
paper.
Another weakness in the closed border libertarian
position concerns internal immigration. If movement from
Argentina to the U.S. is to be stemmed by regulations
Mosquito, Dances With Elephants, BIONIC MOSQUITO BLOG (Aug.
12, 2015), http://bionicmosquito.blogspot.ca/2015/08/danceswith-elephants.html. If I read this correctly, it means that in this
author’s view the homesteader is not the legitimate owner of the
land with which he has mixed his labor. On the other hand, this
scholar also maintains: “Yet ‘own” means something– eventually
they come into contact. This leads me to consider the possibility:
“own’ means what one can defend. I don’t say that this fits
neatly in libertarian theory; I don’t say it is just...” Id. In my view,
in contrast, licit ownership, at least for the libertarian
perspective, has nothing whatsoever to do with whether or not
the owner can successfully defend his property. When the bully
exploits the 90 pound weakling, or the mugger robs a victim, or
the conquistadores steal the land of the peasants, or the slave
master despoils the slave of his labor, the latter is still in the
right, even though he is unable to “defend” his rights, and the
former is in the wrong. Might does not make right, at least not
for the libertarian.
11 See Joachim Hagopian, Deep State’s Draconian Measures To
Criminalize Citizens, LRC BLOG (Jan. 2016)
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2016/01/joachimhagopian/deep-states-vicious-measures; Ron Paul, Oregon
Standoff: Isolated Event or Sign of Things to Come?, LRC BLOG (Jan.
2016), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2016/01/ronpaul/beginning-civil-unrest; Joel Skousen, Oregon Standoff:
Federal Land Grab vs. the Sagebrush Rebellion, TEA PARTY
ECONOMIST (Jan. 9 2016),
http://www.garynorth.com/public/14709.cfm.
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presumably emanating from private property rights
considerations, what of a change of address from New York
to Louisiana? It would appear that the same arguments that
apply to the one case also do so for the other (Richman,
2010). The criticism of the migrant to the U.S. from
Argentina is that without some sort of controls, there is a
violation of property rights. The immigrant arrives, as it
were, without any permission from anyone else. However,
that same situation holds true for interstate movements; for
intrastate ones too. People continually travel, for instance
between New Orleans and Baton Rouge, all on their own
cognizance; with no permission from anyone else. The
implication of the non-open borders position is that this,
too, should be looked at askance. And, yet, this
consideration would appear to be a reductio ad absurdum
of that viewpoint.

IV. OTHER ARGUMENTS
A. ACTUAL IMMIGRANT PRACTICE
It might be claimed that the typical immigrant does
not hive off to the desolate woods where no man has ever
trod before. Rather, he enters a city, typically where
members of the donor country congregate, so that he can be
amongst his own kind. Says Mosquito (2016D): “These
refugees are not settling on the 3000-meter-plus peaks of the
Swiss Alps, far removed from any otherwise improved
land; they are not going north of the Arctic Circle. They are
coming to the developed – and even most developed – parts
of Europe. Even if I accept your theory, you cannot avoid
this practice – today.” This cannot be denied.
However, this is hardly even relevant to our
discussion. We are now attempting to explore whether free
immigration is per se a violation of the libertarian principles
of private property rights. And, if a single, solitary counter
example can be furnished, this proves there is no
fundamental rights violation in this practice.
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B. CANNOT HIRE?
In view of Hoppe (2004):
It is incorrect to infer from the fact that an
immigrant has found someone willing to
employ him that his presence on a given
territory must henceforth be considered
‘invited.’ Strictly speaking, this conclusion is
true only if the employer also assumes the
full costs associated with the importation of
his immigrant-employee. This is the case
under the much-maligned arrangement of a
‘factory town’ owned and operated by a
proprietor. Here, the full cost of
employment, the cost of housing, healthcare,
and all other amenities associated with the
immigrant's presence, is paid for by the
proprietor. No one else's property is
involved
in
the
immigrant-worker
settlement. Less perfectly (and increasingly
less
so),
this
full-cost-principle
of
immigration
is
realized
in
Swiss
immigration
policy.
In
Switzerland,
immigration matters are decided on the local
rather than federal government level, by the
local owner-resident community in which
the immigrant wants to reside. These owners
are interested that the immigrant's presence
in their community increase rather than
decrease their property values. In places as
attractive as Switzerland, this typically
means that the immigrant (or his employer)
is expected to buy his way into a community,
which often requires multimillion-dollar
donations.
Unfortunately, welfare states are not
operated like factory towns or even Swiss
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communities.
Under
welfare-statist
condition, the immigrant employer must pay
only a small fraction of the full costs
associated with the immigrant's presence.
He is permitted to socialize (externalize) a
substantial part of such costs onto other
property owners. Equipped with a work
permit, the immigrant is allowed to make
free use of every public facility: roads, parks,
hospitals, schools, and no landlord,
businessman, or private association is
permitted to discriminate against him as
regards
housing,
employment,
accommodation, and association. That is, the
immigrant comes invited with a substantial
fringe benefits package paid for not (or only
partially) by the immigrant employer (who
allegedly has extended the invitation), but by
other domestic proprietors as taxpayers who
had no say in the invitation whatsoever. This
is not an ‘invitation,’ as commonly
understood. This is an imposition. It is like
inviting immigrant workers to renovate
one's own house while feeding them from
other people's refrigerators. Consequently,
because the cost of importing immigrant
workers is lowered, more employersponsored immigrants will arrive than
otherwise. Moreover, the character of the
immigrant changes, too. While Swiss
communities choose well-heeled, highly
value-productive
immigrants,
whose
presence enhances communal property
values
all-around,
employers
under
democratic welfare State conditions are
permitted by state law to externalize their
employment costs on others and tend to
import increasingly cheap, low-skilled and
low
value-productive
immigrants,
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regardless of their effect on all-around
communal property values. 12

There are several difficulties in this position. First,
consider the claim that the employee immigrant is to be
considered invited 13 “only if the employer also assumes the
full costs associated with the importation of his immigrantemployee.” Consider the case of “immigrants” from an
entirely different country, “Storkovia.” Contrary to the
views of some biologists, all babies come from that nation. 14
They are, not merely in effect, but, actually, immigrants.
They come from a place completely outside of the recipient
country, in some sense even further removed than adult or
child migrants from elsewhere on the planet. Do the parents
of these immigrants bear anything like the “full costs
associated with the[ir] importation?” To ask this is to
answer it: of course not. When these immigrants grow up
and commit crimes, it is their responsibility, not that of their
mothers and fathers. Why, then, impose “full costs” on
employers, and not on parents? Wherein lies the
justification for treating these importers of immigrants so
differently?
Second, consider “the cost of housing, healthcare,
and all other amenities associated with the immigrant's
presence” as well as the fact that the “immigrant is allowed
to make free use of every public facility: roads, parks,
hospitals, schools, and no landlord, businessman, or private
association is permitted to discriminate against him as
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, In the Free Market, May a Businessman
Hire Any Immigrant He Chooses?, LRC BLOG (Sept. 22, 2004),
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2004/09/hans-hermannhoppe/in-the-free-market-may-a-businessman-hire-anyimmigrant-he-chooses/.
13 Block & Callahan, Is There a Right to Immigration? A Libertarian
Perspective, supra note 5 (explaining that because of this, labor
mobility, too, would garner agreement by two parties, as in the
case of internationally traded goods or investments).
14 Id. (explaining that the stork carries boy babies in blue cloth,
and girl babies in pink).
12
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regards housing, employment, accommodation, and
association.” 15 But whose fault is this? Is it the immigrants?
Of course not. These policies were put in place long before
he arrived on the shores of the recipient country. As well,
the immigrants from Storkovia will also be able to access
this “substantial fringe benefits package.” The logic of this
argument implies, again, that babies should either be
banned and/or their creation, in migration from Storkovia,
should be strictly controlled; as strictly as migrants from
any other “place.” No, of course, the libertarian answer, to
which Hoppe would certainly agree is to get rid of the
welfare state which offers these “fringe benefits” to all and
sundry. 16
Third, Hoppe’s concern with declining “communal
property values” is more than passing curious, given that
under libertarianism, property, and only property, not its
value, may properly be owned. This point is eloquently
demonstrated by none other than this author himself. 17

C.

COLOGNE, GERMANY;
DENMARK

SWITZERLAND,

SWEDEN,

A very powerful argument against open borders is
based on what is actually occurring in late 2015 and early
2016. Large numbers of immigrant men, mainly from Arab
countries have been molesting women, raping them, in
many of the European nations that have welcomed them. 18
Id. (explaining how those consideration apply to voting,
receiving welfare, etc., with a lag time of some 18-21 years).
16 David D. Friedman, Welfare and Immigration—The Other Half of
the Argument, DAVID D. FRIEDMAN’S HOME PAGE (April 1, 2006),
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Libertarian/Welfare_and_I
mmigration.html (making a valid point that immigration may
well help reduce or eliminate these burdensome and illicit
welfare programs).
17 See Hans Hermann-Hoppe & Walter Block, On Property and
Exploitation (2002).
18 Martin Armstrong, Germany’s Refugee Crisis is Starting to
Explode, LRC BLOG (Jan 11, 2016),
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2016/01/martin15
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This has been so serious a problem, and so widespread, that
there is even a new language to describe these acts of biting
the hand that feeds them: “rapefugees” and “Taharrush.” 19
This behavior is particularly despicable in that repays
benevolence with viciousness. In the view of many, this is
the Achilles Heel of libertarian open borders position. It
would be difficult to quarrel with this assessment, at least
in the view of most exponents of this opinion. However, this
armstrong/germanys-rapefugee-crisis/; Janosch Deckler,
‘Criminal’ migrants carried out Cologne assault Stolen mobile phones
found at refugee centers, POLITICO (Jan. 11, 2016 1:35 PM),
http://www.politico.eu/article/criminal-migrants-carried-outcologne-hauptbahnhof-sex-assault-refugees-asylium-migration;
Michael B. Doughtery, The Morally Repugnant Response To The
Cologne Sexual Assault Gang, THE WEEK (Jan.11 2016),
http://theweek.com/articles/598070/morally-repugnantresponse-cologne-sexual-assault-gang; Tyler Durden, Massive
Coverup Exposed In Sweden As Media, Cops Hid Migrant Sex
Attacks, ZERO HEDGE (Jan. 11, 2016),
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-01-11/massivecoverup-exposed-sweden-media-cops-hid-migrant-sex-attacks;
Nick Hallett, ‘Taharrush’: Authorities Fear Repeat of Cologne as
Middle East Rape Culture Imported to Europe, BREIBART BLOG (Jan.
10, 2016),
http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/01/10/germanauthorities-fear-repeat-of-cologne-as-taharrush-comes-toeurope/; Rex Murphy, Every major authority in Cologne — police,
officialdom, press — failed, NATIONAL POST (Jan. 9, 2016 4:49 PM),
http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/rex-murphyevery-major-authority-in-cologne-police-officialdom-pressfailed; Taki Theodoracopulos, Who Scares America More?, TAKI’S
MAG. (2016),
http://takimag.com/article/who_scares_america_more_taki/pr
int#axzz3wwItImKF.
19 “Gang-rape,” or “collective harassment” in Arabic. See Corey
Charlton, The Arabic gang-rape 'Taharrush' phenomenon which sees
women surrounded by groups of men in crowds and sexually
assaulted... and has now spread to Europe, MAILONLINE (Jan. 12,
2016), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3395390/TheArabic-gang-rape-Taharrush-phenomenon-sees-womensurrounded-groups-men-crowds-sexually-assaulted-spreadEurope.html.
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is a small segment of scholars who have contributed to that
literature whose perspectives are invulnerable to this
critique.
Before we make this defense, let us take a small
detour and discuss the distinction put forth by Kant (1785,
1930) between his categorical and hypothetical imperatives.
The former is articulated in the form of a command: Do this!
Don’t do that! Or, regarding our present concerns: Open the
border! Do not open the border! The latter takes on an ifthen format: If you want this, do that. If you want that, do
this. If you want to see large numbers of unskilled workers
unemployed, implement the minimum wage law. If you do
not want to see large numbers of unskilled workers
unemployed, eliminate the minimum wage law. 20
Most libertarian advocates of open borders take on
the categorical imperative: Open the borders! True,
advocates state that the following reasons for their position:
it is the moral policy to pursue, it does not harm domestic
workers, and that it promotes specialization, etc.
Nevertheless at the end of the day, their bottom line is a
categorical one: do not prohibit open and free immigration.
However, there are some libertarian advocates of free
unimpeded immigration who adopt the hypothetical
stance. This small subset of the open borders libertarians 21
do not say: open all borders, period. They assert, rather,
open all borders or homestead all land, all standing room,
all territory on which people might settle. 22 To put this in
Note, a scenario in which the minimum wage increases
employment and pay would be a logical contradiction; therefore,
we do not ask about it.
21 Block, Libertarian Case, supra note 5; Block, Immigration: A
Critique, supra note 5; Block, Rejoinder to Hoppe, supra note 5;
Block, Rejoinder to Todea, supra note 5; Block and Callahan, supra
note 5; Gregory and Block, supra note 5.
22 Walter Block & Peter Nelson, WATER CAPITALISM: THE CASE
FOR PRIVATIZING OCEANS, RIVERS, LAKES, AND AQUIFERS,
(Rowman & Littlefield eds., 2015) (including bodies of water
internal to the country).
20
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other words: all borders should be open (a categorical); if,
however, you are afraid of being inundated by people who
will molest women and engage in other untoward acts, then
privatize all land, every square inch of it. When you follow
this policy, free immigration will be converted into trespass
or forced integration, something that falls completely
outside of the bounds of libertarian law. With full private
property over every square inch of land, then and only then
would open immigration constitute trespass or forced
integration.
I do not say that the open border libertarians who
adopt the categorical imperative are refuted by the Cologne,
Germany argument. I only maintain they are vulnerable to
it. For example, they may assert that the obvious harms to
allowing “rapefugees” into their country is more than offset
by the positives; the humanitarian policy of rescuing
innocent people in danger of their lives, etc. Whether this
will suffice or not is beyond the scope of the present paper.
The only point I wish to make now is that the open borders
libertarians who adopt the Kantian hypothetical are
invulnerable to the Cologne counterexample. They can
properly defend their position by claiming that it is not their
fault that the “rapefugees” were allowed into Germany. The
government of Angela Merkel had a choice: either open the
borders or privatize fully. Had they adopted the latter
policy, there would not have been any “rapefugees”
allowed into their territory. But, they chose differently. The
responsibility thus lies with them, not with the open
borders libertarians. 23

D. THICK LIBERTARIANISM
In the view of some libertarian opponents of open
borders, this policy will lead away from libertarianism,
and/or make it more difficult to move in its direction in the

Not that the latter had any power to make any determination
at all in these decisions.
23
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first place. Mosquito (2016H) writes as follows on this
matter:
So what does culture have to do with
maintaining a libertarian order? This,
to me, is quite simple: the less conflict,
the less chance that some selfproclaimed
and
self-pitying
disadvantaged group will look to a
savior to deliver them from their
perceived suffering. The less conflict,
the less chance that people will look for
someone to do something about it. The
‘someone’ will ultimately be the
monopoly provider of fixing all things
for all people. And there goes the
libertarian order – or even the
possibility of moving closer to one. No
matter the pleasant thoughts of openborders libertarians, in this world we
have an open borders example turning
into a call for more state action….Ask
yourself: who is the ‘opposition’ in this
drama? Who is the ‘enemy’? Look in
the mirror. This is the fruit of ‘open
borders’ in this world. 24
Note that this is a thick libertarian 25 perspective. As
such it is incompatible with what I am trying to do in the

Mosquito, supra note 10 (doubles down on this perspective
with this statement: “I am not arguing libertarian theory; I am
suggesting that Block’s suggested path from here to there will move
society away from, and not toward, a libertarian world.”).
25 For advocates of thick libertarianism, See Nick Gillespie, ET
AL., The Declaration of Independents: How Libertarian Politics Can
Fix What’s Wrong With America. (Public Affairs 2011); Charles
Johnson, Libertarianism through Thick and Thin, RAD GEEK
PEOPLE’S DAILY (OCT. 3, 2008),
http://radgeek.com/gt/2008/10/03/libertarianism_through/;
24
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Charles Johnson, Libertarianism through Thick and Thin, RAD GEEK
PEOPLE’S DAILY (July 20, 2013),
http://radgeek.com/gt/2008/10/03/libertarianism_through/;
Roderick Long, The Plot Thickens,
AUSTRO-ATHENIAN EMPIRE BLOG (Nov. 3, 2007),
http://aaeblog.com/2007/11/03/the-plot-thickens/; Roderick
Long, Thickness Unto Death, AUSTRO-ATHENIAN EMPIRE BLOG
(July 10, 2008), http://aaeblog.com/2008/07/10/thickness-untodeath/; Roderick Long, Monster Thickburger Libertarianism,
AUSTRO-ATHENIAN EMPIRE BLOG (July 24, 2008),
http://aaeblog.com/2008/07/24/monster-thickburgerlibertarianism/; Bionic Mosquito, The Real Action is in the
Reaction of the Opposition, LRC BLOG (Jan. 11, 2016),
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2016/01/bionicmosquito/open-borders-saul-alinsky/; Cathy Reisenwitz, Thick
and thin libertarianism and Tom Woods, SEX & THE ST. (Dec. 23,
2013), http://cathyreisenwitz.com/blog/2013/12/23/thick-andthin-libertarianism-and-tom-woods/; Sheldon Richman, TGIF: In
Praise of ‘Thick’ Libertarianism, EXPLORE FREEDOM (Apr. 4, 2014),
http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/tgif-in-praise-of-thicklibertarianism/; Sheldon Richman, Libertarianism is more than just
rejecting force: the ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ of libertarian philosophy, HIT &
RUN (Apr. 6, 2014), http://reason.com/archives/2014/04/06/alibertarian-opposition-to-racism; Sheldon Richman, TGIF:
Libertarianism Rightly Conceived, EXPLORE FREEDOM (May 2, 2014),
http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/tgif-libertarianismrightly-conceived/; Sheldon Richman, What Social Animals Owe
Each Other, EXPLORE FREEDOM (July 1, 2014),
http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/what-social-animalsowe-each-other/; Jeffery Tucker, Against libertarian brutalism:
Will libertarianism be brutalist or humanitarian? Everyone needs to
decide, THE FREEMAN (March 12, 2014),
http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/against-libertarianbrutalism; Kevin Vallier, Political Libertarianism: Between Thick
and Thin, BLEEDING HEART LIBERTARIANS (May 7, 2014)
http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2014/05/politicallibertarianism-between-thick-and-thin; Kevin Vallier, Libertarian
Social Morality: Progressive, Conservative or Liberal?, BLEEDING
HEART LIBERTARIANS (February 22, 2013),
http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2013/02/libertariansocial-morality-progressive-conservative-or-liberal/; Matt
Zwolinski, Libertarianism: Thick and Thin, BLEEDING HEART
LIBERTARIANS (December 28, 2011),
http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2011/12/libertarianism-
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thick-and-thin/#more-1697. In contract, advocates for thin
libertarianism, See Logan Albright, What Libertarianism Is Not,
MISES INSTITUTE CANADA BLOG (Apr. 26, 2014)
http://mises.ca/posts/blog/what-libertarianism-is-not/; Walter
E. Block, Pure libertarianism, THE LIBERTY CRIER (May 17, 2014),
http://libertycrier.com/purelibertarianism/?utm_source=The+Liberty+Crier&utm_campaig
n=8cd483dafcThe_Liberty_Crier_5_19_2014&utm_medium=email&utm_term
=0_600843dec4-8cd483dafc-284768769; Walter Block, Was Murray
Rothbard a Thick Libertarian, ECON POL’Y J. (May 23, 2014),
http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2014/05/wasmurray-rothbard-thicklibertarian.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&
utm_campaign=Feed%3A+economicpolicyjournal%2FKpwH+%
28EconomicPolicyJournal.com%29; Walter Block, Was Murray
Rothbard a Thick Libertarian? Part II, ECON POL’Y J. (May 23, 2014),
http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2014/05/wasmurray-rothbard-thicklibertarian_23.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=em
ail&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+economicpolicyjournal%2FKpw
H+%28EconomicPolicyJournal.com%29; Christopher Cantwell,
Jeffrey Tucker Reduces Core Libertarian Ideals To ‘Brutalism,’
CHRISTOPHER CANTWELL: RADICAL AGENDA (March 12, 2014),
http://www.christophercantwell.com/2014/03/12/jeffreytuckers-case-libertarianism; David Gordon, What Is
Libertarianism?, LRC BLOG (August 29, 2011),
http://archive.lewrockwell.com/gordon/gordon90.1.html;
Jacob Hornberger, The Virtues of Libertarianism, HORNBERGER’S
BLOG (May 15, 2014),
http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/the-virtues-oflibertarianism/; Stephan N. Kinsella, Homesteading,
Abandonment, and Unowned Land in the Civil Law, MISES DAILY
ARTICLES (May 22, 2009),
http://blog.mises.org/10004/homesteading-abandonment-andunowned-land-in-the-civil-law/; Stephan N. Kinsella, What
Libertarianism Is, MISES DAILY ARTICLES (Aug. 21, 2009),
https://mises.org/library/what-libertarianism; Bionic
Mosquito, Sheldon Richman Takes Down Walter Block & Lew
Rockwell?, ECON POL’Y J. (May 3, 2014),
http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2014/05/sheldonrichman-takes-down-walterblock.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm
_campaign=Feed%3A+economicpolicyjournal%2FKpwH+%28Ec
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present paper: discern what is the proper libertarian
position on immigration. In very sharp contrast, this is not
an objection on that ground. That is, whether a policy will
promote liberty, somewhat shockingly, is entirely irrelevant
to the question of what is the proper libertarian analysis of
the issue. Instead, it raises an entirely different question:
what view of libertarianism, correct or incorrect, will best
promote libertarianism, a very distinct concern. To clarify
onomicPolicyJournal.com%29; Bionic Mosquito, On Thick, BIG
Libertarians, ECON POL’Y J. (Aug. 6, 2014),
http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2014/08/on-thickbiglibertarians.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email
&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+economicpolicyjournal%2FKpwH+
%28EconomicPolicyJournal.com%29; Lew Rockwell, The Current
Libertarian Infighting and the Future of Libertarianism, LRC BLOG
(May 1, 2014), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2014/05/lewrockwell/the-future-of-libertarianism/; Dan Sanchez, Sophistry
and the State: The Perils of Fuzzy (Thick) Thinking, LRC BLOG (May
10, 2014), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2014/05/dansanchez/the-perils-of-thick-thinking/; Neil J. Smith, Thick as a
brick, BEFORE IT’S NEWS (May 2, 2014),
http://beforeitsnews.com/alternative/2014/05/thick-as-abrick-2949630.html; Laurence M. Vance, I Am a Libertarian, LRC
BLOG (May 6, 2014),
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2014/05/laurence-m-vance/iam-a-libertarian/; Robert Wenzel, A Note on the Difference
Between Libertarians and Libwaps, ECON POL’Y J. (May 1, 2014),
http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2014/05/a-note-ondifferencebewteen.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&u
tm_campaign=Feed%3A+economicpolicyjournal%2FKpwH+%2
8EconomicPolicyJournal.com%29; Robert Wenzel, It's Here:
Libertarian-Socialism, ECON POL’Y J. (June 14, 2014),
http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2014/06/its-herelibertariansocialism.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&
utm_campaign=Feed%3A+economicpolicyjournal%2FKpwH+%
28EconomicPolicyJournal.com%29; Tom Woods, Thick and Thin
Libertarianism, and Duck Dynasty, THE TOM WOODS SHOW
(December 19, 2013), http://tomwoods.com/thick-and-thinlibertarianism-and-duck-dynasty/.
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this, consider some other cases. For example, the minimum
wage law prohibits consenting adults from negotiating a
wage contract below the level stipulated by this legislation.
As such, this is a per se violation of liberty, and thus
incompatible with libertarianism. But, suppose, just
suppose, that the best way to promote economic freedom
would be to support the minimum wage law. This might be
true if this enactment creates so much unemployment for
unskilled workers that a general revulsion leads to a
jettisoning of all sorts of economic interventionistic policies.
Then, by stipulation, the minimum wage law would
encourage the free enterprise system, paradoxical though
this might sound. A similar procedure is taking place in the
present debate over free and open immigration. Mosquito
is claiming that such a policy will lead to greater statism. It
might well do so, as far as I know. However, my concern
here is not with which is the most efficient efficacious way
to achieve liberty, or maintain it. It is, rather, with what
liberty consists of, an entirely different matter.
Here is another example. It is a paradigm
implication of libertarianism that all drugs should be
legalized. But, posit, that if so, then some famous person
will die from an overdose, and the electorate will become so
revulsed by economic freedom, that democratic
government will institute all sorts of horrid regulations.
Still, drug legalization is the libertarian position, even
though, under our present scenario, it will, paradoxically,
lead to less liberty.
We must stress that there is nothing at all wrong
with enquiring which policies lead to and away from
freedom. These are very valuable studies. One does not
become enmeshed into the wilds of thick libertarianism
until one conflates the two; equating policies the promote
liberty with the libertarian position. For example, consider
the totally made up scenario where murdering innocent
people will somehow bring liberty closer. It is still
incompatible with libertarianism, and punishable by
libertarian law, to do so. (Block, 2004, 2006).
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V. CONCLUSION
Libertarian open borders opponents emphasize the
importance of a shared culture (Mosquito, 2015E) in terms
of reducing intra-national hostilities. They are undoubtedly
correct; there is little doubt that homogeneous societies tend
to be more peaceful than heterogeneous ones. 26 This, of
course, mitigates against the open border position. To be
sure, some open border cases will fall victim to the Cologne,
Germany objection based on rape. But not all, if the benefits
of free immigration are ruled to outweigh this objection.
And all of the free immigration perspectives based on the
hypothetical imperative are immune to the charge that they
promote rape.

26 Craig Calcaterra, Majority of Baseball Brawls are between Players
of Different Ethnicities, NBC SPORTS (2015),
http://mlb.nbcsports.com/2015/09/30/majority-of-baseballbrawls-are-between-players-of-different-ethnicities/ (last visited
Nov. 19, 2016) (offering an example of this that might well be
unknown even to writers who maintain this stance in opposition
to immigration).

